Mangharam J.B. And Co. vs. Kher K.B. And Ors.

Introduction 

In the case “Mangharam J.B. And Co. vs. Kher K.B. And Ors.”, a petition seeking a writ of quo warranto against K.B. Kher was submitted under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. Under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the petition contests Kher’s jurisdiction to serve as a tribunal, arguing that his appointment does not comply with the Act’s legal criteria.  In particular, it raises concerns about whether Kher has the qualifications required to chair an industrial tribunal under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 7(3) of the Act, as well as whether the relevant government had the authority to designate him without the High Court’s consent. The case raises important questions about the structure and operation of India’s industrial tribunals, which could have an impact on how industrial disputes are decided.

Facts of the case 

The following are the main facts of the case “Mangharam J.B. And Co. vs. Kher K.B. And Ors.”  

1. Parties Involved: 

Sri K.B. Kher, acting as a tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is the non-applicant, and Mangharam J.B. And Co. is the petitioner.  

2. Appointment of K.B. Kher: 

In accordance with Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Sri Kher was designated as “a permanent industrial tribunal” by the government on February 3, 1955.  Kher had the status of civil judge, first class, while serving in the Madhya Bharat Judicial Service at the time of his appointment.  But he has never held a position as a District Judge or a High Court Judge.

3. Dispute Reference: 

The government referred a dispute between the petitioner (the biscuit factory) and the J.B. Mangharam Biscuit Factory Labour Union to the tribunal on June 21, 1955, with the order published in the Gazette on June 30, 1955. A subsequent memorandum on August 1, 1955, amended the reference by adding additional points for adjudication.

4. Challenge to Appointment: 

The petitioner challenged Kher’s authority to function as a tribunal on the grounds that:

– Kher was not qualified under Clause (a) or (b) of Section 7(3) of the Act.

– If appointed under Clause (c), the government needed approval from the High Court, which was not obtained, rendering the appointment void.

– The appointment as a permanent tribunal contradicted the provisions of Section 10, which allowed for the appointment of ad hoc tribunals only in instances of existing or anticipated disputes.

5. Proceedings: 

Kher commenced adjudication proceedings on the referred disputes. The petitioner objected to his appointment and the validity of the proceedings, which Kher rejected.

Arguments by the parties 

The arguments presented by the parties in the case “Mangharam J.B. And Co. vs. Kher K.B. And Ors.” can be summarized as follows:

Arguments by the Petitioner (Mangharam J.B. And Co.):

1. Lack of Qualification: The petitioner contended that Sri K.B. Kher was not qualified to serve as the tribunal under Clause (a) or (b) of Section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Kher had never been a Judge of a High Court or a District Judge, as required by the Act.

2. Requirement of High Court Approval: The petitioner argued that if Kher’s appointment was based on Clause (c), the government needed to obtain the approval of the High Court prior to the appointment. Since this approval was not secured, Kher’s appointment was deemed void.

3. Improper Appointment as Permanent Tribunal: The petitioner also claimed that the government had no authority under the Act to appoint Kher as a permanent tribunal, and that Section 10 of the Act mandates the creation of ad hoc tribunals to address specific disputes.

4. Invalid Amendment: The petitioner challenged the government’s memorandum issued on August 1, 1955, which amended the initial reference made under Section 10, claiming it was done without jurisdiction.

Arguments by the Respondents (K.B. Kher and Others):

1. Qualification as a District Judge: The respondent argued that K.B. Kher was qualified to be appointed as a member of the tribunal within the meaning of Clause (b) of Section 7(3), asserting that the definition of a District Judge could include an Additional District Judge.

2. No Need for High Court Approval: The respondent’s counsel claimed that the approval of the High Court was not essential for Kher’s appointment under Clause (c) since the government had discretion in appointing tribunal members.

3. Validity of Permanent Structure: The respondent contended that establishing a permanent tribunal was valid for administrative purposes, and did not violate the provisions of the Act, as the government retained the authority to refer disputes to such a tribunal as they arose.

4. Amendment Authority: The respondents argued that the government had the authority under Section 10 to amend the references related to disputes, and such amendments did not contradict any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Judgment of the case 

In the judgment of the case “Mangharam J.B. And Co. vs. Kher K.B. And Ors.” dated March 15, 1956, the court concluded as follows:

1. Invalid Appointment of K.B. Kher: The court determined that Sri K.B. Kher was not qualified to be appointed as a member of the tribunal under Section 7(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act because he had never served as a District Judge, and the term “District Judge” did not include an Additional District Judge. Therefore, his appointment was void.

2. Mandatory High Court Approval: The court emphasized that, as per the proviso to Section 7(3), it was mandatory for the State to obtain the approval of the High Court for Kher’s appointment as a tribunal member under Clause (c). Since such approval was not obtained, the court held that Kher’s appointment was invalid.

3. Nullification of Proceedings: As a result of the invalidity of Kher’s appointment, the court declared that all proceedings conducted by him in relation to the industrial dispute between the petitioner and the labour union were also null and void.

4. Direction to Restrain K.B. Kher: The judgment issued a directive to Sri K.B. Kher to refrain from functioning as a tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, effectively quashing the proceedings that had been initiated under his authority regarding the industrial dispute.

5. No Costs: The court decided that in the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs regarding the petition.

In summary, the overall judgment established that Kher’s appointment to the tribunal was unlawful due to lack of qualifications and failure to obtain necessary approvals, leading to the invalidation of his proceedings. 

Opinion of the judges 

1. Interpretation of “District Judge”: One judge expressed clear disagreement with the interpretation that an Additional District Judge could be considered a District Judge under Section 7(3)(b). The opinion emphasized that the statutory wording was unambiguous, stating that “a District Judge” means exactly that and excludes Additional District Judges. The judge pointed out that relying on implications rather than explicit definitions could undermine the legislative intent.

2. Mandatory Nature of Provisions: The court unanimously held that the requirement for obtaining approval from the High Court before appointing a member under Clause (c) of Section 7(3) was mandatory, not directory. This reinforces the notion that procedural compliance is critical in ensuring that appointments maintain legitimacy and judicial integrity.

3. Judicial Experience and Standard: The judges acknowledged the importance of ensuring that individuals adjudicating industrial disputes possess the requisite qualifications and experience. They noted that the purpose of designating a District Judge as a tribunal member was to ensure that adjudications were conducted by someone with the appropriate judicial background. This viewpoint stresses the necessity of maintaining a standard of judicial competence in managing industrial relations.

4. Critique of Broader Interpretations: Some judges addressed critiques that equate the positions of a District Judge and an Additional District Judge, pointing out that allowing such an interpretation could set a dangerous precedent. This concern highlights the potential erosion of standards through broad interpretations based on practical convenience rather than strict adherence to the law.

5. Rejection of Inferences: The judges dismissed the argument that an implied approval from the High Court could validate Kher’s appointment based on prior actions or releases. They emphasized that explicit statutory requirements must be adhered to and cannot be supplanted by assumptions or inferred consent.

6. Concurring Opinions: While agreeing with the majority opinion, some judges noted that the lower number of District Judges could necessitate practical solutions, including the potential for using Clause (c) appropriately with prior approval from the High Court. However, they maintained that this did not justify bypassing the clear legislative directives.

In summary, the judges’ opinions collectively reinforced the principles of statutory adherence, the necessity of maintaining judicial standards with respect to appointments, and the mandatory nature of procedural requirements in the context of industrial dispute adjudications. Their careful scrutiny of the statutory language aimed at preserving the integrity of the judicial process in labor relations.