Case Brief: Amardeep Singh v.Harveen Kaur

NAME OF THE CASE AMARDEEP SINGH V. HARVEEN KAUR
CITATIONCIVIL APPEAL NO. 11158 OF 2017
JUDGEMENT DATESEPTEMBER 12, 2017
APPELLANTAMARDEEP SINGH
RESPONDENTHARVEEN KUAR
BENCHJUSTICE ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND JUSTICE UDAY UMESH LALIT

INTRODUCTION 

The Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur is a seminal verdict of the Supreme Court of India that discussed the scope of the six-month “cooling-off” period under Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The essential question before the Court was whether the waiting period is directory or mandatory and whether it could be dispensed with in unusual circumstances. This ruling was a major turning point in matrimonial law by allowing courts to exercise discretion to dispense with this period when the marriage has irreparably failed and reconciliation is impossible. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Amardeep Singh and Harveen Kaur got married on 16th January 1994 in Delhi. Both of them had two children born in 1995 and 2003. In spite of increasing disagreements and incompatibility, they started living separately in 2008. Their strained relationship over the years resulted in the initiation of numerous civil and criminal cases. 

After almost a decade of estrangement, both of them reached a compromise in 2017. They agreed to seek divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. According to the compromise, Amardeep Singh was to give Rs. 2.75 crores as permanent alimony to Harveen Kaur, out of which Rs. 50 lakhs was already settled. The custody of the children was granted to the husband, Amardeep Singh. 

The parties came to the Family Court at Tis Hazari, Delhi, for a divorce under Section 13-B. They urged the exemption of the waiting period of six months prescribed under Section 13-B(2), as they had already lived separately for more than eight years and reconciliation was not feasible. They submitted that requiring another waiting period would only postpone their freedom to look ahead and start their lives again. 

ISSUE:

Whether the six-month waiting period provided under Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is directory or mandatory? 

Whether the Supreme Court has the power to waive this statutory period by exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to render total justice? 

PROVISIONS INVOLVED 

Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 

Section 13-B(1) permits the parties to file a joint petition for divorce after they have lived separately for a period of one year or more and have agreed between themselves that the marriage be terminated. 

Section 13-B(2) mandates the parties to wait for a period of six months from the date of filing the first motion petition before filing the second motion for final decree of divorce. 

Article 142 of the Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court to enact any decree or order that is required to do full justice in any cause or matter before it.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE PARTIES APPELLANT: 

Amardeep Singh Asserted that the six-month waiting period in Section 13-B(2) was procedural and not obligatory. Appealed to Article 142 to seek exemption, holding that the marriage had irretrievably collapsed and the waiting period was unnecessary. 

Harveen Kaur Affirmed the contentions of the appellant. Conceded that there was no chance of reconciliation and further delay would prejudicially impact both parties’ prospects for rehabilitation and settlement. 

JUDICIAL REASONING 

The Supreme Court analyzed the intent and language of Section 13-B(2) in determining whether the waiting period is directory or mandatory. The Court recognized the legislative intent of the cooling-off period: to grant spouses a second chance to rethink their choice and even reconcile. But it stressed that the provision should not be utilized to cement a marriage that is irretrievable. 

The court observed that though the purpose of the six-month period is to discourage careless divorces, its strict enforcement may prove to be oppressive where the marriage has irretrievably disintegrated. 

The word “shall” in Section 13-B(2) does not at all times imply a mandatory requirement. Whether a provision is mandatory or directory depends on legislative intent, language, context, and purpose. 

Courts need to weigh the freedom to break up a failed marriage against the duty to maintain the institution of marriage. 

The Court had been citing earlier judgments wherein it had used its judicial confidence under Article 142 to waive exceptions in extraordinary situations, particularly in Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain (2009), which acknowledged the Court’s power to waive the legislative period where the marriage was entirely impossible and emotionally dead. 

On the other hand, the Court also recognized the opposing opinion in Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel (2010), wherein it was held that judicial orders could not override the statutory provision. Nevertheless, the case at bar was differentiated on its peculiar facts and the changing perception of matrimonial jurisprudence. 

RATIO DECIDENDI 

The Supreme Court held that Section 13-B(2) six-month waiting period is directory and not mandatory. Hence, the Family Court or any competent court can exercise its discretion in waiving the said period in proper cases. The discretion can be exercised subject to the compliance with the following conditions: 

The one year period prescribed by law under Section 13-B(1) and the further six months under Section 13-B(2) have already passed prior to the filing of the petition. Every attempt at reconciliation, conciliation, and mediation has been unsuccessful, and there is no chance of reunification. The parties have sincerely resolved all matrimonial matters, such as alimony, custody of the child, and other outstanding issues. 

The waiting period would only delay the misery and suffering of the parties. The Court further noted that one week from when the initial motion is entered, waiver applications can be submitted and must be accompanied by proper reasons for the waiver. 

JUDGMENT 

The Supreme Court waived the six-month term and allowed the Family Court to grant the final decree of divorce without delay. 

It ruled that: Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is directory, but not mandatory. The waiting period may be dispensed with by the courts in special cases where it can be seen that the marriage has irretrievably collapsed and there is no possibility of reconciliation. 

The choice should be exercised in judicial discretion in light of the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. Courts must not apply the cooling-off period mechanically where it would be of no useful purpose. The Court also authorized the adoption of video conferencing to record the statements of the parties to ensure accessibility to justice where court appearance is impossible. 

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JUDGMENT 

The judgment is a landmark in Indian matrimonial law for the following reasons: It clarifies judicially the interpretation of Section 13-B  (2), settling conflicting precedents regarding whether the six-month waiting period is obligatory. 

It lays stress on the need for judicial discretion in dealing with divorce by consent, particularly when extending the marriage results only in misery. It acknowledges the reality of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, despite it not being officially a ground under the Hindu Marriage Act. 

It advances the constitutional goal of absolute justice under Article 142 and harmonizes with the principles of equity, justice, and convenience. It enhances access to justice through procedural flexibility like allowing virtual hearings, reflecting modern judicial sensibilities. 

CONCLUSION 

The Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur case stands as a landmark decision that brings a pragmatic and humane approach to the process of mutual consent divorce in India. By considering Section 13-B (2) directory, the Supreme Court saw to it that legal processes do not act as impediments to personal freedom, particularly when the continuation of marriage is a cause of misery. The decision reinforces the role of the Court as a tool of justice, as parties are allowed to go on in life with dignity and peace.

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