CASE NAME	Dakhi Singh v. State, 1955 SCC OnLine All 281
CITATION	AIR 1955 ALL 379, 1955 CRI LJ 905
COURT	Allahabad High Court
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice Asthana and Justice Roy
APPELLANT	Dakhi Singh
RESPONDENT	The State
DECIDED ON	3rd February 1955

INTRODUCTION

In that role, “homicide” is not an offense. A person cannot be charged with or charged with homicide. Homicide is the killing of a person and may be legal in situations where one needs to use lethal force to defend oneself, for example. The two most serious crimes of illegal homicide are murder and murder. Although both are crimes under customary law, the elements of murder and homicide have been changed by UK parliamentary acts, and the penalties for each are now lawful. The most serious and abhorrent crimes are those that are regarded as homicide offenses, especially murder. Crimes like killing someone else are given unusual significance by the taking of life and the effects it might have on the victim’s family and friends.

The harshest penalties reflect the sincerity with which they are revered. The Murder (Cancelation of Capital Penalty) Act of 1965 establishes a mandatory sentence for murder. The only option available to the designated authority is to sentence the person charged with murder to an indefinite period of incarceration. According to Section 269 of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003, the preliminary adjudicator must specify the minimum sentence that the accused murderer must fulfill in order to be eligible for release under a permit. This should reflect the seriousness of the murder and be based on one of three first stages: full life, thirty years, or fifteen years.

The legal limits of police behavior during arrests and the use of legitimate defenses under the Indian Penal Code are examined in the 1955 case Dakhi Singh v. State. It emphasizes how Sections 46, 76, and 79 should be interpreted, with particular attention to the use of force, factual errors, and the conviction that the law obligates one. In the context of Indian criminal jurisprudence, this case is important for comprehending the boundaries of power and the rules governing using deadly force in law enforcement.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Up Train No. 375, a mixed train from Banaras Cantt. to Allahabad, halted at Handia Khas station on the evening of July 28–29, 1953. Under dubious circumstances, Railway Protection Police (RPP) constable Dukhi Singh spotted Nanka, a contractor’s servant, next to a freight wagon. Despite protests from the engine driver, Rawil, and fireman Ram Manohar, who identified Nanka as a contractor’s agent, he arrested her on suspicion of theft in light of previous instances of tampering at the station.

Nanka got away by jumping from the train as it was leaving. The Havildar Guard illuminated the area with a flare as Dukhi Singh, brandishing a weapon, followed him. Dukhi Singh is accused of threatening Rawil and aiming his gun during the search. When Ram Manohar stepped in and inquired as to why, Dukhi Singh shot him, killing him. Following the encounter, Dukhi Singh was disarmed by other RPP members.

Ram Manohar implicated Dukhi Singh in his final statements to a magistrate and a police inspector. After receiving preliminary care on the train, he was brought to Colvin Hospital in Allahabad, where he passed away from his wounds. A gunshot wound to the abdomen, several internal injuries, and death from shock and bleeding were discovered at a post-mortem. Blood-stained dirt and the weapon, which ballistic analysis verified had been fired during the incident, were among the evidence the police retrieved. Dukhi Singh’s assertion that he shot a thief after receiving incorrect orders raised concerns regarding his legal rationale and motive.

ISSUES RAISED

• Did the actions of Constable Dukhi Singh, including the use of lethal force resulting in the death of fireman Ram Manohar, fall within the scope of lawful authority under Sections 46, 76, and 79 of the Indian Penal Code?
• Whether the offence can be covered under third exception to Section 300 IPC?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Arguments on behalf of the Appellant

• The appellant contended that he carried out his duties by shooting the thief after receiving orders from Havildar Kashi Singh. 
• He further argued that the fact that he struck the firefighter rather than the robber was an absolute accident.
• The appellant believed he might be a thief because he was present under suspicious circumstances. He consequently took him into custody.

Arguments on behalf of the Respondent

• Ex. P1, which Circle Inspector Fida Husain and Ex recorded. The prosecution cited P32, which was recorded by the Tehsildar Magistrate and contained the dying declaration. The prosecution also cited the testimony of Chingen, the train’s second firefighter, Mohammad Nazir Khan P. W. 4, and Rawil P. W. 3, the train’s driver. Bharat Misra P. W. 2, the train’s guard, Sri Fida Husain Circle Inspector P. W. 1, Sri R. N. Roy P. W. 24, the Tehsildar Magistrate, Ram P. W. 19, an R. P. P. policeman who was on the train, and a few other official witnesses. 

JUDGMENT

Following the arrested man’s escape from the moving train, the appellant pursued him in an attempt to re-arrest him. When he was unable to capture him, he fired at him, striking the deceased firefighter in the process. The Court believed that Exception 3 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code would apply in this case. This exception states that if the perpetrator, who is a public official or assists a public servant working to further public justice, goes beyond his authority, culpable homicide is not murder. the law, and kills someone by carrying out an action that he believes is both legal and essential for him to fulfill his responsibilities as a public servant without harboring animosity toward the person he killed. There was no animosity between the deceased and the appellant in this instance. The furtherance of public justice was the appellant’s goal as a public worker. 

He undoubtedly overreached his legal authority and killed the firefighter by carrying out an action that he honestly thought was both legal and essential to carrying out his duties. Section 304, Part II, Penal Code, which punishes culpable homicide not amounting to murder, was the offense committed in these circumstances. Therefore, we conclude that the appellant should have been found guilty under Section 304, Part II rather than Section 302, I. P. C.
For the grounds outlined, the Court granted the appeal to the point where it overturned the appellant’s conviction and punishment under Section 302 and found him guilty under Section 304, part II of the IPC.

CONCLUSION

Regarding the legal use of force in accordance with Sections 46, 76, and 79 of the Indian Penal Code, the case brought up important issues. While Sections 76 and 79 deal with actions committed under false pretenses or the impression of a legal obligation, Section 46 specifies the amount of force that can be used during an arrest. Whether the constable’s actions, which resulted in the fireman’s death, were justified under these regulations or constituted disproportionate and unnecessary use of force was the main point of contention.

The accused was a police constable who was given authority but was required to act within the bounds set down by law, the court stressed. The court considered the necessity and proportionality of the force employed, notwithstanding the defense’s contention that the constable acted in error, believing that it was his legal obligation to stop a suspect from escaping. Given that the firefighter was not the suspected thief, the facts showed that no immediate or genuine threat warranted shooting him. The defense of mistake under Sections 76 and 79 was undermined by the court’s ruling that the force used was excessive and showed carelessness.

In determining culpability, the court found that although a police officer is permitted to use force, this power must be used sparingly, ensuring it is reasonable and required to accomplish the legal goal. These standards were broken by the indiscriminate firing that resulted in the killing of an uninvolved person. Because the accused’s acts did not conform to the standard of care required of law enforcement, the verdict emphasized that the law did not protect them.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the constable’s argument of misplaced duty and found him guilty of negligent homicide that did not amount to murder. This ruling upholds the rule that activities taken beyond the bounds of the law are not immune from legal authority. It acts as a reminder that those in authority must behave sensibly and ensure their deeds align with the law and moral principles. Thus, the decision maintains accountability in the use of state power while striking a balance between the defense of individual rights and the necessity of efficient law enforcement.