Case Brief: Supreme Court Advocates on Record v UOI (Fourth Judges case) 2015
| CASE NAME | Supreme Court Advocates-On-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (2015) 6 SCC 408 |
| CASE NAME (Also known as) | Fourth Judges case |
| CITATION | (2015) 6 SCC 408 |
| COURT | In the Supreme Court of India |
| BENCH | BEFORE J.S. KHEHAR, JASTI CHELAMESWAR, MADAN B. LOKUR, KURIAN JOSEPH AND A.K. GOEL, JJ |
| APPELLANTS | SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER |
| RESPONDENTS | UNION OF INDIA |
| DECIDED ON | Writ Petitions (C) No. 13 of 2015 with Nos. 14, 18, 23-24, 70, 83, 108, 124, 209, 309-310, 323, 341 of 2015, Transfer Petitions (C) Nos. 391 and 971 of 2015, decided on October 16,2015. |
Introduction:
This case originated from a series of petitions contesting the constitutionality of the Constitution Act (99th Amendment) Act and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act of 2014. These legislations aimed to replace the collegium system responsible for appointing judges to higher judicial positions.The National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) played a significant role in judicial appointments, with the intention of enhancing transparency in the selection process.
However, the court ruled that it violated fundamental principles of the separation of powers and judicial independence, impacting the fundamental structure of the constitution. A five-judge constitutional bench invalidated both the 99th Amendment and the NJAC. The NJAC and the 99th Amendment were declared unconstitutional by a five-judge constitutional bench.
The confidentiality of applicants for judgeships was the key issue that the court had to deal with. According to Justice Lokur, there was never a compromise struck between the candidates’ right to privacy and the public’s right to know. A constitutional principle that has been established by a court is untouchable and cannot be rejected for any reason. There is a comparable significance to the position of constitutional conventions and law. The application of international agreements by the judiciary, which are meant to facilitate the interpretation of current laws, has drawn criticism. Conventions do not necessarily have to be entirely enforceable; what matters most is that constitutional principles must remain unaffected and that the manner in which they are implemented must be carefully chosen.
The need for the executive and judicial branches to be kept as separate as possible is emphasised in Article 50 of the Constitution. Executive participation in the appointment process must be controlled to prevent it from going too far and jeopardising the accountability and openness of appointments. An essential component of the constitution, the judiciary’s independence would be threatened by the executive branch’s rise to power. The Indian Constitution’s Articles 124 and 214 grant the president the authority to select justices for the Supreme Court and High Courts on the recommendation of cabinet ministers. The Chief Justice of India is not able to select anybody, although she does have advising authority. The executive branch is superior in decision-making, with the president granted supreme authority under the Constitution..
Brief fact:
2015 saw the filing of a writ petition by the SCAORA contesting the constitutionality of the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act and the 99th Amendment Act. The first judge’s case, S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, extended the executive’s authority to select members of the higher courts, leading to unfavourable decisions and the executive’s unwelcome control. The 120th Amendment bill, which proposed a six-member Judicial Appointment Commission, was introduced by the UPA government in 2013. The NJAC was created to manage the appointment, promotion, and removal of judges from lower posts in accordance with articles 124(2) and 217(1) of the constitution, supplanting the collegium system.The Chief Justice of India and the four seniormost justices of the Supreme Court make up the collegium, which was created by Supreme Court rulings rather than by statute or law. Recommendations are made, approved by the Chief Justice of India and the Supreme Court collegium, and then forwarded to the Government under the collegium system. The Government may look into the promotion of a counsel to a judge, and it might do so with the help of the Intelligence Bureau. The government has one objection each collegium, after which it has to validate the name if it is repeated.
Issues:
- Whether the 99th Amendment Act and the 2014 Judicial Appointments Commission Act altered the fundamental structure of the constitution.
- Whether the 2014 National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act was based on the prevailing interests of the executive branch.
Arguments from the petitioner:
the separation of the executive from the judiciary, as stipulated in Article 50 of the Indian Constitution. The petitioner asserts that executive involvement in judicial appointments should be minimized, emphasizing that the Chief Justice of India’s (CJI) recommendations should hold significant weight. The petitioner contends that the current judicial appointment procedure, where the CJI plays a passive and detached role, has proven counterproductive. The petitioner expresses concern that executive superiority is impinging on the independence of the judiciary, which could result in the erosion of a fair and impartial justice system. The petitioner argues that the contested constitutional amendment has compromised the judiciary’s independence, specifically citing the elimination of the NJAC chief justice’s responsibility as outlined in Articles 124 and 217.
Arguments from the respondent:
The Union of India challenges the legality of two relevant precedents in the case. The respondent asserts that the appointment of higher judicial officials can only occur if five out of six members of the NJAC commission recommend a candidate. It is argued that the challenged provisions uphold the fundamental framework of the constitution. The respondent contends that the Constitution itself grants the president greater autonomy in the appointment procedure. Additionally, the respondent highlights that the constitution dictates the perks and salary for judges, and even a unanimous bill cannot reduce the amount of salary and allowances.
Judgement:
The National Judicial Appointment Commission (NJAC) Act of 2014 was challenged in the Fourth Judges Case, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record-Association and Others v. Union of India, even before it was put into effect. The Supreme Court affirmed its commitment to upholding judicial independence, a key component of the Constitution, when it ruled, 4:1, that the amendment was unconstitutional and void after it went into effect. The Supreme Court concluded that Article 124A did not sufficiently guarantee representation for the judicial component within the National Judicial Appointment Commission, which was one of the case’s main conclusions. This deficiency was considered insufficient to maintain the judiciary’s primacy, which violated the judiciary’s independence, a crucial constitutional component.
Secondly, the Supreme Court declared the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act and the 99th Amendment to be “unconstitutional and void.” The court agreed with the petitioner, holding that Article 124A of the Constitution is unchangeable and of utmost significance. It came to the conclusion that the National Judicial Appointments Commission’s judicial branch was not sufficiently represented by the removal of Article 124A’s sections (a) and (b) (NJAC). This deficiency was considered to be a violation of the constitutional norms supporting judicial independence and insufficient to protect the judiciary’s dominant position.
The collegium system was endorsed by most respondents, who also suggested certain changes to make it more transparent and efficient. The nine-judge bench overturned the 1993 ruling in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India. A pivotal decision was to accord supremacy to the Chief Justice, curbing the executive’s power. This ruling aligned with Article 50 of the constitution, emphasizing the imperative to prevent bias in the selection process.
The ruling stipulated that the Chief Justice of India must have the highest authority when it comes to appointments and that executive influence must be limited. It also described how justice appointments would be made in the future. It stated that the Chief Justice of India should make the initial suggestion when selecting a judge, and that the Chief Justices of the individual High Courts should make the same request. Transfers must follow the same procedure, with the Chief Justice of India being the one to initiate the transfer of a Chief Justice of a High Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the Chief Justice’s position must be followed, but that colleagues’ opinions must also be taken into account. The appointment procedure needs to work with the entire apparatus of the constitution.
Analysis and Conclusion:
The ruling in this case upholds the Indian judiciary’s constitutionally mandated supremacy. It declared categorically that executive domination would jeopardise the core principles of the constitution. Deemed unconstitutional, it concluded that the new amendment violated basic concepts including the “separation of powers.” An important part of this ruling included reinterpreting the term “consultation” as it appears in the constitution.
India’s constitution is unique in that it reflects a long-standing vision for the way government institutions should operate. Careful selection of judiciary members is considered vital to guarantee the objectivity and justifiability of judges’ rulings. This decision, in contrast to the last one that gave the government’s viewpoint more weight, gave the Chief Justice’s viewpoint more weight, which lessened the influence of the executive branch and eliminated bias and partiality. In order to address the ongoing problem of political influence on the court, the Constitution requires the least amount of government involvement in judicial matters. Although these rulings have many advantages, they also have disadvantages. The potential for favouritism exists, dependent on how the Chief Justice exercises appointment authority, risking biased appointments and potential abuse of authority for personal gain. The judiciary’s independence, crucial for safeguarding citizens’ liberties, must be maintained.
Like a coin with two faces, the collegium system offers benefits and drawbacks. Even while appointments made by it are legal, worries about eligible people who were passed over because they don’t come from a family of judges continue. It is acknowledged that nepotism exists in the legal field, highlighting the importance of equitable chances for all people, regardless of their financial or familial background. The collegium system is inefficient, hence it is necessary to investigate and put into practise more efficient alternatives—possibly taking the public’s views into account.
Despite criticism, the National Judicial Appointments Commission was not considered a good replacement because it concentrated appointment power within the executive branch. Given the judiciary’s influence over the future of the country, it is critical to take experts’ opinions into account and look for solutions that strike a balance between effectiveness and inclusivity. Given the qualifications for the role, the Chief Justice, as the head of India’s judicial activities, deserves more than just ideas.
Despite facing criticism, the Fourth Judges Case reinforced that the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) was not a suitable replacement for the existing collegium system. The Supreme Court, through the Fourth Judges Case, emphasized that concentrating judicial appointment powers within the executive branch would undermine the core constitutional principle of judicial independence. The judgment in the Fourth Judges Case reiterated the importance of insulating the judiciary from political influence to protect the rule of law.
Given the judiciary’s significant role in shaping the future of the country, it becomes essential to consider the views of constitutional experts, legal scholars, and former judges when evaluating alternatives to the collegium system. Any reform must strike a balance between efficiency, transparency, and inclusivity without compromising judicial autonomy.
In light of the Fourth Judges Case, it is clear that the Chief Justice of India—being the head of the nation’s judicial framework—requires more than just a consultative role. The judgment asserted that the Chief Justice must play a central and decisive part in the appointment and transfer of judges to uphold judicial credibility and independence. Thus, while improvements to the collegium system may be necessary, the Fourth Judges Case serves as a constitutional safeguard against executive overreach.
Despite facing criticism, the Fourth Judges Case reinforced that the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) was not a suitable replacement for the existing collegium system. The Supreme Court, through the Fourth Judges Case, emphasized that concentrating judicial appointment powers within the executive branch would undermine the core constitutional principle of judicial independence. The judgment in the Fourth Judges Case reiterated the importance of insulating the judiciary from political influence to protect the rule of law.
Given the judiciary’s significant role in shaping the future of the country, it becomes essential to consider the views of constitutional experts, legal scholars, and former judges when evaluating alternatives to the collegium system. Any reform must strike a balance between efficiency, transparency, and inclusivity without compromising judicial autonomy.
In light of the Fourth Judges Case, it is clear that the Chief Justice of India—being the head of the nation’s judicial framework—requires more than just a consultative role. The judgment asserted that the Chief Justice must play a central and decisive part in the appointment and transfer of judges to uphold judicial credibility and independence. Thus, while improvements to the collegium system may be necessary, the Fourth Judges Case serves as a constitutional safeguard against executive overreach.
🔗 Read the full judgment of the Fourth Judges Case (2015) here:
https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-381610.pdf
