Case Brief: Abhiram Singh v. C. D. Commachen

Case Name	Abhiram Singh vs C.D. Commachen
Citation	(2017) 2 SCC 629
Court	The Supreme Court of India
Bench	Chief Justice TS Thakur, Justice Madan B. Lokur, Justice SA Bobde, Justice AK Goel, Justice DY Chandrachud, Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Justice Nageshwara Rao
Decided on	January 2nd 2017
Case No	Civil Appeal No. 37 Of 1992

Introduction

The present case revolves around a fair and impartial election and campaigning procedure. The Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter represented as “RP Act”) was passed to protect the integrity of the election process. It also listed a number of other “corrupt and unlawful practices,” such as using caste, religion, language, or community as credit identity markers in order to bolster an appeal that would exclude a candidate from the election if it were verified (section 100). It also produced an electoral code of conduct. In Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (dead), the seven justices of the Supreme Court combined the cases of Narayan Singh v. Sunderlalal Patwa and Lrs. & Ors into a single verdict, which was an important ruling.

Facts of the Case

• The Bombay High Court heard this case in 1990 when Commachen accused BJP candidate Abhiram Singh, who was running from Mumbai’s Santacruz seat, of engaging in corrupt behaviour by appealing to voters’ religious sentiments. On April 16, 1992, the three-judge bench then discussed the definition of corrupt practice as defined by the RP act, subsection (3) or (3A).
• The Legislative Assembly of 1993 examined Sunderlal Patwa’s approval from the Bhojpur Constituency No. 245 in Madhya Pradesh in the Narayan Singh v. Sunderlal Patwa case. Based on specific findings, the Assembly cited instances of corrupt practices, specifically the candidate’s use of religion during the election period in violation of section 123(3) of the Representation of People Act.
• On January 30, during the hearing of the Abhiram Singh case by the five-judge Supreme Court Constitution Bench, it was revealed that another Constitution Bench consisting of five judges had been transferred to a seven-judge bench due to a similar issue raised in the political race appeal filed by one Narayan Singh against Sunderlal Patwa, the founder of the Bharatiya Janata Party. The Supreme Court was then requested to decide on what Sec 123 of the RP act comprised in light of the ensuing actions.

Issue

1. Whether the voter’s religion is now included in the definition of “his religion” in Section 123(3) of the RP act, together with the competitor’s, his operator’s, or any other person with the applicant’s permission.
2. Whether Section 123(3) of the RP Act, which restricts the competitor’s political discourse to a certain extent, is violative of Article 19(1) A of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees the right to free speech and expression.

Argument from both sides

Contention of the Petitioner

• In order for a religious appeal to be legitimate, the term “his” in paragraph (3) needs to have significance and be inextricably linked to the word “any.” Voting ought to be driven by a person’s beliefs towards the candidate they support.
• Part (3)’s straightforward wording, which provides the primary definition and creation mechanism for the word “his,” is to blame for this. A call to vote is founded on the candidate’s faith to advance the candidate’s election based on “his” conviction.  
• The persistent solicitation of votes based on caste, community, race, or religion by a candidate, his agent, or any other person acting on their behalf; the use of religious symbols or appeals to them; the use of national symbols, such the flag or emblem, to further the chances of that candidate winning the contest.

Contention of the Respondent

• On the contrary, if one applies the impact of candidate elections by abstaining from voting on the grounds of one’s “own” religion, this is a demand based on a candidate’s conviction that his selection will be the best one. Thus, it is evident that the implicit coalition (call) to support the up-and-coming candidate is predicated on the ideologies of other contenders vying for votes, in which case the organisation will not turn a profit.
• In contrast to the revised clause, which does not apply if a candidate does not additionally appeal to voters based on their religion, the pre-amended rule may consider a candidate corrupt if he made an appeal to voters based on their caste, colour, community, or religion.
• Based on the opinions of other rising stars, involvement in the rising star’s decision is prohibited. Since clause (3) lists several ideas that either forbid or discourage voting, it is confusing.
• In order to address the harm that Section 123 of the Act’s subsections (2), (3), and (3A) aim to repress, it was necessary to take into consideration the political, constitutional, and historical context of our democratic system. In this regard, the authors of our Constitution envisaged a secular democratic republic in which it would be improper to take advantage of differences.

Judgement

In a landmark ruling, the 7-Judge Bench determined by a majority of 4:3 that an appeal based on the religion of any party—the candidate, their agent, any person acting with the candidate’s authorization, or even the voters themselves—would be deemed corrupt activity. Chief Justice T.S. Thakur, Justice Bobde, and Justice Lokur rendered the majority ruling. The majority’s interpretation of Section 123 of the RP act was interpreted liberally, encompassing any appeal based on language, caste, religion, or race.

Chief Justice T.S. Thakur, Justice Madan B. Lokur, Justice L. Nagewar Rao, and Justice S.A. Bobde presented the majority decision in this case, where the word “his” is construed under Section 123(3) of the RP act. They claimed that even after the modification, Section 123(3) still expressly prohibits the impact of racial, religious, social, or linguistic considerations on any part of the voting process, and that any appeal made on the basis of any of those considerations would be deemed corrupt. It was decided that in order to protect the integrity of the election process and avoid its infractions, subsection (3) of Section 123 of the RP act, required a broad interpretation. This refers to any appeal to an elector made by a candidate, his agent, or any other person with the candidate’s or his election agent’s consent to vote or not to vote in favour of the candidate’s election rules, or to unlawfully influence any candidate’s election on the basis of that candidate’s race, religion, caste, community, or language.

However, the word “his” in Section 123(3) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, according to Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Justice Adarsh K. Goel, and Justice U.U. Lalit did not refer to the voter’s race, religion, language, community, or caste. “His” refers to a candidate’s language, race, caste, religion, or community, or it might relate to the opposition candidate’s appeal for voters not to cast ballots. A legal provision rewritten by a judge may not be able to correct flaws in the way a democratic constitution operates or the way democracy really opens up, but it may be able to address some deficiencies.

Analysis

The majority’s interpretation of Section 123(3) in this case, which considers both the voters’ and the candidates’ religion, is based on a dedication to a wide-ranging and comprehensive definition of corrupt election practices. By including appeals based on religious beliefs, the majority hopes to uphold the fundamental tenets of a secular democracy. This strategy aims to stop the exploitation of religious variables that can split voters and jeopardize election integrity. The majority emphasises the difficult balance between the basic right to free expression, as protected by Article 19(1) A, and the requirement of establishing reasonable limits to safeguard the integrity of the democratic process in maintaining Section 123(3) against a constitutional challenge.

The emphasis of the majority on avoiding appeals based on caste, religion, ethnicity, community, or language aligns with India’s constitutional goal of a secular democratic republic. The ruling supports the development of an equal, non-discriminatory, and respectful voting environment by outlawing these types of appeals. It highlights the judiciary’s responsibility to maintain the fundamental values of the Indian Constitution and establishes a noteworthy precedent against divisive political activities.

However, the opposing conclusion adds a layer of doubt about the effectiveness of judicial actions in tackling more fundamental democratic issues. The dissenting judges raise questions about the extent to which judicial interpretation may successfully address challenges inherent in the operation of a democratic constitution by voicing worries about potential flaws in the democratic system that legal interventions may be unable to rectify. This viewpoint encourages contemplation on the judiciary’s function in molding democratic standards and the intrinsic constraints of legal actions in guaranteeing a strong and dynamic democratic system.

Essentially, the case shows how democratic values and legal interpretation interact complexly. The opposing position calls into question the judiciary’s ability to handle the complex issues inherent in democratic administration, while the majority’s strategy aims to strengthen the democratic process by limiting appeals based on sensitive elements. This conversation emphasises how India’s democratic system is still developing and how important the court is to managing its intricacies.

Conclusion

The RP act of 1951 prohibits intrigue motivated by race, religion, station, network, or language. In any case, whether the intrigue was motivated by the opponent, the voter, the political decision specialist, or the up-and-comer, it would establish a degenerate practice sufficient to abrogate the political decision in which it was made. Following a significant alteration, Section 123(3) now states explicitly that any intrigue made to promote a particular religion, race, station, language, or network is forbidden in any case, even if it isn’t motivated by those reasons. Therefore, anyone devoid of discernible religion, race, status, network, or language would not be allowed to hold any position in the discretionary method. If any of those factors were to be considered, the equivalent would create a degenerate practice.