CASE NAME	Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955
CITATION	1962 AIR 955, 1962 SCR SUPL. (2) 769
COURT	Supreme Court of India
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice  Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice S.K. Das, Justice A.K. Sarkar, Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Justice J.R. Mudholkar
PETITIONER	Kedar Nath Singh
RESPONDENTS	State of Bihar
DECIDED ON	Decided on 20th January, 1962

INTRODUCTION

Thomas Babington Macaulay wrote the sedition law, which was incorporated into the Indian Penal Code in 1870. Section 124A of the statute states that using any words—spoken, written, or displayed—to incite hatred or contempt for the government is illegal. Part 124A of the Indian Penal Code was dubbed by Mahatma Gandhi as the most politically charged part, with the intention of restricting citizens’ freedoms. Jawaharlal Nehru shared a similar opinion regarding this clause, pointing out that the sooner this provision was removed, the better, as it was offensive and extremely disagreeable. The Hon’ble High Court held in Ram Nandan v. State of Uttar Pradesh that section 124-A restricted free speech in ways that were not in the public interest, declaring the section to be ultra vires. The validity of this section has been contested in numerous cases. However, in the landmark case of Kedarnath Singh v. State of Bihar, this ruling was overturned.

In 1937, Clause 113 of the Draft Indian Penal Code introduced the law concerning the crime of sedition to India. However, the sedition-related clause was removed from the Indian Penal Code when it was passed in 1860. This unusual removal was justified by the claim that it was an “unaccountable mistake.” Since sedition could be punished under other Act parts, many historians think that this particular section was left out. Upon observing the growing Wahabi activity in the years preceding 1870, the British were immediately pressured to pass special legislation regarding the crime of sedition. 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case concerns the misappropriation of party terminology. Kedarnath Singh, a member of the Forward Communist Party of Bihar, used the term “dogs” to refer to C.I.D. officers and “goondas” to refer to the Indian National Congress party. Singh continued by expressing his belief in a coming revolution that would reduce the country’s smugglers—capitalists, zamindars, and Congress leaders—to ashes and establish a government composed of the impoverished and oppressed people of India. He also took aim at Vinobha Bhave’s land-redistribution initiatives. 

Due to the terms he used and the statements he made, a case was brought against him under sections 124A, sedition, and 505, public mischief. As a result, he was given a one-year sentence of harsh imprisonment. The case was appealed to a single bench of the Patna High Court, where the conviction was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the speech in its entirety was unquestionably seditious, that the charge against the appellant was nothing more than a vilification of the government, and that it was replete with incitements to revolution. It is not a speech that criticizes any specific government policy or initiative.

ISSUES RAISED

• With reference to Article 19(1)(a), read in conjunction with Article 19(2) of the Constitution, are Sections 124A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code considered ultra vires? 
• Whether the act of inciting violence, disrupting law and order, or intending to cause chaos is necessary to qualify as a sedition offense?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Arguments on behalf of the petitioner

• The Indian Penal Code, sections 124A and 505, have resulted in the appellant’s conviction. Due to their violations of Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, both of these parts are extra vires. 
• A speech is punishable under Section 124A whether it disrupts the public order or not. Speeches of both the acceptable and prohibited sorts are included in this section. The main section’s interpretation remains unaffected by the explanation provided in section 124A. A citizen has the right to criticize the government in a democratic setting in an effort to alter it. 
• In these cases, two questions arise: (i) does section 124A implement a law that is in the public interest, and (ii) does this provision impose reasonable limits in the public interest? The right law is taken into account in the ruling in I. L. R. (1958) 2 All. 84, which ruled that s. 124A was ultra vires.

Arguments on behalf of the respondent

• The Court’s interpretation of statute language in relation to a given set of facts has evolved throughout time in tandem with shifts in society’s social and political landscape and the perspectives of its rational constituents. Section 124A is located in a chapter pertaining to offenses against the government. Consequently, it is an offense against the State rather than libel against any individual offender. 
• The Federal Court and the Privy Council have presented the Court with two different interpretations of s. 124A. This Court should accept the section Court’s interpretation since it would render the section constitutional. 
• Section 124A will remain in effect even if the Privy Council’s interpretation is found to be accurate. Although some cases in which public order is not likely disturbed are included in the section, it cannot be invalidated because the section clearly considers cases where the speech is likely to disturb public order. As such, the section is in the interest of public order as contemplated in Art. 19(2). 
• According to English law, a tumultuous or disruptive aim is necessary for seditious intention. The Council has not gone so far as to argue that a tendency to disturb public order was not a need for s. 124A; rather, it has merely stated that actual incitement of violence was not. There is a tendency to disrupt public comments or publications that incite hatred, contempt, or discontent with the legally formed government, even though the public is not required for the offense.

JUDGMENT

The Indian Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the sedition-penalizing sections of the Indian Penal Code. Kedar Nath Singh was found guilty of sedition and inciting public disturbances due to a speech he gave endorsing the Forward Communist Party and criticizing the government. The Court reasoned that the criminalization of sedition is only a constitutionally permissible limitation on the right to free speech in cases when the comments are meant to violently disturb the peace in the community. The Supreme Court made it clear that judges must interpret section 124A, which means that two requirements must be met in order to establish the crime of sedition: 

• The acts must be intended to subvert the government through violent means, or they must have a tendency to do so. 
• Additionally, the acts must incite violence in order to create disorder or disturb public peace and order.

CONCLUSION

The ruling, which emphasizes the value of free speech and cautions against putting too much faith in the state, is one of the court’s most well-known and frequently cited precedents. It has also greatly aided in the development of the judiciary by emphasizing the direct and unmistakable connection between speech that is suppressed and the feared public disorder. In 2011, the court ruled in a case under the now-expired Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) that a person who belongs to a terrorist organization cannot be found guilty just for being a member of the group unless they have actively encouraged others to engage in criminal activity. Additionally, the court distinguished between “advocacy” and “incitement” in the well-known Shreya Singhal case, ruling that only the latter could be punished, consistent with Article 19(2).

Undoubtedly, the ruling sets a solid precedent for future cases since it upholds each person’s right to freedom without jeopardizing national security, which ought to be the primary goal of any state. The court correctly noted that while section 124A is lawful, its reach must be limited because failing to do so would call into question basic rights. However, the provision is still in effect even after the Supreme Court’s ruling, regardless of whether the allegedly seditious conduct or words can incite violence or produce public disorder, as evidenced by some recent cases discussed in the follow-up. 

The government is openly abusing this provision to silence anyone who dares to voice opposition. This ruling, which is among the clearest in the world, lays out two conditions that, if met, would make a person a criminal; however, it is being abused time and time again to silence citizens who are critical of the government and its direct or indirect violations of their fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Indian constitution.