Case Brief: Arkal Govind Rajrao v. Ciba Geigy of India – AIR 1985 SC 985

Introduction 

The case of Arkal Govind Raj Rao vs. Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. was adjudicated by the Supreme Court of India on May 6, 1985. The central issue in this case was the classification of Arkal Govind Raj Rao as a “workman” under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, following his termination from the company.

Arkal, who had been employed as a Stenographer-cum-Accountant, was later promoted to the position of Assistant and designated as Group Leader. After his services were terminated in October 1972, he raised an industrial dispute regarding the validity of his termination. The employer contended that Arkal was not a workman due to the nature of his duties, which included both clerical tasks and some supervisory functions.

The Labour Court initially ruled against Arkal, labeling him as an officer of the Covenanted Contractual Staff Cadre rather than a workman. This decision was based on the perception that his role involved significant supervisory responsibilities. Consequently, Arkal appealed to the Supreme Court, which focused on the critical issues of job function, the definition of a workman, and the evidentiary basis for the Labour Court’s conclusions.

The Supreme Court ultimately found that despite having some supervisory duties, Arkal primarily performed clerical work, which meant he qualified as a workman under the Act. The Court quashed the earlier decisions and remanded the case back to the Labour Court for proper adjudication, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between primary duties and incidental tasks in determining employment status.

Facts of the case 

The facts of the Arkal Govind Raj Rao vs. Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. case are as follows:

1. Employment History:

– Arkal Govind Raj Rao was employed by Ciba Geigy of India Ltd. on January 18, 1956, as a Stenographer-cum-Accountant.

– He was promoted to the position of Assistant on January 1, 1966, and later designated as a Group Leader.

2. Termination of Service:

– Arkal’s employment was terminated on October 10, 1972, leading to an industrial dispute concerning the legality and validity of the termination.

– Following the termination, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour in Bombay referred the dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication, addressing both reinstatement and back wages.

3. Legal Proceedings:

– The employer, Ciba Geigy, contended that Arkal was not a “workman” as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act because he performed supervisory functions in addition to clerical tasks.

– The Labour Court conducted hearings, during which evidence from both parties was presented, including testimonies that indicated that Arkal had performed primarily clerical duties.

4. Labour Court’s Finding:

– The Labour Court held that while Arkal had performed some clerical work, he also engaged in supervisory duties such as checking bank reconciliations and overseeing other employees.

– It concluded that his role was not that of a workman but of an officer within the Covenanted Contractual Staff Cadre, and thus rejected his claim for reinstatement.

5. Appeal to Supreme Court:

– Arkal appealed to the Supreme Court after the Labour Court’s ruling was upheld in a subsequent writ petition at the Bombay High Court, which was dismissed in limine.

– The Supreme Court took up the appeal to reassess whether the Labour Court’s determinations regarding Arkal’s employment classification were valid based on the evidence and application of the law regarding the definition of a “workman.”

Arguments by the parties 

In the case of Arkal Govind Raj Rao vs. Ciba Geigy of India Ltd., both parties presented several arguments that were central to the dispute regarding Arkal’s employment status.

Arguments by the Petitioner (Arkal Govind Raj Rao):

1. Primarily Clerical Work:

– Arkal argued that, despite his designation as a Group Leader, his primary responsibilities were clerical in nature. He contended that the majority of his duties involved routine clerical functions, which qualified him as a “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act.

2. Nature of Duties:

– He emphasized that the additional supervisory tasks did not alter the fundamental nature of his work, which remained clerical. He pointed out that merely having a supervisory title or performing some oversight tasks should not disqualify him from being characterized as a workman.

3. Errors in Labour Court Findings:

– Arkal challenged the Labour Court’s inferences that his designation as Group Leader indicated a primarily supervisory role, asserting that this conclusion was erroneous and not supported by the actual nature of his duties as articulated during the proceedings.

4. Application of the Law:

– He argued that the legal definitions of “workman” should focus on the primary nature of the work performed rather than peripheral or incidental duties. He maintained that the Labour Court had misapplied the law by emphasizing supervisory aspects over clerical responsibilities.

Arguments by the Respondent (Ciba Geigy of India Ltd.):

1.Supervisory Role:

– The employer contended that Arkal’s role as a Group Leader inherently involved supervisory responsibilities. They argued that his position required overseeing the work of other employees, which meant he was not merely performing clerical tasks but also engaged in managerial capacities.

2. Covenanted Contractual Staff Cadre:

– Ciba Geigy argued that Arkal belonged to a prestigious category of staff known as “Covenanted Contractual Staff,” which they claimed demarcated him as more than a mere workman and further supported the classification as not being entitled to protections under the Industrial Disputes Act.

3.Nature of Specific Tasks:

– The employer also claimed that certain tasks performed by Arkal, such as preparing bank reconciliation statements, required a level of skill beyond clerical work. They argued that such tasks demonstrated a managerial role, thus excluding him from being defined as a workman.

4. Evidence and Testimonies:

– The employer presented testimonies and documents, including evaluations of Arkal’s work by a sub-manager, to illustrate that Arkal’s duties included significant supervisory and administrative responsibilities, reinforcing their position that he was not classified as a workman.

The contrasting arguments between Arkal and Ciba Geigy centered around the interpretation of his job functions, the definition of a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, and how titles and responsibilities pertained to employment classifications. This ultimately led the Supreme Court to assess the primary nature of Arkal’s duties in relation to the law.

Judgment

In the case of Arkal Govind Raj Rao vs. Ciba Geigy of India Ltd., the Supreme Court delivered the following judgment on May 6, 1985:

1. Classification of Arkal as a Workman:

– The Supreme Court held that Arkal Govind Raj Rao was indeed a “workman” as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court emphasized that the definition indicates that a person does not cease to be a workman merely because he performs some supervisory duties, provided that his primary engagement remains within the realm defined for a workman.

2. Nature of Duties:

– The Court found that the Labour Court had correctly identified that Arkal’s primary duties were of a clerical nature. However, it criticized the Labour Court for drawing erroneous conclusions from this finding by inferring that these duties became predominantly supervisory simply due to his designation as Group Leader.

– The judgment highlighted that the test for determining workman status should focus on what were the primary, basic, or dominant duties of the employee, rather than incidental tasks that may be delegated or assigned.

3. Rejection of Respondent’s Claims:

– The Supreme Court rejected the argument put forth by Ciba Geigy regarding Arkal’s designation and the nature of his duties as a Group Leader, stating that merely being designated as a Group Leader does not turn clerical work into supervisory roles, especially when the actual responsibilities demonstrated a clerical basis.

4. Quashing of Previous Findings:

– The judgment quashed and set aside both the award of the Labour Court, which declared Arkal not to be a workman, and the subsequent ruling of the Bombay High Court which upheld the Labour Court’s decision.

– It ordered that the matter be remanded to the Labour Court for fresh consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s findings, emphasizing that the Labour Court must approach the matter without entertaining preliminary objections from the employer and must dispose of the case within three months.

5. Compensation and Costs:

– Arkal was awarded a salary for a period of six months at the rate of his last drawn pay, which was to be accepted without prejudice to either party’s claims. The Supreme Court also directed Ciba Geigy to pay costs of Rs. 3,000 to Arkal.

The Court’s judgment underscored the principle that the status of an employee as a workman must be determined based on the primary duties performed and not simply on titles or additional responsibilities that do not represent the core nature of their work. This decision was significant in reinforcing the protections available to workers under the Industrial Disputes Act, ensuring that rights are not undermined by mere nomenclature or job titles.