| NAME OF THE CASE | DANIAL LATIFI & ANR V. UOI |
| CITATION | (2001) 7 SCC 740 |
| BENCH | G.B. PATTANAIK, S. RAJENDRA BABU, D.P. MOHAPATRA, DORAISWAMY RAJU& SHIVRAJ V. PATIL |
| PETITONER | DANIAL LATIFI & ANR |
| RESPONDENT | UNION OF INDIA |
| DATE OF JUDGEMENT | 28TH SEP 2001 |
FACT
The case emerged as a constitutional challenge to the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (MWPRDA), enacted on the back of the Shah Bano judgment of 1985. That judgment had declared that Muslim divorced women were entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) even after the iddat period. The Shah Bano judgment had caused huge controversy among some Muslim circles who believed it was an intrusion into their personal laws.
In order to placate such feelings, the 1986 Act was enacted, seemingly restricting a Muslim husband’s liability to pay maintenance only for the period of iddat. The Act was criticized as discriminatory and unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution.
Danial Latifi, Shah Bano’s lawyer, presented a writ petition questioning the constitutional validity of this Act on the grounds that it deprived divorced Muslim women of equal protection and dignified life.
ISSUE
- Whether the enactment of the Muslim women (protection of rights on divorce) ACT, 1986 complies with the constitutional framework and is legally Valid?
- Whether the provision of the 1986 act conflicts with the fundamental rights to equality, non-discrimination, and dignity as guaranteed under article 14, 15, and 21 of the constitution of India ?
ARGUMENTS PETITIONERS (DANIAL LATIFI AND OTHERS):
The 1986 Act is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it overrides Section 125 CrPC only for Muslim women, and hence is contrary to equality (Article 14) and non-discrimination based on sex (Article 15).
It erodes the right to life with dignity (Article 21) by limiting maintenance to a brief iddat period (around 90 days following divorce).
The Act has the potential to leave divorced Muslim women penniless, which goes against the object of a secular law provision like Section 125 CrPC.
Respondent (Union of India):
Maintained that the Act constituted a constitutional exercise of Parliament’s authority to legislate in matter of personal laws (Entry 5 of List III – Concurrent List). Argued the Act is not against fundamental rights since it offers alternative redresses, i.e., seeking maintenance from relatives or the Wakf Board.
RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS ENFORCED
- Section 125 CrPC – Maintenance for wives who cannot maintain themselves.
- Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986:
- Section 3 – Reasonable and just provision and maintenance during iddat.
- Section 4 – Maintenance by relatives or Wakf Board subsequent to iddat. Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution.
JUDGMENT & REASONING (RATIO DECIDENDI):
The Constitution Bench affirmed the constitutional validity of the 1986 Act but interpreted it in a progressive and expansive manner, harmoniously reading it with constitutional assurances: Fair and Reasonable Provision is Not Limited to Iddat:
The Court held that the “reasonable and fair provision and maintenance” to be provided by the husband according to Section 3(1)(a) is not limited to the iddat period. It can be a lump-sum or for the future, and this has to be discharged within the iddat, not just limited to it.
No Contradiction with Section 125 CrPC: The Court ruled that without any reasonable provision under the 1986 Act, a divorced woman can always go to the magistrate under Section 125 CrPC. Shunning Unconstitutionality through Harmonious Construction: Rather than declaring the law as void, the Court construed the law in a way that is compatible with Articles 14, 15, and 21 so that divorced Muslim women won’t end up being destitute.
Duty of Husband Continues: The Court stressed that the responsibility of a Muslim husband is to provide reasonably and justly for the whole of his ex-wife’s future life, although the payment must be made within the iddat.
SIGNIFICANCE & IMPACT
The decision retained the spirit of Shah Bano without compromising the 1986 Act. It realistically extended the right of maintenance to Muslim women after iddat without invalidating the 1986 Act. The decision reaffirmed the dominance of constitutional rights even in the sphere of personal laws. Granted judicial clarity that Section 125 CrPC is not displaced and continues to apply if relief under MWPRDA is insufficient. Set the stage for subsequent decisions such as Iqbal Bano v. State of U.P. (2007) and Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan (2009), which cemented this line of interpretation. Obiter Dicta (Judicial Observations)
“No Act can be construed to frustrate its object or to transgress the constitutional mandate.” The Court recognized the condition of divorced Muslim women and asserted the value of social justice and dignity, regardless of religious boundaries.
CONCLUSION
The Danial Latifi ruling is an exemplar of judicial equipoise, interpreting a contentious religious law in a constitutionally rational and socially equitable fashion. By interpreting the 1986 Act in a progressive spirit, the Supreme Court safeguarded the rights of Muslim women without offending religious feelings. It remains a landmark case in the field of personal laws, gender justice, and interpretation of the Constitution, and is still being quoted in cases of family law and maintenance matters throughout India.
