INTRODUCTION

The Indian Penal Code’s Chapter IX addresses offenses committed by or in connection with public employees. This chapter is divided into six sections, numbered 166 through 171. This chapter addresses two categories of offenses: those that can be committed solely by public employees and those that affect public employees even when they are not public employees. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 removes Sections 161 to 165A from the Code and incorporates them into the Act with a stiffer penalty. Section 166A of the Indian Penal Code defines “Public servant disobeying direction under law” as an offense. The provision states that a public servant may face up to two years in prison, a fine, or both if they disobey any legal directive with the intent to harm someone or knowing that doing so will probably cause harm to someone else.

The crime of malicious prosecution is frequently committed against judges and public employees when these officials refuse to comply with individual demands. The officials’ reluctance to discriminate against people based on their social, economic, or political standing encourages people to make up accusations against one another in order to intimidate them into engaging in activities that are not in line with the majority population. The purposeful filing of false charges against someone with the goal of discrediting them and bringing them before the law for a crime they have never committed is known as malicious prosecution. Abuse and personal vengeance through the wrong use of judicial machinery is the method established by law with malicious purpose.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The respondent was hired by Indira Gandhi Rastriya Udan Academy, Raebareli (henceforth abbreviated as “IGRUA”) as a “Auto Helper.” On September 02, 1994, the respondent received a promotion to Tractor Driver with a pay grade of Rs. 950–1500. The respondent, Ram Chandra Singh, and he were elevated to the position of driver, but they were not paid the driver’s income, according to the writ case they filed with this court, titled Writ case No. 5782(SS) of 2000. After being removed from service, the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 2226(SS) of 2003 to contest the dismissal order.

The petitioner was summoned under Sections 166 and 506 IPC by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raebareli, by order dated June 20, 2005, after taking into account the allegations in the complaint and the statements made by the complainant and witness. He filed a contempt petition, in which the accused submitted a fraudulent affidavit, after the aforementioned interim order was not followed through on. The claim that the compensation for a driver and a tractor driver was the same was untrue.

But the aforementioned affidavit was a fake since there was no such position in the Academy. The petitioner went to the police station after learning of these facts, but nothing was done. As a result, he filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., which was denied. After that, he met with the Director General of Police, who gave the Superintendent of Police in Raebareli instructions to file a complaint against the defendant. As a result, the accused has been named in a case filed at Police Station-Furshatganj under Case Crime No. 12 of 2005 under Section 420 IPC.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether the accused is liable under Section 166 of IPC for not registering the complaint?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Argument on behalf of the Petitioner

• The petitioner has been employed as IGRUA’s chief administrative officer, and the organization is registered under the terms of the Society Registration Act. The petitioner is not a government servant because he works for a living in society. 
• Since IGRUA is an independent organization, none of its workers, including the petitioner, may be considered public servants for the purposes of Section 21 of the IPC. In accordance with Article 12 of the Indian Constitution, IGRUA may, at most, be described as a state instrumentality; nonetheless, its executives and workers cannot be regarded as public servants. As a result, it is claimed that the petitioner’s charges under Section 166 IPC were framed incorrectly. 
• Furthermore, it has been claimed that the petitioner had filed five separate contempt petitions, two of which were under Section 340 Cr.P.C., alleging the same thing that was in the complaint. This Court has rejected all of the contempt petitions, including the motions made under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. Given the foregoing, the Court’s process has been flagrantly abused by continuing the proceedings in Case No. 226 of 2010 and filing the charge. The accusations have been written mindlessly and mechanically.
• Additionally, it was claimed that the police had submitted the case’s final closure report. The petitioner received a death threat if he didn’t withdraw the case. On April 16, 2005, the accused stopped the petitioner on his way to Police Station-Furshatganj and imprisoned him for an hour. He was mistreated and told he and his family would be killed if he did not close the investigation. He added that on May 3, 2005, information regarding this incidence was sent to the Superintendent of Police by registered mail. He had already complained verbally and in writing to the Superintendent of Police and the Station Officer between April 16, 2005, and May 2, 2005, but nothing had been done. 

Argument on behalf of the Respondent

• The petitioner should face the prosecution because charges have been brought against them. This Court shouldn’t tamper with the ongoing trial at this point. 
• Furthermore, it has been argued that the dismissal of the contempt petitions and the application filed under Section 340 Cr.P.C. have no bearing on the current trial because the criminal trial and the contempt jurisdiction operate in two distinct domains. As a result, the present petition will not be affected by the dismissal of the contempt petitions or the application filed under Section 340 Cr.P.C. 
• Furthermore, it has been argued that the current petition, which was filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is unmaintainable because it was brought in opposition to this Court’s August 11, 2011, dismissal of the petitioner’s initial revision.

JUDGMENT

The Court held that it would be an abuse of the court’s process to continue the criminal proceedings against the petitioner in Case No. 226 of 2010 (Sunder Lal Maurya versus D.K. Mahesh), which is currently pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 15, Raebareli, under Sections 166 and 506 IPC. As such, the proceedings may be quashed. Given the aforementioned, the current petition is granted, and the proceedings in Case No. 226 of 2010 (Sunder Lal Maurya versus D.K. Mahesh), which are currently pending under Sections 166 and 506 IPC in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 15, Raebareli, are quashed.

CONCLUSION

In this case, many arguments were given relating to the liability of the accused and in defence of accused. The Court after examining all the allegations and defences came to the conclusion that proceedings must be quashed. It also interpreted the laws and analysed them in a manner to be effective to the present case. When a public official deliberately disregards legal directives and knows that their actions as public servants or their violation of the law will harm someone, Section 166 IPC comes into play. The only people to whom Section 166 IPC applies are public servants. IGRUA, as previously stated, is a society. The petitioner worked for the organization. Per Section 21 of the IPC, the petitioner is not a public servant. The society’s employee does not fit into any of the twelve categories of individuals listed in Section 21 of the IPC. As a result, the petitioner’s charges under Section 166 IPC are completely baseless and untenable. 

Criminal intimidation is punishable under Section 506 of the IPC. The petitioner’s litigation history is undisputed; in addition to the two writ petitions for his promotion and against his termination from service, he has filed numerous cases, including five contempt petitions before this court and two applications under Section 340 Cr.P.C. The petitioner issued the order of dismissal. The claim that the petitioner was the victim of criminal intimidation has not been substantiated by the witness who was questioned under Section 202 Cr.P.C. The witness did not even utter a word in his Section 202 Cr.P.C. statement that would have violated Section 506 IPC. Thus, there is no foundation or supporting documentation for even filing a case under Section 506 IPC. A petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is maintainable even after a revision filed under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is dismissed, according to well-established law. There is no bar to the remedy provided by Section 482 Cr.P.C. Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not grant any new powers; rather, it only seeks to uphold and acknowledge the High Court’s existing authority.