CASE BRIEF: RAJWANT SINGH v. STATE OF KERAlA, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 50

CASE NAME	Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 50
CITATION	1966 Supp SCR 230, AIR 1966 SC 1874, 1966 Cri LJ 2 1509
COURT	Supreme Court of India
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice M. Hidayatullah and Justice V. Ramaswami
APPELLANT	Rajwant Singh and Another
RESPONDENT	State of Kerala
DECIDED ON	22nd April, 1966

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of India issued a major ruling in 1966 in the case of Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, which explores the meaning of purpose under Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Rajwant Singh, the appellant, was charged with intentionally stabbing the victim to death. The “third clause” of Section 304, which deals with injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the normal course of nature, is examined in length in this case, which is significant.

The prosecution contended that the method and extent of Rajwant Singh’s injuries demonstrated his intentional intent to cause death. The defense disputed the allegation, claiming that there was no premeditation and that the act did not qualify as murder under Section 300. Based on cases like Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court decided that the purpose of causing particular damage that has been shown to be lethal in normal situations meets the legal definition of murder, regardless of whether the accused meant for death to be the ultimate outcome.

Under Indian criminal law, this case remains a fundamental precedent for defining the extent of criminal intent in murder cases.

FACTS OF THE CASE

These appellants were tried alongside three other people, two of whom were found not guilty. One Taylor was also found guilty of the same offenses and received a life sentence in jail. This Court has not received an appeal from him. We don’t care about them. The lawsuit concerns the death of Lt. Commander Mendanha on the evening of March 30, 1963, at Naval Base I.N.S. Vendurthy, Willingdon Island, Cochin Harbour. Unni was on leave at the time of the offense and was assigned as a rating to this Naval Base. Rajwant Singh was married to I.N.S. Vikrant, and Taylor, who hasn’t appealed, was a former seaman. On the eve of the payday, when a sizable amount of money was typically stored there for distribution on the payday, the prosecution said that these individuals banded together to break into the Base Supply Office’s safe. They gathered a variety of items, including cotton wool, ropes, a hacksaw with extra blades, a bottle of chloroform, a garment worn by a naval officer, and adhesive plaster. Under the guise that he was sought at the Naval Base, they tricked the Lt. Commander out of his home that night and captured him in a desolate location. They put the sticky plaster over his mouth, wrapped it with a cloth, and then used cotton wool soaked in chloroform to obstruct his nostrils.

They placed his own shirt behind his head as a cushion, tied his hands and legs with rope, and dumped him in a shallow drain. After that, they approached the sentry and attacked him after persuading him to give up his gun to an accused person who had disguised himself as an officer. The sentry would have been treated the same as his Lt. Commander, but he screamed and caught the watchman’s notice. The attackers abandoned the sentry and fled in fear of being discovered. After making his getaway, the sentry told the Base’s on-duty officer that he had identified Rajwant Singh as one of his attackers. The Lt. Commander’s body was found in the drain where the attackers had abandoned him the following morning. Following an investigation, five people were put on trial before Session Judge Ernakulam Division, who found three guilty and condemned them, as previously mentioned, while clearing the other two. These individuals’ appeals before the High Court were denied.

ISSUES RAISED

Does the evidence submitted show the offense or culpable homicide, or is it only able to lead to the offense of grievous hurt?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Argument on behalf of the appellant

It is maintained that the prosecution’s evidence establishes either culpable homicide that does not equal murder or the offense of causing serious harm. Additionally, it is argued that none of the defendants may be charged under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Additionally, Unni has argued that the death penalty was inappropriate because the evidence against him was identical to that of the other two.
His mouth was totally shut with a huge adhesive plaster. Then, to keep the sticky plaster in place, a cloth was securely knotted over it. Chloroform-soaked cotton was used to block the nose. All of the evidence, according to the appellants’ attorney, demonstrates that the attackers’ goal was to incapacitate the Lt. Commander rather than kill him.
According to Mr. Sethi, the offense was punished under Section 304 (second part) of the Indian Penal Code and involved causing grave harm or, at worst, culpable homicide that did not amount to murder.
According to Mr. Sethi, the first of Section 299’s three clauses—which define the crime of culpable homicide—deals with intentional killing, while the second clause addresses intentionally induced injuries that have the potential to result in death. He contends that the first part of Section 304 punishes the offense of murder and culpable homicide, while the second part of Section 304 punishes the offense of culpable homicide amounting to murder, which is based on the third clause, which deals with causing death with the knowledge that the offender’s actions are likely to cause death.
He argues that while the appellants did not plan to kill the Lt. Commander, they did take steps to keep him silent and immobilized while they searched the safe. They bound the victim, sealed his mouth, and used cotton soaked in chloroform to cover his nostrils in order to accomplish their goal. All of these actions indicated a wish to temporarily keep the Lt. Commander out of the way without killing him. Furthermore, the acts cannot be said to have been committed with the intent to cause death-causing bodily harm. According to him, at most, it can be claimed that the appellants knew that their actions were what caused the death.

Argument on behalf of the respondent

According to the prosecution, Rajwant Singh, the appellant, had a deliberate plan to murder the victim. The intentional act of stabbing the victim with a weapon that may cause fatal injuries demonstrated this purpose. In order to demonstrate that the accused’s actions were neither impulsive nor unplanned, the prosecution highlighted the attack’s premeditated nature.
It was argued that the type and extent of the injuries were enough to result in death in the normal course of events. The prosecution used witness statements and medical data to demonstrate that the injuries were not merely cosmetic but rather pointed to a murderous intent.
The prosecution emphasized that the act was clearly in violation of Section 304 IPC’s third clause, which addresses causing physical harm severe enough to cause death. The circumstances and method of the attack made it clear that the goal was to do such harm.
The prosecution denied any allegations of impulsive behavior or unexpected provocation. They ruled out any exclusions under the Section, arguing that the accused acted maliciously and without immediate reason.

JUDGMENT

The appellants deliberated before taking any action. They were the kind that needed multiple perpetrators to carry out. Without a doubt, there was a common intention, and since clause 3 of Section 300 considers the act’s consequences objectively, everyone who had the same intention of causing bodily harm that was sufficient to result in death in the normal course of events must be held accountable for the ensuing offense. According to Section 113 of the Indian Penal Code, anyone who assisted would be held equally accountable even if the outcome differed from what was originally intended, so long as they were aware that the act they were aiding was likely to have that impact.

The aforementioned clause must be incorporated into the appellants’ contention that Section 304 II is applicable. 17. The appellants were correctly found guilty in our ruling in accordance with Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. We find no justification for interfering with Unni’s death sentence. Since he was the mastermind behind the entire situation, the death penalty was fitting. As a result, the Court denied both appeals.

CONCLUSION

The Court examined the provision, which says that an act is murderous if it is done to cause particular physical harm and the harm is severe enough to cause death in the normal course of events. The Court affirmed that demonstrating intent to cause the harm discovered on the corpse is sufficient to establish murder, following the precedent established in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab. The Court explained that while the severity of the harm and its propensity to result in death can be determined objectively, it is not essential to prove the purpose to cause death itself. The Court emphasized that the question under Clause (3) is not whether the accused intended to inflict death but rather whether they intended to cause harm. Mens rea must be demonstrated as particular intent to cause the injury that was shown to be present on the deceased’s body, the ruling reiterates.

The ruling oversimplifies intent by distancing it from the result, which is death. This strategy might make it more difficult for defendants to demonstrate that lesser crimes, such as culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC, fall under the purview of murder under Section 300, Clause (3). The Court’s reliance on Virsa Singh raises questions about how it may have underweighed mitigating circumstances that could have lessened the severity of the conduct, such as provocation or lack of malice. In order to ensure proportionate sentences, these subtleties are frequently crucial.

By focusing on the sufficiency of injury to cause death “in the ordinary course of nature,” the Court imposes a rigid, almost mechanical standard. Critics contend that this could ignore certain situations in which the accused was unaware of the deadly outcomes, potentially resulting in severe punishments. The exceptions to murder under Section 300, including abrupt provocation or lack of intent, are not adequately addressed in the ruling. According to critics, the Court might have given a more thorough explanation of why these exceptions did not apply in this particular case. Although this decision is nonetheless a crucial precedent, it emphasizes the delicate balance that courts must strike between applying a rigid interpretation of statutory requirements and taking into account the particular circumstances of each case.