| CASE NAME | INDRA SARMA VS. V.K.V SARMA |
| CIATION | AIR 2014 SC 309 |
| BENCH | JUSTICE K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, JUSTICE PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE |
| APPELLANT | INDRA SARMA |
| RESPONDENT | V.K.V SARMA |
Facts of the case
The appellant, Indra Sarma, began a live-in relationship with V.K.V. Sarma, who had a wife and two children in 1992. Knowing about his marital life, the relationship lasted for more than 14 years. They cohabited, shared the same dwelling, and the respondent used to maintain Indra. The respondent terminated the relationship in 2006 and requested her to leave the house.
Alone and economically vulnerable, Indra Sarma instituted a case under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA), seeking protection, residence, and maintenance under Sections 18 to 20, asserting that she was in a relationship with the respondent “in the nature of marriage.”
Though relief was not granted by the Trial Court and the Karnataka High Court, Indra went to the Supreme Court seeking the live-in relationship status under the PWDVA.
Issues
The Supreme Court was asked to resolve the following principal questions:
- Whether a live-in relationship can be said to be a “relationship in the nature of marriage” under Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
- Is a woman who commits to a live-in relationship with a married man knowingly so eligible for relief under the PWDVA?
- What are the decisive factors in deciding whether a live-in relationship resembles marriage?
Analysis
The Court undertook a detailed examination of the definition of “relationship in the nature of marriage” under Section 2(f) of the PWDVA, and formulated certain rules of interpretation:
(a) Statutory Interpretation of Section 2(f)
The Court held that the phrase “relationship in the nature of marriage” is meant to extend protection to women in de facto relationships of marital nature. It has to be interpreted in the context of the object and purpose of the PWDVA, viz., to extend protection to women against violence and vulnerability emerging in domestic life.
(b) Tests for “Relationship in the Nature of Marriage”
The Court reaffirmed and expounded the tests previously enunciated in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010), viz.:
- Whether they stayed together for a long period.
- Whether they had shared household responsibilities and a sexual relationship.
- If they were socially recognized as spouses.
- If they had children.
- Whether the woman was emotionally or financially dependent on the man.
- Whether the relationship was permanent and exclusive.
Here, while the couple lived together and shared duties, Indra knew very well that the respondent was legally married, which breached the pillar of exclusivity and social acceptability.
(c) Effect of Knowledge of Marital Status
The Court ruled that a woman who of her own free will engages in a relation with a married man cannot insist that the relation is “in the nature of marriage.” It cannot be equated with a valid marriage or even a valid cohabiting relation because it is not clothed with legal and moral sanction.
(d) Protection of Other Vulnerable Women
The Court did hold that women who are misled into thinking their partner is unmarried can be eligible for relief under the PWDVA, as they enter the relationship with a false premise. But Indra was not given this protection, as she voluntarily entered into a relationship with a married man.
Judgment
The Supreme Court, sympathetic to the appellant, however, rejected the appeal. The most important decisions were:
- The appellant was not covered by the PWDVA because she was not in a relationship “in the nature of marriage” as defined in Section 2(f).
- The relationship was not open, was not exclusive, and broke the law of fidelity since the man was married.
- Women going into live-in relationships knowing of their partner’s previous marriage are entering at their own risk, and the law does not provide them with legal redress under the DV Act.
Conclusion
This is a landmark judgment which establishes the extent and boundary of the term “relationship in the nature of marriage” under the PWDVA. The judgment categorizes that:
- Only relationships that closely resemble valid marriages, marked by exclusivity, continuity, and mutual commitment, can attract legal protection.
- Knowledge of illegality (the man already being married) precludes any claim for protection.
- Although the PWDVA is a beneficial act, it should be put into practice within the limits of social and legal standards.
In rejecting relief to the appellant, the Court intimated that future legislation and social welfare programs could potentially have to intervene and fill such gaps in the protection of the law.
Significance
- Definitional clarity: The case defines and restricts the term “relationship in the nature of marriage.”
- Recognition of vulnerability: The Court recognized that not all live-in women are similarly situated—those deceived could be entitled to protection.
- Moral and legal balance: It finds a balance between social morality, legal sanctity of marriage, and safeguarding women’s rights.
- The judgment has since been cited in a number of cases related to residence and upkeep rights under live-in relationships.
A cohabitation with a legally married man, undertaken by a woman knowingly, is not a “relationship in the nature of marriage” as defined under Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and does not entitle the woman to protection under the Act.
