CASE NAME	Errington v. Errington and Woods
CITATION	[1952] 1 KB 290; [1951] EWCA Civ 2; [1952] 1 All ER 149;  [1952] 1 TLR 231
COURT	Court of Appeal (England)
BENCH	Lord Justice Somervell, Lord Justice Denning, Lord Justice Rodson
APPELLANT	Errington
DEFENDANT	Errington
DECIDED ON	1880

INTRODUCTION

Errington v. Errington and Woods is a landmark case in English contract law that discusses the enforceability of unilateral contracts and the concept of consideration in the context of performance. The case pertains to a disagreement between Mr. Errington and the defendants, Errington and Woods, regarding a promise associated with the acquisition of a property.
In this instance, Mr. Errington had pledged to his son and daughter-in-law, the plaintiffs, that he would convey the property to them if they continued to make mortgage payments on it. The son and daughter-in-law began making payments based on this vow. The defendants, who were Mr. Errington’s executors, attempted to contest the enforceability of the promise after his death, contending that it was not legally binding due to the absence of consideration.
The primary legal question was whether Mr. Errington’s pledge was a binding unilateral contract and, if so, whether it was enforceable in light of the plaintiffs’ fulfillment of the promise. The court was required to determine whether the plaintiffs’ fulfillment of the conditions outlined in the pledge constituted adequate consideration to render the promise enforceable.
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that Mr. Errington’s promise was enforceable as a unilateral contract. The judgment underscored that Mr. Errington was subject to a binding obligation as a result of his mortgage payments, which were considered to be a fulfillment of the contractual terms. The executors were unable to argue against the enforceability of the agreement, as the court determined that the promise became binding upon the plaintiffs’ commencement of the required performance.
The case of Errington v. Errington and Woods is noteworthy for its analysis of unilateral contracts and the significance of consideration in such agreements. The case reaffirmed the principle that a unilateral promise can be enforced if the promisor’s terms are met and the promised act is performed. This decision clarified the application of consideration in unilateral contracts and established that binding contractual obligations can be established through the performance of the promised act rather than bare acceptance.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Errington’s son wedded the defendant. Errington acquired a house for the couple to inhabit in order to provide for his son. He was responsible for the deposit and the payment of specific rates that were associated with the purchase. The couple, in the interim, committed to making the weekly mortgage payments. His statement to the defendant was that they were entitled to remain in the residence as long as they paid off the mortgage. Errington also informed her that he would transfer the title to the property to them once they had fully paid the mortgage.
His widow, the claimant, received all of Errington’s property upon his death. In the aftermath of his passing, the defendant’s son abandoned him. The defendant maintained occupancy of the residence and continued to comply with the mortgage payments. Her sibling subsequently relocated to live with her. An action was initiated by the claimant to evict the defendant and her sister from the property.

ISSUE RAISED

Did the defendant and her husband have any property rights in the house?
Did the defendant and her husband have any contractual entitlement to remain in the house?
If the defendant was entitled to remain in the house, could her sister be evicted?

PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENTS

The plaintiffs, Mr. Errington’s son and daughter-in-law, contended that Mr. Errington’s assurance to convey the property was a unilateral contract that was legally binding. They argued that the promise was substantiated by valid contemplation because they had acted in reliance on it by making the mortgage payments as specified. The plaintiffs contended that the mortgage payment was a fulfillment of the contractual terms established by Mr.Errington.
The plaintiffs underscored that Mr. Errington’s assurance was not merely a gift but rather a conditional promise that became enforceable upon the commencement of the necessary actions. They contended that the condition required for the commitment to be binding was satisfied by their payment obligations. Consequently, they claimed that the executors of Mr. Errington’s estate were required to fulfill the agreement and convey the property in accordance with it.
In conclusion, the plaintiff’s argument was that the unilateral contract was enforceable because it fulfilled the terms of Mr. Errington’s promise, thereby establishing a binding obligation on the promisor.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The respondents, Errington and Woods (the executors of Mr. Errington’s estate), contended that Mr. Errington’s guarantee to convey the property was not legally binding. They argued that the pledge did not have the requisite consideration to be considered a binding unilateral contract. According to the respondents, Mr. Errington’s assurance was gratuitous rather than contractual, and as a result, it did not establish enforceable obligations.
The respondents also contended that there was no binding contract because Mr. Errington’s promise was contingent upon future performance, and the performance (making mortgage payments) had not been completed by the time of his demise. They argued that the promise could not be enforced after Mr. Errington’s death because it had not been completely fulfilled, and any expectation of the property’s transfer was not legally supported. The executors contended that they were not obligated to implement the promise made by Mr. Errington, as the requisite contractual conditions had not been met during his lifetime.
In essence, the respondents’ defense was predicated on the argument that Mr. Errington’s pledge did not qualify as a legally binding contract because the plaintiffs failed to provide consideration and executed the contract incompletely at the time of Mr. Errington’s death.

JUDGEMENT

The Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, the son and daughter-in-law, in the case of Errington v. Errington and Woods. The court determined that Mr. Errington’s assurance to convey the property was a unilateral contract that was legally binding. The judgment was predicated on the principle that a unilateral contract becomes enforceable once the offeree has commenced the required act in accordance with the promise.
The court determined that the plaintiffs’ mortgage payments were valid consideration, as they were acting in accordance with Mr. Errington’s assurance. They accomplished Mr. Errington’s condition by making the payments, which made his promise binding. The court underscored that the promise was not merely a gift, but rather a contractual commitment that became enforceable upon the commencement of performance.
The court also disregarded the argument that the promise could not be enforced as a result of Mr. Errington’s death, pointing out that the promise was already binding upon the plaintiffs’ performance. The executors were, therefore, required to fulfill the promise and convey the property in accordance with the agreement.
The court’s ruling in Errington v. Errington and Woods reaffirmed the enforceability of unilateral contracts in cases where the offeree has already begun fulfilling the contractual condition. It was established that a promise that is substantiated by performance could establish binding obligations, even if the promise were not fulfilled prior to the promisor’s demise. This ruling affirmed that performance could render such promises enforceable and clarified the role of consideration in unilateral contracts, thereby influencing the way courts view unilateral contractual commitments.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeal in Errington v. Errington and Woods maintained the enforceability of Mr. Errington’s promise as a binding unilateral contract. The plaintiffs had initiated performance by making the necessary mortgage payments, which led the court to conclude that the promise to transfer the property was valid. This performance was a sufficient consideration to enforce the pledge. Consequently, the executors were required to fulfill Mr. Errington’s assurance and convey the property to the plaintiffs despite his passing.
The judgment elucidated that the offeror’s pledge becomes enforceable once the offeree commences to fulfill the conditions outlined in a unilateral contract. The court’s decision guaranteed that contractual obligations established in unilateral agreements are not rendered null and invalid by the promisor’s subsequent death or revocation provided that performance has commenced.
The decision in this case is noteworthy for its examination of unilateral contracts and the significance of consideration in such agreements. The case reaffirmed the principle that a unilateral contract becomes binding once the offeree begins performing the required act, thereby offering a degree of protection and certainty to parties who depend on such promises.
The judgment underscores the significance of performance in the determination of enforceability in unilateral contracts. It emphasizes that a promise can be enforced if consideration, in the form of performance, is given, even if the promise is contingent upon future actions. Furthermore, the case demonstrates the legal system’s approach to honoring contractual commitments and ensuring that promises are not readily nullified by changes in circumstances, such as the sudden death of the promisor.
In general, the case establishes a critical precedent for comprehending the legal implications of performance on the formation and enforcement of unilateral contracts.