Poona Labour Union v. State of Maharashtra, 1969

Citation	(1969)IILLJ291BOM
Court	Bombay High court
Decided on	2 December 1968
Petitioner	Poonam labour union
Respondent	State of Maharashtra

Introduction 

The case of Poona Labour Union vs. State of Maharashtra (1969) addresses a labor dispute where the Poona Labour Union petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the State to refer their industrial dispute to a tribunal. After failed negotiations with the Poona Municipal Transport service, the union and transport manager made a joint application under Section 10(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The key legal issue was whether the government was obligated to immediately refer the dispute upon receiving this application or had discretion to first verify the union’s majority status. The Bombay High Court held that the government must satisfy itself about the representative character of the applying parties and could conduct a verification inquiry following principles of natural justice. The Court discharged the petition after the State agreed to follow Rule 28A procedures, which allowed party representatives to be present during witness examinations.

Facts of the case 

– On February 25, 1965, the Poona Labour Union submitted a charter of demands on behalf of workmen employed by the Poona Municipal Transport service.

– The transport manager refused to negotiate these demands, prompting the union to serve a strike notice on June 2, 1965, under Section 22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

– The conciliation officer initiated proceedings, during which the transport manager claimed the dispute was already covered by a settlement with another union (Poona Municipal Transport Kamgar Sangh) that allegedly represented the majority of workmen.

– On July 7, 1965, the transport committee resolved to make a joint application with the Poona Labour Union to refer the disputes to an industrial tribunal, provided the union withdrew its strike notice.

– The union withdrew the strike notice, and on October 27, 1965, a joint application was made to the Deputy Commissioner of Labour under Section 10(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

– The Deputy Commissioner requested the union to produce membership registers and receipt counterfoils to verify their membership claims.

– The Deputy Commissioner later proposed to conduct a spot inquiry in Poona on January 7, 1966, to further verify the union’s membership claims.

– The union objected to this inquiry method, suggesting instead that the government should either accept their membership registers as correct or conduct a secret ballot to determine majority representation.

– When the government did not accede to these requests, the union filed a petition on April 23, 1966, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the referral of the dispute.

Arguments by the parties 

Arguments by the Petitioner (Poona Labour Union)

The Poona Labour Union contended that it was mandatory for the State Government to refer an industrial dispute to adjudication as soon as parties applied jointly or separately under Section 10(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. They argued that since the transport committee had resolved to make a joint application, and since about 950 out of 1,100 workmen were allegedly members of their union, the State Government was legally bound to refer the dispute to adjudication. The union maintained that the government’s refusal to do so was mala fide. They insisted that their membership registers should be accepted as correct without further verification, or alternatively, that a secret ballot should be conducted to ascertain majority representation. The union also objected to the proposed method of inquiry where workmen would be questioned individually without union representatives present, arguing this violated principles of natural justice.

Arguments by the Respondent (State of Maharashtra)

The State of Maharashtra argued that Section 10(2) imposed two distinct conditions for reference: first, an application made in the prescribed manner, and second, the government’s satisfaction that the applicants represented the majority of each party. They maintained that while the first condition was met, the second was not, as the government was still in the process of satisfying itself about the representative character of the union. The State contended that in the absence of specific statutory provisions governing such verification, it was entitled to adopt a reasonable procedure, such as the one prescribed by Rule 28A of the Bombay Industrial Relation Rules. The State further argued that the proposed spot-inquiry was consistent with established practice under the Code of Discipline for verification of union membership. They asserted that it was for the government to determine the appropriate procedure for verification, not for the petitioners to dictate terms by insisting on either immediate referral or a secret ballot.

Judgment of the case 

Justice Madon, delivering the judgment for the Bombay High Court, ruled that the State Government was not obligated to automatically refer the dispute for adjudication upon receiving a joint application under Section 10(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court held that the provision clearly established two conditions: first, an application made in the prescribed manner, and second, the government’s satisfaction that the applicants represented the majority of each party. While acknowledging that the first condition was met, the Court found that the second was not, as the government was still attempting to verify the union’s membership claims. The Court determined that in the absence of specific statutory provisions governing verification procedures, the government could adopt any reasonable method consistent with principles of natural justice, including the procedure under Rule 28A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Rules. However, the Court clarified that examining witnesses “in camera” did not mean excluding party representatives, but rather conducting examinations with only the witness and party representatives present. The petition was ultimately discharged after the State Government agreed to follow the Rule 28A procedure, which the Court deemed consonant with natural justice principles, with no order as to costs.