Case Commentary: K.V. Narayana v. K.V. Ranganathan AIR 1976
Background & Facts
Kota Venkatachala Pathy, the respondents in this, and Kota Narayanan, the litigant thus, were certifiable siblings, being the children of one Kota Rangaswami Chettiar. They made an exchanging family with their cousin Subramanyam Chettiar, the child of Kota Kuppuswami Chettiar and sibling of Kota Rangaswami Chettiar. Subramanyam Chettiar was the family’s chief and karta before 1927.
Following 1927, Kota Venkatachala Pathy expected control of the family and its assets. A recorded deed dated May 29, 1929 (Exh. A-1) parceled joint family possessions between Subramanyam Chettiar and Kota Venkatachala Pathy and his more youthful sibling, Kota Narayanan, from one perspective, and each branch getting a half bit on the other.
As the consolidated family’s karta. Subramanyam Chettiar had amassed obligations of Rs. 9,506/ – from an assortment of loan bosses preceding November 20, 1927. Five bits of joint family property, as expressed in Schedule D-1 to the deed of division, were assigned for the installment of the previously mentioned commitments and were moved to Kota Venkatachala Pathy, who was assigned as the borrower’s representative.
Kota Venkatachala Pathy released these commitments before March 26, 1934. On September 7, 1956, Kota Venkatachala Pathy documented suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Vellore, North Arcot, looking for parcel and separate ownership of 3/fourth of the properties recorded in Schedule ‘A’ to the plaint, 1/2 of the properties recorded in Schedule A-1 to the plaint, and the whole rundown of properties recorded in Schedule ‘B’ to the plaint.
One of the things, thing No. 1 of Schedule ‘B’ to the plaint, which comprises of four shops, is the thing that remains undisposed of from the properties referenced in Schedule ‘D-1’ to the deed of parcel that were saved to release the previously mentioned obligations caused by Subramanyam Chettiar preceding 1927.
Basis of the case
Also, Kota Venkatachala Pathy contended that since he had released the obligations indicated in Schedule ‘D’ to the deed of segment, he was qualified for the selective ownership of thing No. 1 of Schedule ‘B’ to the plaint as his self-obtained property in accordance with the particulars of the deed of segment, just as the rest of the properties indicated in said Schedule ‘B’ as he had bought something similar.
Kota Venkatachala Pathy asserted 3/fourth interest in the properties recorded in Schedule ‘A’ to the plaint because he was qualified for 1/fourth by birth as a coparcener and the rest of the half offer allocated to Subramanyam Chettiar because of his acquisition of the properties from closeout buyers.
Kota Venkatachala Pathy looked for bookkeeping alleviation because there was an oral division of status in 1938 and the appealing party has been overseeing the properties from that point forward, either as a co-proprietor or as a specialist.
The appealing party went against Kota Venkatachala Pathy’s case for an extra offer, contending that the last was simply qualified for a half part in all the suit properties. As indicated by the appealing party, Kota Venkatachala Pathy released the family obligations determined in Schedule ‘D’ to the previously mentioned deed of segment not just through the offer of the properties indicated in Schedule ‘D-1’ to the deed of parcel, yet in addition through the considerable usage of other joint family properties accessible for division.
Furthermore, the litigant fought that since Kota Venkatachala Pathy filled in as Karta of his branch, the previously mentioned deed of segment ought to be deciphered as implying that any thing rescued or saved after the release of the previously mentioned family obligations would be familial property and not the offended party’s select property.
Notwithstanding the properties recorded in Exhibit ‘B’ of the plaint, the litigant contended that they were to be divided down the middle among him and Kota Venkatachala Pathy on the grounds that they were procured with joint family funds.
As to help for interpretation of records, the litigant fought that he turned into the Karta of the joint family in 1947 and that Kota Venkatachala Pathy was not qualified for the alleviation until the date of the suit, when there was a division of status, not in 1938, as Kota Venkatachala Pathy guaranteed.
On the side of the allure, Kota Venkatachala Pathy’s learned direction has unyieldingly contended that the properties recorded in Schedule D-1 to the deed of parcel were not planned by the gatherings thereto to be given to him as his different properties, yet were rather given to him for a particular reason, to be specific, to release the family obligations; that the tribal properties couldn’t be considered to be his different properties; and that the hereditary properties couldn’t be considered to be his different properties Kota Venkatachala Pathy has additionally contended that, regardless, D-1 Schedule properties have lost their differentiation as autonomous properties because of their reconciliation with joint family resources by Kota Venkatachala Pathy.
At long last, he has contended that the bookkeeping directions gave by the High Court can’t be maintained since they are not unambiguous nor very much upheld by proof.
The Court also stated that “Endless supply of the obligations portrayed in the ‘D’ Schedule, the obligations payable to pariahs by Subramanyam Chetti among us for the sum acquired for leading the privately-run company preceding 20-11-27, and individual No. 2 for releasing the advances, Venkatachala Pathy will partake in the properties portrayed in Schedule D-1 completely.
Inside one month of the date of enrollment of this record, Venkatachalapathi Chetti, the individual No. 2, will either release the obligations owed to the lenders or get receipts from the banks expressing that Subramanyam Chetti isn’t responsible for the previously mentioned advances and convey those receipts to Subramanyam Chetti.
On the off chance that this isn’t done and a misfortune is caused by Subramanyam Chetti because of loan bosses, Venkatachalapathi Chetti would be considered answerable for the harms brought about by the organization. It is the aim of the court that the aforementioned Venkatachalapathi Chetti by and by claim the D-1 Schedule properties that were given to him in lieu of releasing the previously mentioned obligations, whether or not those properties have been acclimated to the previously mentioned obligations, or regardless of whether there is an equilibrium or a shortfall remaining.”
Kota Venkatachala Pathy’s individual rights to the properties recorded in Schedule D-1 to the deed of division were not deserted, and we can’t decide if he wanted to do as such in the current case. Regardless of the way that these properties were not independently recorded in Kota Venkatachala Pathy’s record books, and that no different record of the pay from these properties was kept by him, the way that these properties were not recorded in his record books doesn’t deny them of their status as self-possessed properties.
Thus, we are of the assessment that Kota Venkatachala Pathy didn’t join the properties, in spite of what the appealing party claims.
The basic reality that a bit of the joint family cash was used to take care of the commitments recorded in the Schedule to the deed of division doesn’t matter to the result of the case.
As per the High Court, if any cash from the joint family funds was utilized to take care of the exceptional obligations owed to outside leasers, the lawful delegates of Kota Venkatachala Pathy would be answerable for such obligations, as the court called attention to.