CASE BRIEF: NAIM AHMED V. STATE OF DELHI, (2023) 1 SCR 1061

CASE NAME	Naim Ahmed v. State of Delhi, (2023) 1 SCR 1061
CITATION	(2023) SCC OnLine SC 89
COURT	Supreme Court of India
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice Bela M. Trivedi and Justice Ajay Rastogi
PETITIONER	Naim Ahmed
RESPONDENT	State of Delhi
DECIDED ON	Decided on 30th January, 2023

INTRODUCTION

The Indian Penal Code (IPC), which defines rape, is the main subject of the case Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), which was resolved on January 30, 2023. A significant element of Indian criminal law, Section 376, criminalizes non-consensual sexual actions to protect people’s bodily integrity and dignity, especially that of women. The severity of such transgressions in Indian society is highlighted by the law, which imposes harsh punishments on those found guilty. A comprehensive framework for punishing rape is provided under Section 376 of the IPC, with different levels of punishment depending on the circumstances, the seriousness of the crime, and the relationship between the accused and the victim. It contains clauses that increase the penalties for severe types of rape, including crimes carried out by those in positions of authority, gang rape, rape of minors, and rape that occurs in custody. This section’s minimum sentence is often seven years of hard labor, but it can also be life in prison or, in certain situations, the death penalty.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The prosecution’s case, presented to the Sessions Court, stated that, in 2009, the prosecutrix, her husband, and their three children lived in a rented property at C-1/3/5, Sanjay Enclave, Uttam Nagar, Delhi. In addition, the accused was living on rented property right in front of her home. The prosecutrix filed a complaint against the accused on March 21, 2015, claiming, among other things, that the accused was trying to convince her that her spouse wasn’t making enough money and that he (the accused) had a decent career and would provide for her in accordance with his status. Additionally, the accused promised to formally consummate their marriage (nikah). After that, the accused began calling her at different locations with the goal of having unlawful sex with her, and as a result, she became pregnant in 2011. She further claimed that the accused convinced the prosecutor that he would wed her following the birth of the child. In addition, he gave her the assurance that he was single and that he would bring her back to his hometown after their marriage.

The accused lured her away in 2012 to a different rental property at the Kapashera Border Nathu Mal Building, where they carried on their illegal connection. After a while, the accused left the rented property, claiming to have to go back to his hometown since his parents were very sick. He also ordered the prosecutrix to file for divorce from her husband and forced her to move in with the minor child, Naman. In the complaint, the prosecutrix also claimed that the accused had misled her into believing he had returned to his home country when, in reality, he had not, as she discovered when she visited the call center where he worked. When she protested at his workplace, he promised to marry her soon, and in 2012, she went to his home country and discovered he was already married and had children. The accused’s parents objected to her being there. The accused continued to promise to marry her after that, but they never got married. The complaint was thus made. The aforementioned complaint was filed under the Indian Penal Code’s Section 376 on March 21, 2015, as File No. 412/2015, at Police Station Bindapur, District South West, Delhi, against the accused.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether the accused is liable to be prosecuted under Sec. 376 of IPC?
Can the accused take the defense of consent and knowledge in this case?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Arguments on behalf of the appellant

Due to the Sessions Court’s and the High Court’s inability to consider the facts from an appropriate angle, the appellant was found guilty under Section 376 IPC, leading to a flagrant injustice.
Using Section 375 read with Section 90 of the IPC, he argued that since the prosecutrix had acknowledged in her testimony that she had been in a consenting sexual relationship with the appellant from 2009 to 2010 and that this relationship had continued until the appellant’s child was born in 2011 until the complaint was filed in 2015, it was impossible to conclude that the accused-appellant had committed rape in the sense defined by Clause-Secondly of Section 375 read with Section 90 of the IPC.
It was evident from the prosecutrix’s filing of the complaint in March 2015 that she intended to abuse the legal system by fabricating accusations against the accused in order to defraud him of money. She gave birth to the child in November 2011 and traveled to his hometown in 2012.
He further argued that notwithstanding the appellant’s own account, she had maintained a relationship with the accused for around four years following the child’s birth and had not abandoned the duty of the kid born of his loins. She only filed the lawsuit when the accused declined to comply with her demand that they give her a significant sum of money.

Arguments on the behalf of the respondent

The state argued, however, that this Court should not get involved since the Sessions Court and the High Court concurrently recorded findings of facts against the appellant-accused, finding him guilty under Section 376 IPC.
He claimed that even in the absence of any other evidence, the prosecution had established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant had deceitfully promised to marry the prosecutrix in order to entice her to engage in sexual relations. However, he broke that promise after she gave birth, demonstrating that the appellant had obtained her consent while misrepresenting the truth.

Arguments on behalf of Amicus Curiae

There was a substantial difference between “rape” and “consensual sex,” and the accused had to carefully consider whether the court had issued a false promise of marriage out of malice or whether the accused had simply broken their word.
Counsel said that the lower courts had appropriately considered the prosecutrix’s evidence in coming to a conclusion that, in accordance with Section 90 of the IPC, the prosecutrix’s consent to engage in sexual relations with the accused was a misrepresentation of fact. As a result, the prosecutrix’s case was covered by Clause – Second of Section 375 IPC.

JUDGMENT

The prosecutrix, a married mother of three, could not have behaved in accordance with the appellant’s purported false promise or under the impression of truth when she gave her agreement to engage in sexual relations with the appellant, the court said. She undoubtedly maintained this kind of interaction with him for at least five years before filing a complaint in 2015. If the claims she made during her deposition before the court are accepted at face value, it would be excessive to interpret them as “rape” on the part of the appellant. The prosecutrix, a married mother of three, was smart and mature enough to comprehend the gravity of the act she was giving her agreement for, whether it was morally right or wrong. According to the accused’s further statement, which was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., she had made the complaint because he had refused to comply with her demand that he pay her an enormous sum of money. Because of this, it is impossible to hold the appellant guilty of rape under Section 375 because of the facts and circumstances of the case, even if it were true that the prosecutrix gave her consent for the appellant’s sexual relationship under false pretenses. It is right and proper that the accused be exonerated of the charges brought against him. Naturally, since the appellant took up the child’s responsibilities and paid the prosecutrix the appropriate amount of compensation, the directive from the lower courts regarding the payment of compensation will stand.

CONCLUSION

It is important to remember that the fundamental rules of criminal law require the prosecution to establish the accused person’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt through the presentation of strong evidence. Nevertheless, given the customs and values of Indian society, as well as the increasing rate at which the social crime known as “rape” is committed, the courts are able to establish a presumption of guilt under Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act. According to Section 114A, in some circumstances involving rape, there may be a presumption that consent was not given. According to the aforementioned provision, in the event that the accused is found to have engaged in sexual activity and it becomes apparent whether the woman who is allegedly the victim of the rape gave her consent or not, the court will assume that she did not.

The Naim Ahamed case serves as a reminder of how seriously Section 376 IPC violations are regarded by Indian law. The legal system seeks to fairly administer justice during the trial while guaranteeing respect for due process and emphasizing victim protection. In order to ensure responsibility and victim protection, the case serves as more evidence of the necessity of prompt court action in treating sexual crimes. This case highlights the importance of analyzing evidence and also sets an example for the protection of the accused and proving the maxim innocent until guilty. The Court has highlighted that every allegation of rape is not true and consent is a defense that the defense can take. Along with the consent, the experience and the mens rea of the victim are also to be taken into account.