CASE NAME | Shankerlal Kacharabhai v. State of Gujarat, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 131 |
CITATION | 1965 AIR 1260, 1965 SCR (1) 287 |
COURT | Supreme Court of India |
BENCH | Hon’ble Justice K. Subba Rao, Justice J.C. Shah and Justice S.M. Sikri |
APPELLANT | Shankerlal Kacharabhai and Others |
RESPONDENT | State of Gujarat |
DECIDED ON | 21st September 1964 |
INTRODUCTION
The case of *Shankerlal Kacharabhai v. State of Gujarat* is a significant judgment that delves into the principles of criminal liability under the Indian Penal Code (IPC), with a particular emphasis on the classification of culpable homicide and murder. In order to ascertain whether the offense met the criteria for murder under Section 300 or could be mitigated to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 299., the court was obligated to evaluate the presence of intent, premeditation, and aggravating factors in this case.
The applicability of the exceptions to Section 300, particularly in the context of abrupt provocation or the absence of premeditation, was a central issue in this case. The court also evaluated procedural compliance with the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to confirm that the evidence presented satisfies the legal requirements for establishing culpability beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment emphasizes the judiciary’s obligation to meticulously evaluate the facts and circumstances of each case in order to maintain justice. It also contributes to jurisprudence by illustrating the interaction between established legal doctrines and mitigating circumstances, such as provocation and lack of premeditation. This case is of enduring relevance due to its comprehensive examination of criminal intent, proportionality in punishment, and adherence to fair trial principles in criminal law.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The case is the result of an incident that occurred in the village of Aithor, which involved members of the Kadva and Leva Patidar communities. At approximately 8 p.m. on January 16, 1961, seven members of the Leva Patidar community—Rama Bhupta, Lakha Madha, Hira Punja, Jetha Nagar, Parshottam Prabhuva, Manor Madha, and Gova Shiva—assembled in the vicinity of a pan shop owned by Girdhar Shanker. At the same time, 12 accused members of the Kadva Patidar community arrived at the scene, each armed with a different weapon. Specifically, accused 1 to 6 were armed with muzzle-loading firearms, accused 7, 8, 11, and 12 were armed with sticks, and accused 9 and 10 were armed with dharias.
Rama Bhupta’s murder was the consequence of a confrontation in which the accused 1 to 4 discharged their firearms. Additionally, Lakha Madha, Jetha Nagar, and Hira Punja were injured when accuseds 5 and 6 discharged their firearms. Additionally, Lakha Madha was injured by a stick while accused 12 injured Parshottam Prabhuva’s tongue. The armed individuals were incited to attack by the other accused, resulting in a violent and tumultuous altercation.
The Sessions Judge determined that the 12 accused had assembled unlawfully; however, he also determined that their shared objective was not to murder Rama Bhupta but rather to harm Madha, who was not present at the scene. As a result, the court acquitted all of the accused of the allegation under Section 302, read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). However, accused 1 to 4 were convicted under Section 302, read with Section 34 IPC, and were sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000 each. For the injuries inflicted on Hira Punja and others, all accused were convicted under Section 324, read with Section 149 IPC. Accused 5 to 12 were convicted under Sections 326 and 324 IPC, read with Sections 34 and 149 IPC, and received varying sentences of imprisonment and penalties.
The High Court modified the convictions upon appeal. The life imprisonment of accuseds 1 to 4 under Section 302, read with Sections 301 and 34 IPC, was upheld; however, their fines were waived. For the accused aged five to twelve, the High Court found them guilty under Section 302, in conjunction with Sections 301, 34, and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced them to life imprisonment. These stricter penalties were the outcome of the State of Gujarat’s appeal against the acquittals and its revision for sentence enhancement.
ISSUES RAISED
If the conviction of accused I to 4 under s. 302, read in conjunction with ss. 34 and 301 of the Indian Penal Code, was accurate?
ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES
Arguments on behalf of the appellant
- The Indian Penal Code s. 302, read with s. 34, could not be used to convict accused I to 4, as there was no common intention to murder Rama. Rather, Rama was killed under the mistaken belief that he was Madba.
- According to the argument, it is impossible for an error made by one or more of the accused to be “in furtherance of the common intention” of the accused. In the circumstances of the case, he further contends that the provisions of s. 301 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be invoked.
Arguments on behalf of the respondent
- The prosecution contended that the 11 accused constituted an unlawful assembly in violation of Section 149 of the IPC with the explicit purpose of attacking and injuring the individuals in the Chowk, with a particular emphasis on the Leva Patidars. The respondent would argue that the actions of the accused, particularly the use of firearms, demonstrate a clear intent to cause death or severe harm, despite the Sessions Judge’s conclusion that their common intention was not to kill Rama Bhupta. The conviction of the accused under Section 302, read with Section 149 IPC, is justified by the fact that they acted together with a common purpose to cause damage to the Leva Patidars.
- The evidence clearly demonstrates the role of each accused in the incident. Rama Bhupta was fatally wounded by the firearms of accuseds 1 to 4, while Lakha Madha, Jetha Nagar, and Hira Punja were injured or shot by other accused. The respondent would underscore that the allegations under Sections 302 and 324 of the IPC for causing death and injuries to multiple victims are substantiated by the individual actions of the accused and the fact that they acted in furtherance of a common intention. The respondent would contend that the principle of collective liability under Section 34 and Section 149 is applicable because the accused acted in concert to achieve a common unlawful objective.
JUDGMENT
The court, in this instance, evaluated the application of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which pertains to actions taken in furtherance of a shared intention. The primary concern was whether the accused, who mistakenly shot Rama in the belief that he was Madha, could be held accountable for Rama’s homicide under Section 34. The court observed that the act of shooting Rama was in furtherance of their common intention to kill Madha, despite the fact that the accused shot the incorrect person due to mistaken identity. The principle that a criminal act committed in furtherance of a common intention can lead to collective liability, regardless of an error made by one of the accused, supported this.
Section 301, which pertains to the “doctrine of transfer of malice,” was additionally examined by the court. This doctrine posits that an individual’s intention to murder one individual is transferred to the individual who is actually killed, even if it was an error. The court clarified that Section 301 was not applicable in this case because the accused did not intend to murder a different person by mistake but rather believed they were targeting the intended victim, Madha. Consequently, Section 301 was superfluous, as all of the criteria for culpable homicide under Sections 299 and 300 were met.
The court held that the accused were guilty of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, as the death of Rama was in furtherance of their shared intention to kill Madha, despite the mistaken identity. The convictions were upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The application of the principle of “common intention” under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is underscored by the analysis of this case. The court’s inquiry focused on whether the collective liability under Section 34 could be rendered null and void by an error made by one of the accused in identifying the victim. The court determined that a mistaken identity does not absolve the accused’s liability if the act of violence was committed in furtherance of the common intention, as was the case in this instance with the intention to murder Madha. The judgment underscores the extensive application of Section 34, which holds individuals collectively accountable for their actions when they act with a shared illicit purpose, regardless of whether the exact result differs from the intended outcome. Furthermore, the court disregarded the relevance of Section 301 in this instance, as the prerequisites for its application, including a lack of intent to murder the actual victim, were not satisfied.
The significance of the “common intention” doctrine is emphasized by the case, particularly in the context of group crimes, in which all members of the assembly share a singular criminal objective. It demonstrates that the accused can be held jointly liable for the resulting crime, even if the act is still in furtherance of the original intent, despite a mistaken belief about the victim’s identity. The judgment reiterates that the law does not necessitate precise accuracy in designating the victim, provided that the act is within the scope of the shared criminal intention. In summary, the court correctly upheld the convictions under Section 302 with Section 34 of the IPC, highlighting that the act of violence was a component of the common intention to murder the intended victim despite the mistaken identity.