CASE BRIEF: DEVENDRAN v. STATE OF T.N. (1997) 11 SCC 720

CASE NAME	A. Devendran v. State of T.N., (1997) 11 SCC 720
CITATION	1998 SCC (Cri) 220
COURT	Supreme Court of India
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice G.N. Ray and Justice G.B. Pattanaik
PETITIONER	A. Devendran and Another
RESPONDENT	State of Tami Nadu
DECIDED ON	21st October, 1997

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of India decided A. Deivendran vs the State of Tamil Nadu on October 21, 1997, about a well-planned robbery that ended in several murders. The prosecution claimed that A. Deivendran and the co-accused conspired to rob PW-5’s home using inside knowledge from a domestic worker familiar with the place. With pistols and other weapons, the suspects entered the house through the chimney on November 24, 1992. Three people were slain during the robbery, leading to the accused’s capture and trial.

The trial court convicted Deivendran of murder under IPC Section 302 and sentenced him to death. PW-1, an accomplice turned approver, and the seizure of stolen things and firearms from Deivendran’s possession led to the conviction. The Supreme Court heard an appeal after the High Court upheld the trial court’s decision.

FACTS OF THE CASE

It involves the alleged robbery of Devendran and PW-5’s house. After recovering from his illness, Devendran was requested to work at the house. PW-5 was advised by accused Nos. 2 and 3 that the residence had many valuables and cash for robbery when he was working. Devendran said dacoity would be hard without house topography. He also said the detainees would leave on 24.11.1992, and the only way in was by the chimney.

The suspects entered through the chimney carrying a double-barreled gun, pistol, tiny knife, torch, gloves, and ropes. A rope led them into the house through the chimney. Devendran pulled the old lady’s neck and roped her legs as she left through the kitchen. PW-1 was chosen to guard, but the lady died before the water arrived. The accused then strangled a sleeping woman with a cloth in another room. She died while the second accused grabbed her legs.

A girl in the house fled, but the accused threatened to kill her if she made a disturbance. They wanted her house keys, and PW-2 handed them a specific set. They crowbarred a container of diamonds and cash and heard a jeep horn. PW-2 fled through the main door to tell her parents. Nagarajan, the driver, and PW-5, PW-2’s father, rushed into the home and shot him, causing chest injuries, and he fell. All suspects stole jewels and cash and fled through the stairway. Several people had gathered by now, but none could catch them. The accused distributed the decorations from PW-5’s house and dispersed. PW-2 made a formal complaint with the police, which became a FIR, and they investigated.

The case was committed to the Court of Sessions on 27.1.1994, and a pardon application was submitted under CrPC 164 on 25.8.1994. On 14.11.1994, the Chief Judicial Magistrate pardoned Mohd. Rafiq and changed the accusations and sentences. Accused No. 5 was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The defense examined three witnesses and presented several papers, while the prosecution interrogated 25 witnesses and exhibited many documents. The learned Sessions Judge and High Court trusted approver PW-1’s testimony and found it supported by the doctor’s testimony and the accused persons’ recoveries. Both courts accepted PW-2 and 5’s evidence that the three appellants were involved in the crime.

ISSUES RAISED

How reliable is the approver’s evidence for charging the accused?
Is the approver’s proof reliable enough to convict the accused?
Omitting approver evidence from determining if the prosecution case is proven beyond a reasonable doubt?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Arguments on behalf of the Petitioner

Section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (the ‘Code’) allows the Sessions Judge to grant pardon once the matter is committed to the Court of Sessions. The Sessions Judge did not act and transferred the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who pardoned the offender, making the ruling unconstitutional. Thus, Mr. Rafiq is not a legal approver.
The learned Counsel also submitted that even if the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s order pardoning the accused is sustained, a violation of Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 of the Code vitiates the proceedings and excludes the approver’s evidence as PW-1.
Under Section 306(4)(a), the accused has a crucial right, and non-compliance voids the entire proceeding to examine the approver as a witness, according to the experienced Counsel. He said that the approver’s evidence seemed exculpatory and unreliable.
The learned Counsel further claims that the accused became an approver under duress and threat, hence PW-1’s evidence is unreliable.
The learned Counsel’s final point against the approver’s evidence is that it lacks independent confirmation of the accused’s identity or role, making it untrustworthy and unreliable.
The learned Counsel contended that although Devendran is accused of killing three persons, the prosecution’s evidence does not sustain the death punishment.

Arguments on behalf of the Respondent

Subsection (3) of Section 10 of the Code allows a Sessions Judge to delegate his Code duties to a subordinate officer, the experienced counsel said. The challenged Sessions Judge’s order directing the Chief Judicial Magistrate to process the pardon application in accordance with the law is not without jurisdiction. Sections 306 and 307 suggest that the Sessions Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate can give pardons together.
The learned counsel also submitted that Section 306, particularly Sub-section (4)(a), is not invoked when an accused is pardoned under Section 307 after the case is committed to the Court of Sessions. Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 is not a condition; hence, it cannot be applied to a situation where a pardon is granted under Section 307 after the case is committed to the Court of Sessions.
The learned counsel advised the Court not to appreciate the evidence unless there has been a violation of natural justice or a misreading of a vital part of the evidence or the Court has committed an error of law or legal process or procedure by which justice has failed. The learned counsel further recommended corroboration of the approver’s testimony by independent sources to make it trustworthy.
The learned counsel further stated that the accused’s murder of three people and robbery are part of the same transaction, thus the accused’s possession of stolen ornaments proves he did both. The residuary evidence of PWs-2 and 5 and other recoveries from the accused can support the appellants’ conviction even without the approver’s evidence.

JUDGMENT

The Court maintained A. Deivendran’s murder conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was decided that the evidence—which included the discovery of guns and stolen goods—was adequate to prove his involvement in the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court exonerated the appellant of the criminal conspiracy accusation under Section 120B IPC. There was insufficient evidence to prove that the accused conspired to conduct the offense.

The court upheld the appellant’s conviction under Section 449 IPC (home trespassing to commit an offense punishable by death). The conditions of this section were met by the appellant’s entry into the premises to commit robbery and subsequent killings.

The appellant was exonerated by the court of the accusation of voluntarily causing grievous harm using hazardous weapons or weapons under Section 326/34 IPC. The allegation that the appellant used a dangerous weapon to cause serious harm was not supported by the evidence.