CASE NAME	Noor Mohd. Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra, (1970) 1 SCC 696
CITATION	1971 AIR 885, (1971) 1 SCJ 43, 1971 MADLJ(CRI) 33, 1971 MAH LJ 792, 1971 SCD 81
COURT	Supreme Court of India
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice  I.D. Dua, Justice M. Hidayatullah, Justice A.N. Ray
PETITIONER	Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin
RESPONDENTS	State of Maharashtra
DECIDED ON	Decided on 24th March, 1970

INTRODUCTION

According to I.P.C. § 120-B, criminal conspiracy is a serious offense. It is distinct from other offenses in that it is considered an offense to simply have an agreement, even in the absence of any action being taken to carry it out. Despite the close relationship between incitement and abetment and conspiracy, the substantive offense of criminal conspiracy is more expansive than the act of abetment by conspiracy as defined by s. 107 I.P.C. Since conspiracy is by its very nature a clandestine activity, it is exceedingly uncommon that direct evidence of conspiracy can be produced; but, as with other offenses, circumstantial evidence can be used to establish conspiracy. Relevant material is comprised of antecedent and subsequent conduct, surrounding circumstances, and other relevant variables. 

In actuality, due to the challenges associated with obtaining direct evidence of criminal conspiracy, anything done by any one of them in reference to their common intention after the same is entered becomes, under the law of evidence, relevant for proving both conspiracy and the offenses committed in response thereto once “reasonable ground is shown for believing that two or more persons have conspired to commit an offense.”

FACTS OF THE CASE

Charges under sections 120-B (conspiracy to commit murder) and 302, read with section 34, were brought against four of the defendants. In addition, the fourth accused was charged with aiding and abetting the murders of the other three accused under sections 302 and 109. While the first accused was a servant of the second accused’s brother, the other four accused were linked to each other. The deceased and the fourth accused were in frequent disagreement about the right of passage and the right to tap water. The fourth accused went to the deceased’s home the day before the murder and urged his friends—among them the second accused—to murder the victim. The fourth accused made a threat to kill the dead the next day (the day of the murder), and thereafter, the deceased was followed outside at around ten o’clock in the evening by the first and second accused. The dead was stabbed fifteen minutes after it was observed that the accused was pursuing him. When the two constables heard the disturbance, the third accused tried to convince them that nothing strange had happened. However, the constables went to the scene, saw the deceased’s wounded body, pursued and apprehended the first accused, and identified the second accused, who had escaped. The initial complaint against the defendants was filed by one of the constables, 1 to 3. 

ISSUES RAISED

• Whether on April 17, 1965, in Bhiwandi, the appellant abetted Accused 1 through 3 to perpetrate the murder of Mohamed Yahya, a crime punishable by Sections 109 and 302 of the Penal Code, 1860.
• Can the appellant be held liable for abetment of the offense of murder?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Argument on behalf of the appellant

• The appellant contended that the story presented by the prosecution was false and that Noor Mohammad did not abet the offense.

Argument on behalf of the respondent

• There were disputes between both parties regarding the right of passage and the right of tap water. The final event occurred at seven in the morning on April 16, 1965. When Mohd. Yahya left his house that day; he discovered that the appellant’s cot and a mound of dirt were blocking his path. There was also an appellant’s cow standing in the passage. The deceased picked up a stone and threw it at the cow to make room for himself. 

• The appellant was angered by this, and in retribution, he abused the dead and threw a glass he was carrying in his direction. The dead went to the police station and reported this occurrence. Along with going to the police station, the appellant also filed a countercomplaint against the deceased. 

• Jaitunbi, the deceased’s wife, was abused by the appellant’s two wives after she and the deceased went to the police station. As a result, Jaitunbi went to the police station as well to file a report. However, no record of this report exists. A short while later, Jaitunbi was subjected to more harassment and stone throwing by the appellant’s spouses, sisters, and kids. At around ten in the morning on the same day, Jaitunbi returned to the police station to file a complaint. The appellant approached the deceased’s door and asked him to get down while he was lying on a cot in his home.

JUDGMENT

In this case, the Court had four following observations:

1. With regard to Section 34, it represents the idea of shared culpability for committing a crime, whereby there must be a common intention in order for there to be liability. Its application is encouraged by involvement in the commission of the offense in service of a common aim. 
2. Even if the abettor is not present when the offense is committed, Section 109 may still apply if he has encouraged the offense to be committed, participated in a conspiracy to commit an offense with one or more other people, and as a result of that conspiracy, an illegal act or omission occurs, or has purposefully assisted in the commission of an offense by an act or illegal commission. 
3. A criminal conspiracy is the assumption that two or more people have an agreement to commit an illegal act or to cause an act that is not illegal to be committed by illegal means. It is distinct from other offenses in that it becomes illegal just to promise to do something, even if no action is taken to carry it out. 
4. It appears quite likely that the appellant was either there with the other three co-accused or in the vicinity at the time of Mohd. Yahya’s actual murder. However, it appears that this evidence is insufficient to establish his presence at the location beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, we are inclined to grant the appellant the benefit of the doubt regarding the Section 302 charge; see Section

CONCLUSION

The main factor influencing abetting is the abettor’s intention. However, in order to be held accountable for the crime, the prosecution must demonstrate mens rea, or a guilty mentality, along with an actus reus, or wrongful deed, in accordance with Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code. It is important to remember that remarks made by someone who is furious cannot be interpreted as encouragement or incitement of any kind because a responsible person cannot control his words when he is furious, whereas, in a conspiracy, both conspirators will be aware that a crime has been committed. They share responsibility for the conspiracy’s acts and contribute equally; thus, they are held equally accountable. 

A scenario known as “abetting by conspiracy” occurs when there is both conspiracy and aiding in the same instance. The accused is tried by the prosecution on counts of conspiracy and abetment. The court has complete discretion over whether to find the accused guilty of conspiracy or just of abetment. Cases of dower deaths are prime illustrations of conspiracy abetment. The present case expanded the horizon of criminal conspiracy. The court observed and took into account that criminal conspiracy is a much wider term than abetment and includes within its ambit elements other than abetment and thus has a wider scope.

By definition, conspiracies are usually created in secrecy. Therefore, direct evidence of a conspiracy from completely impartial sources or from complete strangers is exceedingly uncommon. However, circumstantial evidence can be used to prove criminal conspiracy just like it can be used for other offenses. In fact, evidence of a conspiracy is typically inferential; nonetheless, the inference needs to be supported by substantial evidence. Relevant material includes, among other things, the surrounding conditions and the actions of the past and present.