CASE NAME	Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409
CITATION	AIR 1998 SC 1895, 1998 (4) SCC 409, 1998 AIR SCW 1706, (1998) 2 SCALE 745
COURT	The Supreme Court of India.
BENCH	S.C. Agrawal, G.N. Ray, Dr A.S. Anand, S.P. Bharucha And S. Rajendra Babu, JJ.
PETITIONERS	Supreme Court Bar Assn. And Anr.
RESPONDENT	Union of India and Anr.
DECIDED ON	decided on 17th April, 1998

INTRODUCTION

The court ruled that the contempt authority’s goal is to safeguard the authority of the law and the administration of justice, not to uphold the honor and dignity of any one judge who has been wronged or scandalized. The people’s confidence in the judiciary’s ability to deliver brave and unbiased justice is the cornerstone of the system. In Indian legal history, the Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) is regarded as a seminal case. The Supreme Court of India rendered this important decision, which has broad ramifications and tackles important problems that are central to the country’s legal system.

The Supreme Court has discretionary power under Article 142, which says that it may exercise its jurisdiction to pass any decree or issue any order that is required to ensure that any case or matter that is before it receives full and fair justice. During the initial stages of Article 142’s development, the Supreme Court was praised by both the legal community and the general public for its efforts to provide full justice to underprivileged groups in society and to save the environment.

The Supreme Court’s authority to penalize its own members for professional misconduct was at issue in the 1998 Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India case. The issue concerned whether the Advocates Act, 1961’s prevent Councils were the only bodies authorized to take disciplinary action against advocates or if the Supreme Court may suspend or prevent an advocate from practicing before it.

FACTS OF THE CASE

For interfering with and “obstructing the process of justice by attempting to frighten, overawe, and overbear the court by using rude, contemptuous, and threatening words,” the contemner, an attorney, was found guilty of criminal contempt of court. He received a six-year sentence of ordinary imprisonment along with a three-year ban from advocating. During the four years that the sentence of confinement was suspended, it would become effective if he was found guilty of any other acts of contempt of court.

The Supreme Court Bar Association, through its Honorary Secretary, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, expressing dissatisfaction with the decision to prohibit the defendant from practicing as an advocate for three years. The petition sought: 

• A suitable writ, directive, or declaration stating that the Bar Councils’ disciplinary committees, which were established under the Advocates Act of 1961, are the only bodies with the power to look into, suspend, or prohibit an advocate from practicing law for professional or other misconduct stemming from a contempt of court or other punishment;
• And a declaration that no High Court or the Supreme Court of India, acting in the course of their inherent jurisdiction, has original jurisdiction, power, or authority in this matter.

ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether an advocate engages in professional misconduct, the Supreme Court may decide to suspend or debar them from practice before the Court.
2. Does the Advocates Act of 1961 give the Bar Councils the only authority to impose discipline on advocates?

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF BOTH SIDES

Argument on behalf of the petitioner

• The powers granted to this Court by Article 142 are extremely broad, but they can only be used to “do complete justice in any case or cause pending before it.” Since the issue of “professional misconduct” is not one of the “any causes” that this court is considering while handling a contempt of court case, it is not permitted to use Article 142 or 129 to issue an order suspending an advocate’s license, for which there are other statutory provisions providing a punishment.

Argument on behalf of the respondent

• The Constitution’s Articles 129 and 142 state that neither this court nor any other body can create “jurisdiction” or “punishment” that is not otherwise authorized by law. Since the Advocates Act’s statutory body is the only entity with the authority to suspend an advocate’s license for “professional misconduct,” this court is not permitted to exercise its jurisdiction under either Article 142 or 129 or even Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
• Following the enactment of the Advocates Act of 1961, the Bar Council of India and the relevant state bar councils have the exclusive authority to punish an advocate for “professional misconduct.” 
• The Act includes a comprehensive procedure for suspending or canceling an advocate’s license due to “professional misconduct.” The requirements must be closely read since the suspension or revocation of an advocate’s license has both civil and criminal ramifications, with the punishment taking the form of a penalty. 
• An advocate may only be punished by having their license suspended by the appropriate statutory body upon the establishment of the charge against them in accordance with the guidelines provided by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

JUDGMENT

Even though the Supreme Court has broad power to punish for contempt of court, this jurisdiction cannot be expanded to include the capacity to summarily determine whether an advocate is also guilty of “professional misconduct,” eschewing the process outlined in the Advocates Act. While Article 142’s “power to do complete justice” is a corrective power that prioritizes equity over the law, it cannot be used to deny a professional lawyer due process by suspending his license to practice law in an expedited manner while handling a contempt of court case. This is in accordance with the Advocates Act of 1961. 

It is impossible to interpret Article 142’s curative powers as giving the court the authority to ignore a litigant’s substantive rights when considering a case. The use of this authority to “supplant” applicable substantive law in relation to the case or matter before the court is prohibited. Article 142, for all its scope, cannot be used to create a new tower where none has previously been by ignoring specific statutory provisions pertaining to a subject and accomplishing something that can only be accomplished indirectly.

Since the contemner is also an advocate, it is not permissible to exercise Article 142’s jurisdiction to punish him by suspending his license to practice while handling a contempt of court case. This power is otherwise statutorily limited to the Bar Council of India. The interpretation of Article 142 must take into account its salutary purpose, which is to ensure that all parties get complete justice. There is no other possibility. In a contempt of court case, neither the contemner nor the court are parties to a lawsuit.

Similar to how a court of law investigates a criminal case, the Bar Council’s disciplinary committee looks into complaints of professional misconduct. Based on the evidence presented to the committee after being given the opportunity to be heard, an advocate may face consequences. The offending advocate may face any further consequence allowed by the Act, including removal from the Advocates’ Rolls.

Therefore, the Supreme Court cannot use its appeal jurisdiction to punish an advocate for “professional misconduct” by transforming into a statutory body with “original jurisdiction.”  In fact, in exercising its appellate powers under section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961, read with Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may very well have the jurisdiction to proceed suo motu, send for the records from the Bar Council, and pass appropriate orders if the concerned Bar Council does not take any action against an advocate after being informed of their willful and blameworthy conduct by the High Court or the Supreme Court. Suo motu appeal authority may occasionally be considered by the Supreme Court if a matter is before the appropriate Bar Council and the Bar Council “does not act.”

ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

There was an underlying error in the Vinay Mishra case, where it was claimed that the court may issue any order or instruction once the matter was in front of it. But rather than being an issue of professional misconduct, this is a case of contempt of court. Whereas the Bar has jurisdiction over professional misconduct, the court has jurisdiction over contempt. 

With the Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, the Bar may only suspend an advocate with the provision of due process of law, which requires the advocate to have the opportunity to represent himself. The court granted itself jurisdiction in Vinay’s case that it had never had before.

Under Article 129 read in conjunction with Article 142 of the Indian Constitution, the Supreme Court has the authority to penalize any person who disobeys the court. Article 215 of the Constitution gives the High Courts the authority to punish contemners; however, the Contempt of Courts Act of 1971 governs the severity of the punishments meted out by the High Court. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is unaffected by this Act. Because of the court’s incorrect interpretation of Articles 129 and 142 in this instance, the Bar is unable to penalize those who commit professional misconduct. The court reached the conclusion that the Bar should have the authority to punish for any professional misconduct after applying a sufficiently objective process and receiving support from the law and appropriate interpretation. 

Civil contempt is necessary because willful rebellious litigants cannot be absolved of their actions; otherwise, the administration of justice and public trust in the judiciary would be negatively impacted. The Rule of Law cannot exist unless there is public faith and confidence in the courts. On the other hand, experts believe that criminal contempt ought to be made simpler, if not completely eliminated. This is due to the possibility that Article 19 of the Indian Constitution, which protects freedom of speech and expression, could be applied to it.