1.      Section 124— “Contract” of indemnity defined

1. Definition and Scope:

• Section 124 of the Indian Contract Act defines indemnity narrowly, covering losses caused by the conduct of the promisor or another person.
• English law uses “indemnity” more broadly, including protection from losses due to accidents, events, or liabilities incurred at the promisor’s request.
• Contracts of insurance are classic examples of indemnity contracts.

2. Express and Implied Indemnities:

• The Indian Contract Act primarily addresses express indemnity agreements.
• A duty to indemnify can be implied by law in certain cases, such as when someone settles another’s liability (Section 69).

3. Liability of the Indemnifier:

• The Indian Contract Act does not specify when the indemnifier’s liability begins.
• Traditionally, English Common Law required the indemnified to incur actual loss.
• Under modern equitable principles, indemnity means to prevent loss, not just to reimburse for payments made.

4. Case Laws:

• Bombay High Court Ruling:
  • The indemnity holder can claim indemnity before incurring actual damage if an absolute liability has arisen.
  • The court held that the law of indemnity in India is not exhaustive.
• Osman Jamal & Sons Ltd v Gopal Purshottam:
  • The plaintiff company was allowed to recover a loss from the defendant even before it had paid the vendor.
  • Reinforced that actual payment is not a condition to claim indemnity.
• Subsequent Bombay High Court Case:
  • When indemnity is agreed, the indemnity holder can call on the indemnifier as soon as the loss becomes imminent.
  • The indemnified does not have to wait until they suffer the loss.
• Re Richardson, Ex parte the Governors of St. Thomas’s Hospital:
  • Buckley LJ clarified that indemnity can prevent the indemnified from ever having to pay, not just reimburse after payment.

2.     Section 125—Rights of indemnity holder when sued

1. Essential Condition for Indemnity Holder’s Rights:

• The indemnity holder must act within the scope of authority granted by the promisor.
• Sub-section (1): The suit must pertain to matters covered by the indemnity promise.
• Sub-sections (2) & (3): The indemnity holder must either be:
  • Authorized by the promisor.
  • Acting without violating the promisor’s orders.
  • Acting as a prudent person in the absence of specific orders or authority.

2. Recovery of Damages and Costs:

• The indemnity holder is entitled to recover damages and costs only when acting within the scope of authority.
• They can claim all damages and costs incurred from the promisor for actions related to the indemnity.

3. Right to Sue for Specific Performance:

• Even before damage is incurred, the indemnity holder can sue for specific performance of the indemnity contract if:
  • An absolute liability has been incurred.
  • The liability is covered by the indemnity contract.

4. Non-exhaustive Nature of Rights:

• Section 125 does not list all rights available to an indemnity holder; additional rights may exist under other legal provisions.
• Scholarship Bond: A scholar who fails to return to India after studies under a government bond would be required to indemnify the government for breach of contract.

5. Sub-section 1:

• If a contract of indemnity leads to litigation and a verdict is given, the judgment is conclusive for the indemnifier, even if the indemnifier was not a party to the litigation.
• This rule has been upheld by Indian courts.

6. Sub-section 2:

• Costs reasonably incurred in defending, resisting, or settling claims covered by the indemnity contract are recoverable.
• The costs must be those that a prudent person would have incurred.

7. Sub-section 3:

• If the indemnity covers a specific claim, and the indemnified party is sued, they can notify the indemnifier to defend.
• If the indemnifier refuses, the indemnified can settle the claim on reasonable terms and then seek recovery from the indemnifier.

8. Cause of Action and Limitation:

• Two possible causes of action:
  • The indemnity holder can demand the promisor pay the amount directly to the third party.
  • Alternatively, the indemnity holder can wait until they suffer loss (i.e., pay the claim) and then seek recovery.
• The period of limitation is three years under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, starting from the date of payment.

9. Rights of the Promisor:

• The Act does not explicitly deal with the rights of the promisor.
• However, English law provides certain rights for the promisor, similar to those of a surety under Section 141 of the Indian Contract Act.

3.     Section 126— “CONTRACT of guarantee,” “surety,” “Principal debtor,” and “creditor.”

1. Essence of a Contract of Guarantee:

• A contract of guarantee involves three parties: principal debtor, creditor, and surety.
• The surety’s obligation is contingent on the default of the principal debtor.
• If someone promises to be primarily and independently liable, it is not a guarantee but may be an indemnity (as per Section 126 and Section 141).
• Example: If A enters into a contract with B and C, without communicating with B, promises to indemnify A against any loss due to B’s default, C would not be considered a surety for B nor would C have any right of action against B in the event of B’s default.

2. Consideration in a Contract of Guarantee:

• A contract of guarantee is void without consideration.
• Consideration can be a past or future benefit given to the principal debtor (Section 127).
• It is important to note that a contract of guarantee can be present in multiple documents.
• Case Example: In England, a guarantee falls under the Statute of Frauds, requiring a “memorandum or note” as per Section 4 of the statute, whereas in India, a guarantee may be either oral or written under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act.

3. Distinction Between Guarantee and Indemnity:

• Determining whether a contract is one of guarantee or indemnity is a matter of interpretation in each case. A guarantee involves three parties (debtor, creditor, and surety), while indemnity generally involves two parties (the indemnifier and the indemnified).
• Case Example: If C promises to indemnify A for losses caused by B, but there is no direct communication between C and B, it would be an indemnity, not a guarantee.

4. Legal Characteristics of a Guarantee:

• Performance of Promise: The guarantee is based on the surety performing the promise of the principal debtor or discharging the liability of the principal debtor.
• Misrepresentation or Concealment: A guarantee becomes invalid if obtained through:
  • Misrepresentation by the creditor (Section 142).
  • Silence on material facts by the creditor, leading the surety to misunderstand essential details of the contract (Section 143).

5. Liability of the Surety:

• The surety’s liability is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor (Section 128).
• This means that the surety is responsible for the same amount and in the same manner as the principal debtor.

6. Rights of the Surety:

• The surety has the right to be indemnified by the principal debtor after fulfilling the obligation (Section 145).
• The surety is also entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the creditor, meaning the surety can step into the shoes of the creditor and exercise the creditor’s rights after making the payment (Sections 140, 141).

7. Discharge of the Surety:

• The surety is discharged from liability under the following conditions:
  • Release of the principal debtor by the creditor.
  • Any act or omission of the creditor that discharges the principal debtor, such as altering the contract without the surety’s consent (Sections 134, 135, 139).

8. Revocation of Guarantee:

• The surety can revoke the guarantee by:
  • Giving notice to the creditor (Section 130).
  • The death of the surety automatically revokes the guarantee for future transactions (Section 131).
  • Any variation of the original contract to the detriment of the surety results in revocation (Sections 133, 135).

9. Co-sureties:

• Co-sureties are equally liable to contribute toward the discharge of the debt inter se (among themselves) (Sections 146, 147).

10. Discharge of Liability:

• The term “liability” under this section refers to a legally enforceable liability. If no such liability exists, there is no contract of guarantee.
• The surety is not liable for a debt that has become time-barred under the law of limitation.

11. Illustration on non-guarantee:

• If a person signs under a certificate of solvency in an auction list without guaranteeing the bidder’s performance, this would not constitute a contract of guarantee (Excise Department auction sale).

12. Limitation of a Guarantee:

• A contract of guarantee is void if the liability is unenforceable at law, such as debts barred by limitation laws.

4.     127—Consideration for guarantee

1. General Principle of Consideration:

• The principle of consideration in the context of a guarantee refers to the legal detriment incurred by the promisee (creditor) at the promisor’s (surety’s) request, even if the promisor does not directly benefit from the contract. Section 127 specifies that even past consideration may suffice for a contract of guarantee.
• In Sornating v Pachai Naickan, (1915) 38 Mad 680, the Madras High Court reaffirmed that the consideration must provide a benefit to the creditor or a detriment to the surety, aligning with the core contractual principles.

2. Failure of Consideration:

• A guarantee may be invalidated if there is a total failure of consideration. If the agreed consideration is not provided or fails to materialize, the surety may seek discharge from liability.
• In Cooper v Joel, (1859) 1 DF & J 240, the court held that a guarantee for a payment could be cancelled when the creditor failed to perform their promise of postponing the sale, which was the basis for the guarantee. The surety successfully argued that the consideration had failed, leading to the cancellation of the guarantee.

3. Lack of Consideration from Principal Debtor:

• If the creditor does not incur any detriment or provide any benefit to the principal debtor, the contract of guarantee may be deemed void. Consideration must be provided to the principal debtor, not merely to secure the lender’s interests.
• Case Example: In Nanak Ram v Mehin Lal, (1877) 1 All 487, the creditor failed to provide any consideration to the principal debtor when the surety signed the bond after the money was already advanced. The court found that this amounted to lack of consideration, rendering the surety’s bond unenforceable.

4. Surety After Loan Has Been Granted:

• If a surety promises to guarantee a debt after the loan has been granted and no new consideration is provided, the contract is invalid.
• Case Example: In Varghese v Abraham, AIR 1952 Tra Coch 202 (DB), the Travancore-Cochin High Court held that a surety bond signed after the loan had already been advanced lacked valid consideration. As the benefit had already been conferred to the principal debtor, the surety’s promise was deemed unenforceable.

5. Timing and Sufficiency of Consideration:

• The consideration for a contract of guarantee does not necessarily need to be chronologically aligned with the principal contract. If the transactions (e.g., a sale and a guarantee) form part of a single overall transaction, a later execution of the surety agreement may still be valid.
• Case Example: In Thornton v Jenkyns, (1840) 1 Man & G 166, the court found that if a sale and a subsequent guarantee are considered part of a single transaction, the guarantee can still be enforceable, even if signed later than the principal agreement.

6. No Detriment to the Creditor:

• A guarantee without consideration to the creditor is void. For instance, if a surety promises to pay a debt but the creditor suffers no detriment or incurs no liability, there is no valid consideration to support the contract.
• Case Example: In Varghese v Abraham, AIR 1952 Tra Coch 202 (DB), it was held that after the debt had been contracted, a surety who promises to ensure the debtors will discharge their obligation is not liable, as there was no detriment to the creditor or a benefit provided to the debtor.

7. Subsequent Guarantees for Existing Debts:

• Where a subsequent guarantee is provided for an already existing debt, it may be held invalid unless there is additional consideration to support the surety’s obligation.
• Case Example: In Muthukaruppa v Kathappudyan, (1914) 27 Mad LJ 249, the Madras High Court held that a guarantee provided after the creation of a debt, without fresh consideration, is not valid, reinforcing the necessity of valid consideration.

8. Consideration for Post-Lease Suretyship:

• A person who becomes a surety for the payment of rent after the execution of a lease may still be bound by the guarantee if it forms part of the original transaction and consideration is deemed to have been provided.
• Case Example: In Ghulam Husain v Faiyaz Ali, (1940) 15 Luck 656: AIR 1940 Oudh 346, the court held that the surety’s promise, though made after the lease agreement, was valid as it was part of the broader transaction related to the lease and payments.

9. Release of Surety upon Failure of Consideration:

• If the suretyship is based on a specific condition or promise from the creditor (e.g., withdrawing a prosecution) and that promise fails, the surety may be released from liability.
• In Ilet Ram v Devi Prasad, a surety promised to guarantee a debt contingent on the creditor withdrawing a criminal prosecution. When the court refused to sanction the withdrawal because the offense was not compoundable, the surety was released, as the consideration failed.

5.     Section 128—Surety’s liability

1. Proof of Surety’s Liability

• Surety’s liability must be established in the same manner as that of the principal debtor.
• A judgment or award against the principal debtor is inadmissible against the surety without a special agreement allowing it (Central Bank of India v C.L. Vimla, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 393).
• The principle is a re-enactment of Common Law (Hajarimal v Krishnarav, (1881) 5 Bom 647, 650).

2. Madras Agriculturists’ Relief Act

• A non-agriculturist surety is liable only for the scaled-down debt when the principal debt of an agriculturist is reduced under the Madras Agriculturists’ Relief Act.
• This was distinguished from cases where the discharge of the principal debtor in bankruptcy did not affect sureties (Subramania v Narayanaswami, AIR 1951 Mad 48 (FB); Narayan Singh v Chhatar Singh, AIR 1973 Raj 347).

3. Liability for Whole or Part of Debt

• A surety can limit their guarantee to a fixed sum.
• If the debt exceeds that sum, the surety guarantees the whole debt but limits liability to the fixed sum.
• For floating balances or future debts, the presumption is that the surety guarantees only part of the debt, not the whole (Ellis v Emanuel, (1876) 1 Ex Div 157).
• Liability depends on the terms of the contract (Subhankhan v Lalkhan, (1947) Nag 643 : AIR 1951 Nag 123).
• The surety does not have rights of subrogation until the entire fixed sum is paid (SN Prasad v Monnet Finance Ltd, (2011) 1 SCC 320).

4. Co-extensive Liability

• The surety is jointly and severally liable with the principal debtor unless the contract states otherwise.
• The liability is co-extensive, meaning the surety is liable to the same extent as the principal debtor (Suresh Narain v Akhauri, AIR 1957 Pat 256).
• The Supreme Court in Bank of Bihar v Damodar Prasad, (1969) 1 SCR 620 : AIR 1969 SC 297 ruled that the surety’s liability is immediate and cannot be deferred until the creditor exhausts remedies against the principal debtor.
• If the principal debt is illegal or unenforceable (e.g., under the Moneylenders Act), neither the principal debtor nor the surety is liable (Swan v Bank of Scotland, 1836; AV Varadarajulu Naidu v KV Thavasi Nadar, AIR 1963 Mad 413).

5. Effect of Creditor’s Omission

• The surety’s liability is not affected by the creditor’s omission to sue the principal debtor.
• The creditor is not required to exhaust remedies against the principal debtor before suing the surety (Bank of Bihar v Damodar Prasad, (1969) 1 SCR 620 : AIR 1969 SC 297).
• A surety cannot restrain the creditor from proceeding against them until remedies against the principal debtor are exhausted (Ram Kishan v State of UP, (2012) 11 SCC 511).
• If the principal debtor is released without the creditor reserving rights against the guarantor, the surety is also released (Cutler v McPhail, (1962) 2 QB 292).

6. Impact of Statutory Reduction or Extinguishment

• If the principal debtor’s liability is reduced by statute, the surety’s liability is proportionately reduced (Narayan Singh v Chhatar Singh, AIR 1973 Raj 347).
• This applies to laws like the Agriculturist Debtors Relief Act, where debt scaling benefits the debtor and indirectly reduce the surety’s liability.
• The surety can claim reimbursement from the debtor after paying the creditor (Mahant Singh v U Ba Yi, 66 IA 198 : 41 Bom LR 742).

7. Surety’s Liability Where Original Contract is Void or Voidable

• A surety remains liable even if the principal debtor’s contract is voidable and avoided by the debtor.
• If the original contract is void, as in cases involving minors, the surety is treated as the principal debtor (Kashiba v Shripat, 1894).
• The contract of the surety is seen as a principal contract in such cases.

8. Limitation

• Payment of interest by a debtor before the limitation period does not reset the limitation period for a surety under the Limitation Act, 1908 (Gopal Daji v Gopal Bin Sonu, (1903) 28 Bom 248).
• A surety is not bound by acknowledgments made by the debtor unless expressly agreed in the contract, such as in a continuing guarantee with a bank (Popular Bank Ltd v United Coir Factories, ILR).

 

6.     Section 129— “Continuing guarantee”

1. Definition

• A continuing guarantee is a type of guarantee that extends to a series of transactions, rather than a single transaction. This implies an ongoing obligation of the guarantor for future liabilities of the principal debtor.

2. Nature of Consideration:

• The consideration for a guarantee may be either:
• Entire Consideration: This is indivisible and relates to a single transaction. It does not extend to future transactions.
• Fragmentary Consideration: This is divisible and can be supplied over time, allowing the guarantee to cover multiple transactions.

3. Revocation:

• In the case of a continuing guarantee, the guarantor may revoke the guarantee after providing notice to the creditor. The guarantor is liable for all transactions that occur before the notice of revocation.

4. Intention of the Parties:
   • The classification of a guarantee as continuing or not depends on the intention of the parties, as reflected in the language of the guarantee. This intention is assessed by examining the context in which the agreement was made.

5. Example of a Continuing Guarantee:

• Durga Priya Chowdhury v. Durga Pada Roy (1928): A guaranteed obligation for the collection and payment of rents by a third party (C) is a continuing guarantee, as it covers future collections (see illustration (a)).

6. Case of Fragmentary Consideration:

• Wood v. Priestner (1867): A guarantee to a tea dealer for supplies made to a third party (C) up to £100 is a continuing guarantee. The guarantor is liable for the value of supplies made before revocation, but not after (see illustration (b)).

7. Non-Continuing Guarantee:

• Kay v. Groves (1829): A guarantee for five sacks of flour delivered and paid for does not extend to future deliveries. The guarantee is specific and does not cover the subsequent delivery for which payment was not made (see illustration (c)).

8. Indivisible Guarantees:

• Guarantees related to specific performance under a lease for rent payments are considered indivisible, as the guarantee pertains to a definite engagement (Husan Ali v. Waliullah, AIR 1930 All 730).

9. Appointment Guarantees:

• Sen v. Bank of Bengal (1920): A guarantee for the faithful discharge of duties by a bank employee is considered a single transaction and not a continuing guarantee, as it does not involve a series of transactions.

10. Installment Payments:

• Bhagwandas v. Secretary of State (1926): A guarantee for the payment of a fixed sum by instalments is not a continuing guarantee but pertains to a definite loan engagement.

11. Continuing Suretyship:

• Lala Bansidhar v. Govt of Bengal (1872): The surety remains liable under old bonds when new bonds are executed without cancellation, indicating a continuing guarantee exists across multiple bonds.

7.     Section 130—Revocation of continuing guarantee

1. Definition and General Principle

• A continuing guarantee can be revoked by the surety at any time regarding future transactions by providing notice to the creditor. This means that the guarantor’s liability for future obligations can cease upon proper notification.

2. Revocation Mechanisms: A continuing guarantee may be revoked in the following ways:
   • By notice to the creditor (as per Section 130).
   • By the death of the surety (Section 131).
   • By variance in the terms of the contract between debtor and creditor (Section 133).

3. Scope of Future Transactions:

• The term “future transactions” implies that the operation of this section is limited to situations where distinct and separate transactions are anticipated. In cases involving entire consideration, the guarantee remains binding as long as the relationship is ongoing.
• Thus, the surety cannot unilaterally terminate the guarantee through notice, nor is the estate of the surety relieved from liability upon death, unless the transaction specifies otherwise.

4. Case Laws:
   • In the case of Lloyd’s v. Harper (1880), a father guaranteed all engagements of his son as a member of Lloyd’s. After the father’s death, the question arose whether the guarantee ended with his death. The court held that the guarantee remained effective, and the father’s estate was liable for the son’s engagements, indicating that guarantees could survive the death of the surety when related to ongoing obligations.
   • Phillips v. Foxall (1872) illustrates that a material change in circumstances, such as proven dishonesty of a servant, can justify the surety’s revocation of the guarantee. This case established that a surety could withdraw from liability if the circumstances of the guarantee changed significantly.
   • The provision does not apply to guarantees concerning a court-appointed receiver, as per Mahomed Ali v. Howeson Bros. (1925) and Bai Somi v. Chokshi Ishwardas (1894), indicating that court-related guarantees have different considerations.

5. Notice Requirements:

• A clear, specific notice of revocation is required. In Bhikabhai v. Bai Bhuri, it was determined that a prior denial of liability in a different suit does not suffice as a notice of revocation under Section 130. The law mandates explicit communication to terminate a guarantee effectively.

6. Contracting Out:

• Parties can contract out of the right of the surety to revoke under this section. In Sita Ram Gupta v. Punjab National Bank (2008), the guarantee included terms that it was “continuing” and “irrevocable.” The court held that such wording effectively contracted out of the provisions allowing revocation. This case highlights the enforceability of contractual terms that negate statutory rights.

7. Legal Interpretation:

The dichotomy between the ability to contract out and the non-derogable nature of certain provisions has been addressed in All India Power Engineer Federation v. Sasan Power Ltd. (2017). The Supreme Court emphasized that provisions in the Contract Act should not be inconsistent with statutory mandates, signaling a need for clarity in future judgments regarding contracting out of statutory rights.

8.     Section 131—Revocation of continuing guarantee by surety’s death

1. Revocation of Guarantee Upon Death of Surety

• Principle: The death of a surety generally results in the revocation of a continuing guarantee concerning future transactions. This operates under the presumption that there is no contract stipulating otherwise.
• Legal Framework: This principle is codified in the relevant legal provisions, which state that the surety’s death automatically terminates their obligation for any future guarantees unless an express contract exists that dictates otherwise.

2. Contract to the Contrary

• Definition: A “contract to the contrary” refers to any express terms within the guarantee agreement that allow for its continuance despite the death of the surety.
• Implications: If such a contract exists, mere notice of the surety’s death will not suffice to revoke the guarantee. This requires a more formal action as dictated by the terms of the contract.

3. Case Law

• Coulthart v. Clementson (1879): This case establishes that if a guarantee can be revoked by notice, the death of the surety, without prior revocation, acts as a revocation upon notifying the creditor. This case underpins the common law approach that emphasizes the significance of notice in the context of suretyship.
• Durga Priya Chowdhury v. Durga Pada Roy (1928): This case further clarifies that the death of the surety operates as a revocation in absence of any contrary agreement. It reinforces the idea that without explicit terms allowing for continuation, death revokes the guarantee for future obligations.
• Re Silvestor (1895): This case illustrates an example of a situation where a specific provision allowing the guarantor or their representatives to terminate the guarantee by notice is considered a contract to the contrary. The ruling emphasizes the necessity of adhering to the express terms of the agreement in determining the revocation of the guarantee.

In the absence of an express contract allowing continuation post-death, the death of a surety revokes their obligations for future transactions. The principles established in key case law highlight the importance of the contract terms and the requirement for notice in the context of guarantees. The nuances of these legal interpretations are critical for creditors and guarantors to understand their rights and obligations under such agreements.

5. Practical Implications

• Creditors should review the terms of guarantees to identify any provisions that may alter the general rule regarding revocation upon the surety’s death.
• Guarantors and their legal representatives must ensure clear communication and documentation regarding the intention to revoke guarantees, particularly in light of death, to avoid unintended liability.

9.     Section 132—Liability of two persons, primarily liable, not affected by arrangement between them that one shall be surety on other’s default

1. Primary Liability: When two persons enter into a contract with a third party (the creditor), both are jointly and severally liable for the obligation. This means each debtor can be held responsible for the entire debt.
2. Internal Agreements: If the two debtors have an internal agreement whereby one is to act as a surety for the other, this arrangement does not alter their obligations to the creditor. The creditor’s rights remain intact regardless of the internal agreement between the debtors.
3. Creditor’s Awareness: The creditor’s knowledge of the internal surety arrangement does not negate the primary liability of the debtors. In the provided illustration, when A and B jointly execute a promissory note to C, and A is merely acting as B’s surety (with C’s knowledge), C can still enforce the note against A.
4. Rights of Surety: A surety (the person who agrees to pay the debt if the primary debtor defaults) retains specific rights under the law. These rights include:

1. • Indemnification Rights: The surety can seek reimbursement from the primary debtor for any amounts paid to the creditor.
   • Subrogation Rights: After paying the debt, the surety can assume the creditor’s rights against the primary debtor.

5. Prejudice to Surety: After a creditor becomes aware of the surety arrangement, they must not take actions that prejudice the surety’s rights in relation to the primary debtor. This includes situations where a partner in a partnership agrees to indemnify an outgoing partner after one partner retires.
6. Limitations: The provisions related to joint debtors and surety arrangements do not apply if the liability in question is not identical. For instance, a party who accepts bills of exchange as an accommodation (i.e., without receiving value) is not precluded from claiming that they acted solely as an accommodation acceptor, as referenced in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, sections 37 and 38.
7. Relevant Case Law

• Oakeley v Pasheller (1836): This case emphasizes that an internal arrangement between joint debtors does not impact the creditor’s ability to pursue either debtor for the full amount owed, irrespective of any surety agreements they may have made.
• Overend, Gurney & Co v Oriental Financial Corp (1874): In this case, the House of Lords confirmed that once a creditor is aware of a surety arrangement, they must act in a manner that does not undermine the surety’s interests, particularly in situations involving the liability of co-debtors.
• Rouse v Bradford Banking Co (1894): The principle articulated here reinforces the obligation of creditors to respect the rights of sureties, further establishing the framework within which the law operates concerning joint debts and surety relationships.

8.     Section 133—Discharge of surety by variance in terms of contract

1. Introduction:

Section 133 of the Indian Contract Act provides that any variance made in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor, without the consent of the surety, discharges the surety from liability regarding future transactions. This principle is rooted in the protection of the surety’s interests, ensuring they are not bound to changes that could affect the risk they undertook without their consent.

2. General Rule:

• The principle of discharge by variance in the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor is long-established. In Bonar v. Macdonald (1850), it was held that any alteration in the agreement to which the surety has consented, if made without the surety’s knowledge, discharges the surety.
• Even if the contract is still substantially performed, if there is a change that could potentially prejudice the surety, they are discharged from further National Bank of New Zealand (1883), the Judicial Committee emphasized that a long line of decisions had affirmed that a surety is discharged if the creditor alters the terms of the contract with the principal debtor or a co-surety without the surety’s consent.

3. Case laws:

• In MS Anirudham v. Thomcos Bank Ltd. (1963), a surety handed a letter of guarantee to the principal debtor for Rs. 25,000. However, the creditor reduced the amount to Rs. 20,000, and the debtor altered the figure accordingly. The court held that the surety, having left the letter with the debtor, was estopped from contesting the alteration, especially since it was to the surety’s benefit .
• In Amin Abdv. Jivraj Otmal Ratnagiri Bhagidari (1972), a surety bond for Rs. 25,000 was executed under Section 145 of the Civil Procedure Code. A subsequent consent decree reduced the amount to Rs. 22,717.12. The surety claimed a material variation and sought to disclaim liability. The court ruled that the compromise decree did not prejudice the surety, as the liability had been reduced, and thus, the surety could not plead variation to his detriment.
• In Uttam Chand Saligram v. Jewa Mamooji (Court held that a contract of resale by a seller to a buyer did not discharge the surety from their original obligations since both contracts were intended to coexist.
• Similarly, in Uderam v. Shivbhajan (1920), it was hat changes in subsidiary terms of the contract did not absolve the surety of liability for the primary terms they had guaranteed.

4. Surety’s Right to Discharge Despite Waivers:

• Even if a surety ertain rights in the contract, such waivers do not automatically mean the surety consents to all future variations. In Chitguppi & Co. v. Vinayak Kashinath (1921), it was held that a general waiver of rights does not imply consent to all variations of the contract, and any substantial variation without the surety’s explicit consent can still discharge the surety .

• For instance, in Khatun Bibi v. Abdullah (1880), the surety was dischargetor’s rent rate was increased without the surety’s consent, as this constituted a material alteration to the contract.

5. Substantial Variations:

• Courts have consistently held that if a substantial variation is made ict without the surety’s consent, the surety is discharged regardless of whether they suffer actual prejudice. This was reaffirmed in Pratapsingh v. Keshavlal (1935), where the Privy Council stated that a surety is released if the contract they guaranteed is altered, even if there is no demonstrable prejudice.

• A leading example of this principle is seen in Pratapsingh v. Keshavlal (1935), where the court held that the surety cannot be held liable for obligations different from those they originally guaranteed.

9.     Section 134— Discharge of surety by release or discharge of principal debtor

1. Introduction

• Section 134 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 deals with the discharge of a surety in cases where the principal debtor is released by the creditor. This section forms a significant part of the law of suretyship, providing that any contract or act that results in the release of the principal debtor also discharges the surety from liability.
• The section outlines two key scenarios:
• Release by Contract: If the principal debtor is released through any agreement between the creditor and the debtor.
• Release by Act or Omission: If the creditor’s actions or omissions lead to the discharge of the principal debtor.

2. Creditor’s Discharge of Principal Debtor

• The legal principle established under Section 134 is well-settled: when a creditor releases the principal debtor through a contractual arrangement, or through an act or omission that leads to the debtor’s discharge, the surety is discharged as well. This is because the surety’s obligation is contingent on the continued existence of the principal debtor’s liability.
• In Cragoe v Jones ((1873) LR 8 Ex 81, 82) where a creditor, without the consent of the surety, extinguished the debt by his own act, the surety was discharged from liability. The case demonstrated the importance of preserving the surety’s rights, including the right of indemnity against the principal debtor, which would otherwise be destroyed if the debtor is released.
• However, it is notable that if the creditor reserves their right to sue the surety, the surety is not discharged. This principle was upheld in Ram Ranjan v Chief Administrator (AIR 1960 Cal 416), where the court recognized that the surety’s liability remains intact if the creditor expressly reserves remedies against the surety.

3. Full Release of Principal Debtor by Novation

• Where the principal debtor is fully released through novation or otherwise, the surety is discharged as the underlying debt is extinguished. As held in Commercial Bank of Tasmania v Jones ((1893) AC 313, 316), acceptance of a new debtor in place of the original one ends the surety’s liability for the old debt, since there is no longer an enforceable obligation against the original debtor.
• In cases where the principal debtor cannot be served or traced, as in Nathabhai v Ranchhodlal (16 Bom LR 696), the court held that striking off the name of the principal debtor under Order IX, Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code does not amount to a discharge of the surety. Hence, the creditor was entitled to pursue the surety alone.

4. Acts or Omissions of the Creditor

• The creditor’s acts or omissions that discharge the principal debtor (such as those mentioned in Sections 39, 53, 54, 55, 63, and 67 of the Indian Contract Act) result in the discharge of the surety.
• The key is that these acts must have the legal effect of discharging the principal debtor. For example, a waiver or alteration of the debtor’s obligations without the surety’s consent would lead to the surety’s discharge, unless remedies are specifically reserved.

5. Creditor’s Omission to Sue the Principal Debtor within Limitation Period

• The question of whether the surety is discharged if the creditor allows the remedy against the principal debtor to become time-barred has been subject to varied judicial interpretations. Most High Courts, including those in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, have held that the surety is not discharged in such circumstances.
• The Madras High Court in Subramania v Gopala ((1909) 33 Mad 308) drew a distinction between barring a remedy by limitation and the extinguishment of the debt itself, holding that mere omission to sue within the limitation period does not discharge the surety.
• The Supreme Court, in Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd v State of Bombay (AIR 1958 SC 328), also held that a creditor could still recover from the surety even if the claim against the principal debtor was time-barred.
• However, a contrary view was expressed in Syndicate Bank v Channaveerappa Beleri ((2006) 11 SCC 506), where the Supreme Court ruled that the creditor could not pursue the surety if the debt was time-barred against the principal debtor. This decision was not in alignment with the earlier ruling in Bombay Dyeing, leading to a divergence in legal opinion. It is argued that the decision in Bombay Dyeing remains the binding precedent.

 

4.     Section 135—Discharge of surety when creditor compounds with, gives time to, or agrees not to sue, principal debtor

1. Introduction

• Section 135 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 deals with situations where a creditor, without the consent of the surety, enters into a contract with the principal debtor by which the creditor either makes a composition, agrees to give time, or promises not to sue the debtor.
• Such actions discharge the surety unless the surety has expressly agreed to the arrangement. The purpose of this provision is to safeguard the surety’s right to seek immediate recourse against the principal debtor.
• This section is grounded in the fundamental principle that a surety has a vested interest in the actions between the creditor and the principal debtor, and any alteration in this relationship that prejudices the surety’s right without their consent leads to the surety’s discharge.

2. Contract to Give Time to Principal Debtor

• A creditor’s agreement to give time to the principal debtor has the effect of suspending the surety’s liability.
• The earliest judicial interpretation of this principle came from Rees v Berrington ((1795) 2 Ves Jr 540), where Lord Loughborough emphasized the equity of not altering a debtor-creditor relationship without consulting the surety.
• It was held that since the surety has a concern in the transaction, the creditor cannot alter the original terms without the surety’s assent.
• In Kali Prasanna v Ambica Charan ((1872) 9 BLR 261), it was further clarified that when a contract is formed to give time to the principal debtor, the creditor cannot sue the debtor until the time expires, thus affecting the surety’s right to insist that immediate action be taken against the debtor.
• The distinction between a contract to give time and a promise not to sue is critical. In the former, the creditor’s remedy is merely postponed, while in the latter, the debtor is fully released from liability, and under Protab Chunder v Gour Chunder ((1878) 4 Cal 132), the court highlighted that this discharge of the principal debtor entitles the surety to discharge under Section 134 of the Act.
• However, not all cases of giving time amount to a discharge of the surety. In Amritlal v State Bank of Travancore (AIR 1968 SC 1432), the Supreme Court held that a bank’s act of allowing the debtor more time to make up a shortage in pledged goods did not qualify as “giving time” within the meaning of Section 135. The court explained that the mere request for the debtor to address a deficit does not prevent the creditor from exercising their rights against the debtor immediately, thus not discharging the surety.

3. Composition with the Principal Debtor

• A composition refers to an agreement between the creditor and the debtor whereby the creditor agrees to accept less than the full amount owed or agrees to new terms for repayment. Under Section 135, if such an arrangement is made without the surety’s consent, it discharges the surety from liability.
• In National Coal Co v Kshitish Bose & Co (AIR 1926 Cal 818), a creditor accepted a reduced sum from the principal debtor through a consent decree without the surety’s consent. The court held that this amounted to a composition, thereby discharging the surety from any further obligation.
• Similarly, in Mahomedalli Ibrahimji v Lakshmibai Anant Palande (AIR 1930 Bom 122), the Bombay High Court emphasized that any composition that alters the creditor-debtor relationship, without the surety’s knowledge or assent, results in the discharge of the surety. The rationale is that the surety should not be bound by a reduced liability or altered repayment terms that the creditor has agreed to without their participation.

4. Agreement Not to Sue the Principal Debtor

• An agreement by the creditor not to sue the principal debtor effectively releases the debtor from liability and, consequently, discharges the surety. This is distinct from merely giving time, as it is a complete relinquishment of the creditor’s right to enforce the debt.
• In Bondru v Dagadu (45 Bom LR 438), the creditor entered into an arrangement to not sue the debtor for a specified period. The court ruled that the surety was discharged, as the surety has the right to demand that the creditor take immediate action against the debtor once the debt becomes due.
• A similar ruling was seen in Kali Prasanna v Ambica Charan ((1872) 9 BLR 261), where the court confirmed that the acceptance of interest in advance from the debtor amounted to a tacit agreement to give time, thus discharging the surety. This case highlights that even implied or tacit contracts fall within the purview of Section 135.

5. 5. Effect of Implied Contracts

• It is important to note that contracts under Section 135 need not always be express. Courts have ruled that implied agreements, inferred from the conduct of the parties, are equally binding and can result in the discharge of the surety. For instance, if a creditor accepts interest in advance, it is generally regarded as an implied agreement to give time to the debtor, as seen in Greenwood v Francis ((1899) 1 QB 312).

6. Surety’s Assent to the Contract

• The provisions of Section 135 can be overridden if the surety gives their assent to the creditor’s actions. The surety’s assent can be provided either before or after the contract is made. In Krishnaswami v Travancore National Bank (AIR 1940 Mad 437), it was held that a contract which explicitly reserves the creditor’s right to deal with the principal debtor without discharging the surety is valid if the surety has consented to it. Such provisions often include clauses where the surety is treated as the principal debtor for certain purposes, effectively barring the surety from claiming discharge.
• In Hari Prasad v Chandrajirao (AIR 1962 MP 69), the Madhya Pradesh High Court affirmed that once the surety has given consent to an arrangement between the creditor and the debtor, they cannot later claim discharge on the grounds of composition, giving time, or forbearance by the creditor.

5.     Section 136—Surety not discharged when agreement made with third person to give time to principal debtor

1. General Rule:

Under Section 135 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a surety is discharged from liability if the creditor enters into a binding contract with the principal debtor to either give more time for the debt repayment, compounds the debt, or agrees not to sue the principal debtor without the surety’s consent. This rule emphasizes the surety’s right to have the debt repaid immediately after it is due, unless explicitly agreed otherwise.

2. Exception: Contract with a Third Party

• However, the surety is not discharged if the creditor contracts with a third party (and not directly with the principal debtor) to give time to the principal debtor. In this case, since the principal debtor cannot enforce the agreement made with the third party, the surety remains liable under the original terms of the contract. The surety’s liability is only affected when the creditor enters into a contract directly with the principal debtor, which varies the terms of the original contract, potentially releasing the surety.
• Example: Consider a situation where C, the creditor, holds an overdue bill of exchange drawn by A as surety for B, who is the principal debtor. If C makes a contract with B to give time to B, this would alter the original contract for which A stood surety, and as a result, A would be discharged from liability.
• However, if C instead contracts with a third person, say M, to give time to B, this contract is unenforceable by B, and therefore A, the surety, is not discharged. The contract with M does not affect B’s liability under the original contract with C, meaning the surety’s obligations remain intact.

3. Case Law:

• In Frazer v Jordan, (8 E. & B. 303), the English courts clarified that for a surety to be discharged, the creditor must enter into a binding contract with the principal debtor to give time. If the contract to extend time is made with a third party, such as in this case, it does not discharge the surety. In the case, the creditor, instead of contracting with the debtor, contracted with a third party to give time to the principal debtor. The court ruled that such a contract does not affect the surety’s liability.
• This principle was reiterated in Clarke v Birley, (1889) 41 Ch D 422, where North J stated that two essential conditions must be met for a surety to be discharged:
• There must be a binding contract to give time.
• The contract must be made with the principal debtor, not a third party.
• The court clarified that a mere agreement with a third party, without the debtor’s participation, would not suffice to discharge the surety from their obligation.

4. Additional Security and Surety’s Liability:

• If the creditor merely takes additional security without altering the terms of the original contract with the principal debtor, the surety is not discharged.
• This was upheld in N. Firm v Mahomed Hussain, (1934) 57 Mad 398, where the court found that the surety remains liable if no contract to extend time is made directly with the principal debtor, even if additional securities are taken from a third party.

6.     Section 137—Creditors forbearance to sue does not discharge surety

1. General Rule

• Under Section 137, mere forbearance by the creditor to sue the principal debtor or to enforce any other remedy against him does not discharge the surety from his liability. In simple terms, if the creditor chooses not to immediately take legal action against the principal debtor or delays such action, this alone does not absolve the surety unless the guarantee contains specific terms to the contrary.
• The section highlights that there needs to be a positive agreement between the creditor and the principal debtor that expressly promises not to sue or delay proceedings. Only such a positive agreement can discharge the surety, not mere neglect or failure to act on the creditor’s part.

2. Distinction between Section 135 and Section 137:

• Section 135 deals with situations where the creditor enters into a binding contract with the principal debtor to either not sue, give time, or compound the debt, which results in the discharge of the surety.
• Section 137, on the other hand, clarifies that mere inaction or forbearance by the creditor—without any formal contract or promise—will not discharge the surety. The creditor’s failure to sue within the period allowed for legal action, or choosing to delay enforcement, is not enough to relieve the surety of liability.

3. Illustration:

• If a creditor fails to sue the principal debtor within the period of limitation, it does not automatically discharge the surety. The legislature intended to differentiate between a creditor’s decision to refrain from taking legal action and a formal contract not to sue. The Illustration to this section deals with situations where the creditor fails to sue before the period of limitation expires, and such failure does not discharge the surety.
• For example, if A is the surety for B, and C, the creditor, neglects to sue B for a debt even though the period of limitation has not yet expired, A (the surety) remains liable. However, if C and B enter into a formal contract to not sue or extend time, A may be discharged under Section 135.

4. Case Law:

• Oriental Financial Corp v Overend Gurney & Co (1871) LR 7 Ch 142: In this case, Lord Hatherley made it clear that mere neglect on the part of the creditor to sue or enforce remedies does not discharge the surety. This decision reinforces the principle that inaction alone does not affect the surety’s liability.
• Sankaranarayana v Kottayam Bank, AIR 1950 Tra-Coch 66: The court in this case upheld the view that the surety is not discharged merely because the creditor abstains from suing or delays taking legal action. There must be an affirmative agreement for non-suit or a formal arrangement for extending time with the principal debtor for the surety to be discharged.

7.     Section 138—Release of one co-surety does not discharge others

1. Introduction:

Section 138 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, addresses the release of one co-surety by the creditor and its effect on the liability of the other co-sureties. The section ensures that the discharge of one surety does not affect the liability of the remaining co-sureties or the released surety’s responsibility to the others.

2. Key Principles and Explanation:

• Non-Discharge of Other Sureties: When the creditor releases one surety, the release does not discharge the other co-sureties from their obligations. This provision ensures that the creditor’s rights against the remaining sureties remain intact. The creditor can still claim the unpaid debt from the remaining co-sureties.
• Responsibility of Released Surety: The surety who is released by the creditor continues to bear responsibility toward the remaining co-sureties. This means that if the remaining sureties pay off the debt, they can claim contribution from the released surety for their respective shares of the liability.
• Applicability to Both Joint and Several Co-Sureties: Section 138 applies to co-sureties, whether they are bound jointly or severally. The section extends the common law principle, which typically applies only to co-sureties contracting severally. In the Indian context, the law ensures that even joint sureties are placed on the same footing as co-sureties, meaning the release of one does not discharge the others.

3. Relationship with Section 44:

• Section 44 of the Indian Contract Act provides that a discharge of one of several joint debtors does not discharge the others. Section 138 mirrors this principle for co-sureties. It makes sure that releasing one surety does not extinguish the liability of others who have guaranteed the same debt. The principle behind this is to maintain fairness and prevent the creditor from losing their right to recover the debt from the remaining sureties.

4. Practical Implications:

• Creditor Protection: This section provides significant protection to creditors by ensuring that their rights against remaining sureties are not affected by the release of one co-surety. The creditor can still enforce the suretyship contract against those who have not been released.
• Fairness Among Sureties: The section promotes fairness among co-sureties by ensuring that the released surety remains responsible for contributing his share to the remaining co-sureties if they are required to fulfill the debt. This prevents any one surety from bearing an undue burden.
• Risk for Sureties: Co-sureties must be cautious while entering into surety agreements, as they remain liable for the entire debt even if the creditor releases one of them. This underlines the importance of carefully negotiating the terms of any release with both the creditor and the other co-sureties to avoid unexpected liabilities.

8.     Section 139—Discharge of surety by creditor’s act or omission impairing surety’s eventual remedy

1. Key Principle: Acts or Omissions Impairing Surety’s Remedy

• Under Section 139, a surety is discharged if:
• The creditor commits any act that is inconsistent with the surety’s rights.
• The creditor omits to perform any duty towards the surety.

If such acts or omissions impair the surety’s eventual remedy against the principal debtor, the surety is released from liability. This principle upholds the surety’s right to ensure that the arrangement between the creditor and the debtor does not impose additional burdens on the surety without their consent.

2. Tendency to Impair Surety’s Remedy

• The focus is on whether the creditor’s actions diminish the surety’s remedy or increase the surety’s liability. Actions that allow the principal debtor to default or jeopardize the surety’s right to recover from the debtor are particularly relevant.
• Lord Langdale in Calvert v London Dock Co (2 Keen 638, p 644) emphasized that the surety is the proper judge of whether any action beneficial to them can be forced upon them without consent. The surety must have the benefit of all securities held by the creditor. Therefore, any action by the creditor that reduces this security discharges the surety.

3. Examples of Acts or Omissions Leading to Discharge

• Failure to Perform Duties Specified in Contracts:
  In Chandrasekhara Pai v Town Co-op Bank, AIR 1965 Mys 209, the Mysore High Court discharged the surety because the bank directors failed to scrutinize cash balances and appoint a treasurer as required by the bye-laws. This failure impaired the surety’s remedy.
• Compromise with the Principal Debtor:
  If the creditor compromises with the principal debtor without the surety’s consent, the surety is discharged. The rationale is that no alternative arrangement can be forced upon the surety, as explained in Calvert v London Dock Co.
• Failure to Execute Decrees on Time:
  In Hazari v Chunni Lal, 8 All 260, the surety was discharged because the creditor failed to execute the decree obtained against the principal debtor within the prescribed time, resulting in the decree becoming time-barred. This impaired the surety’s remedy.
• Continuing Employment After Proven Dishonesty:
  In Phillips v Foxall, LR 7 QB 666, it was held that if an employer continues to employ a servant after a proven act of dishonesty, the surety for the servant’s performance is discharged. Similarly, in Radha Kanta v United Bank of India, AIR 1955 Cal 217: (1956) ILR 2 Cal 329, the court held that continuing the employment of a dishonest employee discharged the surety.
• Passive Acquiescence in Irregularities:
  Mere passive acquiescence by the creditor in the irregularities committed by the principal debtor, such as laxity in account-keeping, does not automatically discharge the surety. In Mayor of Durham v Fowler, (1889) 22 QBD 394, the court held that passive acquiescence alone is insufficient to discharge the surety unless it directly impairs the surety’s remedy.

4. Distinction between Discharge under Section 134 and Section 139

• While Section 134 deals with acts or omissions of the creditor that result in the legal discharge of the principal debtor, Section 139 applies even when the principal debtor remains liable, but the surety’s remedy against the debtor is impaired. This can occur when the creditor’s actions make it more difficult for the surety to recover from the debtor.
• For example, in Pogose v The Bank of Bengal (1877) 3 Cal 174 and Ghuznavi v National Bank of India (1916) 20 Cal WN 562, the creditor’s acts that impaired the surety’s remedy, even though the principal debtor was not discharged, were sufficient to release the surety from liability.

5. Special Provisions for Negotiable Instruments

• Section 39 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, provides a similar rule for endorsers. If the holder of a negotiable instrument, without the endorser’s consent, impairs the endorser’s remedy against a prior party, the endorser is discharged from liability as if the instrument had been paid at maturity.
• This principle mirrors the rules under Section 139 of the Indian Contract Act, ensuring that the rights of the surety or endorser are preserved.

9.     Section 140—Rights of surety, on payment or performance

1. Introduction:

• Section 140 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, outlines the rights of a surety once they have fulfilled their obligation, either by paying the guaranteed debt or performing the guaranteed duty.
• Upon such payment or performance, the surety is invested with all the rights that the creditor had against the principal debtor.
• This provision ensures that the surety is not left disadvantaged after fulfilling their obligations.

2. Subrogation: The Core Right of a Surety

• When a surety pays the guaranteed debt or performs the duty, they step into the shoes of the creditor. This principle is known as subrogation. The surety is entitled to all the rights the creditor had against the principal debtor, including any security that the creditor held.
• This provision helps protect the surety’s financial interests, allowing them to recover from the principal debtor the amount paid or the performance rendered.
• As highlighted by Mellish LJ in Gray v Seckham (1872) LR 7 Ch 680, a surety who pays a portion of the debt is entitled to stand in the shoes of the creditor for that portion of the debt. The reasoning is that for the surety, the part they paid represents their whole obligation, and they are entitled to the creditor’s rights concerning that portion.

3. Two Categories of Sureties

• Surety for a Part of the Debt:
  When the surety is liable for only a part of the debt, upon payment of that part, the surety is entitled to the rights of the creditor for the portion discharged. For example, in Gray v Seckham, it was held that a surety who pays only a fraction of the debt is still entitled to subrogation for that specific amount. As far as the surety is concerned, the fraction they paid is their whole obligation, and they are entitled to recover that from the debtor.
• Surety with Limited Liability for the Entire Debt:
  When a surety is liable for the entire debt but with a capped liability (i.e., limited to a specific amount), they are not entitled to subrogation until the creditor has been fully paid. In such cases, the surety cannot claim the rights of the creditor until the creditor has received full payment. This distinction was clarified in Re, Sass (1896) 2 QB 12, where it was held that a surety who has limited liability for the entire debt does not become a creditor of the principal debtor until the full debt has been discharged.

4. Analogy to Endorsers of Bills of Exchange

• The principle of subrogation applies not only to sureties but also to parties in similar positions, such as the indorser of a bill of exchange. Although an indorser is primarily liable as a principal on the bill, they are entitled to subrogation rights similar to those of a surety once they pay the holder of the bill.
• In Duncan Fox & Co v North and South Wales Bank (1880) 6 App Cas 1, the court held that after notice of dishonor, the indorser is entitled to all the benefits of payments made by the acceptor, just as a surety is entitled to the creditor’s rights after fulfilling their obligations.

5. Application of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

• The principle of subrogation for indorsers is further reflected in Section 114 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which states that a person who pays a bill of exchange for the honor of any party liable upon it is entitled to recover from that party as if they were a surety.
• This demonstrates the broad applicability of the subrogation principle across different areas of law.

6. Judicial Interpretation of Surety’s Rights Upon Payment

• Partial Payment and Right to Dividend:
  If a surety pays only a part of the debt, they are entitled to a proportionate share of any dividend paid by the debtor in respect of the amount they discharged. In Bhushayya v Suryanarayana, AIR 1944 Mad 195, the court held that the surety, having paid part of the debt, was entitled to stand in the creditor’s position concerning that part. As far as the surety is concerned, the fraction they paid is the whole obligation they took on.
• No Right of Subrogation Until Full Payment:
  In Darbari Lal v Mahbub Ali Mian (1927) 49 All 640: AIR 1927 All 538, the Allahabad High Court emphasized that a surety who is liable for the entire debt but with a capped liability has no right of subrogation until the creditor is fully paid. The surety becomes only a creditor of the principal debtor for the amount they have paid, but subrogation rights are not fully available until the full debt is cleared.

10.   Section 141—Surety’s right to benefit of creditor’s securities

1. Introduction

• Section 141 establishes that a surety is entitled to any security that the creditor holds against the principal debtor at the time the suretyship contract is made.
• This entitlement exists irrespective of the surety’s awareness of the security.
• If the creditor loses or relinquishes that security without the surety’s consent, the surety is discharged to the extent of the security’s value.

2. Key Principles

• Entitlement to Securities:

• • The surety has a right to all securities held by the creditor at the time of entering into the suretyship, whether or not the surety is aware of them. This principle is emphasized in Amritlal v. State Bank of Travancore (AIR 1968 SC 1432), where the Supreme Court clarified that the right is limited to securities known at the time of contract formation, distinguishing it from English law, which permits claims on securities created even after the surety agreement.

• Loss of Security:

• • If a creditor loses or parts with the security without the surety’s consent, the surety is discharged to the extent of the lost security’s value. This was illustrated in State Bank of Saurashtra v. Chitranjan (AIR 1980 SC 1528), where it was held that the surety was discharged due to the creditor’s negligence in losing pledged goods.

• Nature of Security:

• • The term “security” is interpreted broadly, encompassing any rights the creditor holds against the property at the time of the contract, as indicated in Amritlal v. State Bank of Travancore. This means it includes rights arising from set-offs against the creditor if they arise from the same transaction.

• Creditor’s Responsibility:

• • The creditor must maintain the securities and cannot relinquish them without the surety’s consent. The Supreme Court in State of MP v. Kaluram (AIR 1968 SC 1432) highlighted that a surety is discharged when the creditor, through negligence, allows the principal debtor to possess the secured property without payment.

3. Conditions for Discharge

• Deliberate Actions by the Creditor: The discharge applies when the creditor has intentionally lost or parted with the security. Conversely, if the loss is due to unforeseen circumstances beyond the creditor’s control, the surety may not be discharged (referenced in Industrial Finance Corp of India Ltd v. Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd (AIR 2002 SC 1841)).
• Extent of Discharge: The discharge is proportional to the value of the lost security, as outlined in the principles of Goverdhandas v. Bank of Bengal (1890) 15 Bom 48, which emphasized that the surety’s claim arises only when the creditor’s claim against the securities is satisfied.

4. Timing of Entitlement

• The Act does not specify the precise moment when a surety can claim the benefit of the securities. The Supreme Court in Goverdhandas v. Bank of Bengal ruled that a surety is not entitled to benefit from the creditor’s securities until the entire debt is paid off.
• The court argued that allowing a surety to claim a portion of the security before the full debt is settled would undermine the creditor’s security position.

11.   Section 142—Guarantee obtained by misrepresentation, invalid

1. Introduction

• A guarantee is a contractual obligation where one party (the guarantor) agrees to fulfill the obligations of another party (the principal debtor) if that party defaults. Under the Indian Contract Act, a guarantee is invalid if obtained through misrepresentation by the creditor.
• This principle aims to protect parties from entering into agreements based on false representations.

2. Key Principles

• Invalidity Due to Misrepresentation:

• • A guarantee obtained through misrepresentation made by the creditor is deemed invalid. Misrepresentation refers to a false statement or misleading conduct regarding a material part of the transaction. It encompasses both active misrepresentation (false statements) and passive misrepresentation (withholding information). The key aspect is that the misrepresentation must pertain to a material part of the transaction, impacting the guarantor’s decision to enter into the guarantee.

• Creditor’s Knowledge and Assent:

• • If the creditor knowingly allows a misrepresentation to persist, the guarantee remains invalid. This principle ensures that creditors cannot benefit from their own wrongful actions. The law holds creditors accountable for any misleading information they provide or condone, as emphasized in case law.

12.   Section 143—Guarantee obtained by concealment, invalid

1. Definition and Validity of Guarantee

• According to Section 143 of the Indian Contract Act, any guarantee obtained by the creditor through concealment of material circumstances is deemed invalid. This means that if a creditor knowingly withholds critical information that affects the surety’s decision to enter into the guarantee, the guarantee cannot be enforced.

2. Legal Principles

• The principle established in Davies v. London and Provincial Marine Insurance Co. (1878) articulates that while a contract of suretyship does not universally mandate disclosure, the surety is entitled to sufficient knowledge about the transaction for which they are providing a guarantee. The absence of such information may lead to the discharge of the surety’s obligations. This principle underlines that misrepresentation or concealment by the creditor can invalidate the guarantee.

3. Misrepresentation and Its Impact

• The English law on suretyship recognizes two forms of misrepresentation that can impact the validity of a guarantee:
• Active Misrepresentation: Where the creditor makes false statements that mislead the surety about material facts.
• Silence Amounting to Misrepresentation: This refers to situations where the creditor fails to disclose pertinent information, which can be viewed as misleading under specific circumstances.

A crucial case in this context is Lee v. Jones (1863), where the court held that if the creditor’s statements, while technically true, are misleading in the context of the surety’s existing liabilities, it constitutes material misrepresentation.

4. Requirements to Invalidate a Guarantee

To successfully argue that a guarantee is invalidated under Section 143, the following must be established:

• Silence on Material Circumstances: The creditor must have remained silent regarding information that a reasonable person would consider significant in the decision-making process of the surety.
• Obtaining Guarantee by Means of Silence: It must be demonstrated that the guarantee was procured as a result of this concealment. This requirement emphasizes that mere silence is insufficient; it must be shown that the concealment was intentional.

5. Interpretation of “Keeping Silence”

• The expression “keeping silence” was explored in Balkrishna v. Bank of Bengal (1891), where Sargent CJ noted that this phrase implies intentional concealment, distinct from mere non-disclosure.
• In situations of insurance policies, non-disclosure can be fatal; however, in the context of guarantees, intentional concealment is pivotal. This aligns with the decision in North British Insurance Co v. Lloyd (10 Ex 523), which asserted that fraudulent withholding of material circumstances is a critical element in invalidating guarantees.

7. Scope of the Sections

• This section specifically address acts or omissions by the creditor. If the misrepresentation or concealment arises from the actions of the debtor, these sections do not apply. This delineation is crucial for ensuring that the burden of disclosure rests with the creditor, thereby protecting the interests of the surety.

13.   Section 144—Guarantee on contract that creditor shall not act on it until co-surety joins

1. Definition and Validity of Guarantee with Co-Surety Condition

• The principle established in the Indian Contract Act stipulates that if a guarantee is provided on the condition that the creditor will not act upon it until another person joins as a co-surety, the guarantee becomes invalid if the co-surety does not join.
• This legal doctrine underscores the importance of the intended joint obligation among sureties and the reliance of each surety on the commitment of the others.

2. Legal Principles

• A guarantee provided under the understanding that another individual will also act as a co-surety creates an equitable expectation. In such cases, the initial surety has the right to relief if the co-surety fails to join, as established in the case Evans v. Bremridge (1856).
• This case illustrates that when one party enters into a guarantee based on the assurance that another party will also be bound, the absence of the co-surety invalidates the obligation of the initial surety.

3. Right of Relief for the Surety

• The surety who provides a guarantee contingent on the co-surety’s involvement possesses a right in equity to be relieved from their obligation. The rationale behind this principle is that the surety’s acceptance of risk is inherently linked to the expectation of shared liability.
• As articulated in Evans v. Bremridge, if the intended co-surety does not execute the instrument, the original surety is justified in seeking relief from the obligation due to the non-fulfillment of a foundational condition of the agreement.

4. Conditions for Validity

• For a guarantee conditioned upon the joining of a co-surety to remain valid, the following elements must be satisfied:
• Joint Commitment: The guarantee must explicitly state that the creditor cannot enforce it until the co-surety’s agreement is obtained.
• Execution of the Agreement: If the co-surety does not execute the agreement, the guarantee is rendered invalid, reflecting the principle that the surety’s obligation is dependent on the joint action of both parties.

5. Implications of non-execution

• In circumstances where a surety has entered into the obligation under the assumption that another party would also join, the failure of that co-surety to sign creates a legal void.
• The primary surety’s reliance on the co-surety’s participation is central to the enforceability of the guarantee. Should this condition not be met, the original surety is not only justified in seeking relief but is also protected by equitable principles that prevent unjust enrichment of the creditor.

6. Case Law

• Evans v. Bremridge (1856): This case established the foundational principle that a guarantee contingent upon the joining of a co-surety is invalid if that co-surety does not join. The decision emphasizes the equitable right of the surety to be relieved from their obligations due to the non-execution of the guarantee by the intended co-surety.

14.   Section 145—Implied promise to indemnify surety

1. Overview of Indemnity in Guarantee

• In every contract of guarantee, there exists an implied promise from the principal debtor to indemnify the surety.
• This principle establishes that the surety is entitled to recover any sum rightfully paid under the guarantee.
• However, the surety cannot claim for any sums paid wrongfully.

2. Surety’s Right to Indemnity

The right of indemnity for a surety becomes absolute as soon as the obligation to pay is established. This principle is supported by English authorities, which recognize that:

• Bechervaise v. Lewis (1872): The court affirmed that a surety has an equitable right to be exonerated by the principal debtor as soon as the obligation to pay becomes absolute.
• Ascherson v. Tredegar Dry Dock Co. (1909): This case reiterated that a surety can compel the principal debtor to fulfill their obligations, provided an ascertainable debt is due. The right to seek indemnity is not confined to instances where the creditor refuses to sue the principal debtor.

3. Conditions for Claiming Indemnity

The surety’s claim for indemnity is limited to the amount rightfully paid in discharge of the obligation. The following key points outline the conditions under which a surety can claim indemnity:

• Proportionality of Payment: A surety cannot claim an amount exceeding what was actually paid. If a surety discharges an obligation for a lesser sum than the total debt, they cannot treat themselves as a creditor for the entire amount. Instead, they can only claim the actual amount paid to discharge the obligation.
• Rightful Payments: In Raghavendra v. Mahipat (1925), it was held that if sureties to a money bond acknowledged their liability before the claim against the principal debtor became time-barred and one of the sureties subsequently paid the decretal amount, this payment is deemed “rightfully paid under the guarantee.” The Madhya Pradesh High Court emphasized the importance of timely interest payments to keep the liability alive, establishing that the surety’s payment was not wrongful despite being made after the limitation period.

4. Determining Rightfulness of Payment

Whether a payment made by the surety is rightful is contextual and requires consideration of the circumstances surrounding the payment. Notably:

• If both the surety and principal debtor face a time-barred claim from the creditor, the surety’s payment could prima facie be viewed as not rightful. However, the surety may still demonstrate that the payment, despite being made after the limitation period, was valid.
• The term “sum rightfully paid” encompasses not just monetary payments but also the transfer of property equivalent to money. Importantly, a mere incurring of a pecuniary obligation is insufficient for establishing a rightful payment.

5. Legal Distinction on Indemnity Claims

• In cases where a surety has not made a payment but is merely liable to do so, a different approach emerges.
• The Bombay High Court has held that Section 145 of the Indian Contract Act does not preclude a surety from seeking indemnity against the principal debtor even when payment under the guarantee has not yet occurred.

6. Rights of Surety Without Knowledge of Principal Debtor

If a surety becomes bound without the principal debtor’s knowledge and consent, the rights they acquire are limited to those specified in Sections 140 and 141 of the Indian Contract Act, and not the more extensive rights outlined in Section 145.

15.   Section 146 —Co-sureties liable to contribute equally

1. Overview of Co-Sureties

• When two or more persons act as co-sureties for the same debt or obligation, whether under a single contract or multiple contracts, they are collectively responsible for the payment of the debt to the creditor.
• This liability exists regardless of whether the co-sureties are aware of each other’s participation or if they are bound under the same agreement.

2. Equal Contribution Among Co-Sureties

• As per Section 146 of the Indian Contract Act, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, co-sureties are liable to contribute equally towards the total debt or the portion of it that remains unpaid by the principal debtor.
• This principle is well-established in legal precedent and reflects the fundamental principle of equity among co-sureties.
• Dering v. Earl of Winchilsea (1787): This case illustrates that co-sureties need not be bound by the same contract to invoke the right to contribution, affirming that the right to contribution exists independently of any express agreement among the sureties.

3. Preconditions for Contribution Claims

• A surety may not seek contribution from co-sureties until they have paid more than their fair share of the debt to the principal creditor. This condition is crucial as it ensures that the right to contribution arises only after the surety’s payment exceeds their proportional liability.
• Ex parte Snowdon (1881): The court noted that a surety must discharge a portion of the debt beyond their equitable share before claiming contribution from co-sureties.
• Shirley v. Burdett (1911): This case reiterates that a surety’s entitlement to contribution is contingent upon exceeding their proportional share of the debt.

4. Effect of Judgment on Contribution Rights

• A judgment against a surety by the creditor for the total amount guaranteed, or an equivalent legal process (such as the recognition of a claim in the administration of the surety’s estate), is considered equivalent to a payment for the purposes of claiming contribution.
• This principle enables the surety to establish their right to recover from co-sureties after fulfilling their obligation to the creditor.
• Wolmershausen v. Gullick (1893): This case supports the notion that a judgment against a surety is treated as payment, thereby enabling the surety to seek contribution from co-sureties.

5. Sharing of Security and Indemnity

• All co-sureties are entitled to share the benefits of any security or indemnity obtained by any of them from the principal debtor.
• This entitlement is irrespective of whether the other co-sureties were aware of the security or indemnity.
• Steel v. Dixon (1881): The ruling established that co-sureties can collectively benefit from securities acquired by any individual co-surety, emphasizing that the sharing of indemnity or security is an essential aspect of their relationship.
• Berridge v. Berridge (1890): The court held that a surety who benefits from any security must account for the amounts received and is entitled to seek further participation until all co-sureties are fully reimbursed or the counter-security is exhausted.

16.   Section 147—Liability of co-sureties bound in different sums

1. Overview of Co-Sureties’ Liability

• Co-sureties who have entered into agreements to guarantee a debt or obligation are subject to specific rules regarding their liability, especially when they are bound for different sums.
• The general principle governing co-sureties in such cases is that they are liable to pay equally, constrained by the limits of their respective obligations.
• This ensures fairness in the distribution of liability among co-sureties while considering the varying amounts of their bonds.

2. Legal Framework

• The liability of co-sureties bound in different sums is outlined in relevant legal provisions, emphasizing that their obligations should be assessed based on the specific amounts they have guaranteed.

• The phrase “as far as the limits of their respective obligations permit” signifies that each surety’s liability is capped by the amount they have agreed to secure, reflecting a departure from a purely rateable distribution of liability.

3. Illustrations of Liability

• Scenario: A, B, and C serve as sureties for D, entering into three separate bonds: A guarantees ₹10,000, B guarantees ₹20,000, and C guarantees ₹40,000, all conditioned for D’s accountability to E.
• Default: D defaults for ₹30,000.
• Liability: Each surety is liable to pay ₹10,000. Since the total default is ₹30,000, and the liability is shared equally among the three, they each contribute equally up to their respective obligations.

4. Interpretation of Liability

• The legal language indicates a deliberate choice to utilize the term “equally” rather than “rateably.”
• This distinction clarifies that, regardless of the differing amounts guaranteed, the expectation is for each co-surety to contribute equally to the extent of their obligations when the total amount defaults, marking a departure from traditional understandings of liability distribution.