INTRODUCTION

The case is about a controversy relating to the application of the “Employees Provident Fund & Misc. Provisions Act, 1952 (the Act)” to 45 workers who were hired as trainees at the Chocolate Factory of M/s Central Aercanut & Coca Marketing and Processing Co-op Ltd. in Puttur (the respondent). The question at the centre is whether these trainees are to be treated as “employees” under the definition given in “Section 2(f) of the Act”, and thereby hold the respondent liable to contribute towards their provident fund. Proceedings under “Section 7-A of the Act” were brought by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Mangalore (the appellant), stating that the trainees were employees and seeking a particular amount from the respondent. This assertion was assailed by the respondent in a writ application before the High Court of Karnataka. The case went through a Single Judge Bench and later a Division Bench of the High Court, both of which determined in favor of the respondent, finding the demand to be unsustainable. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner subsequently appealed this determination to the Supreme Court of India. This overview will explore the case facts, issues involved, arguments put forward by the both parties, the Supreme Court’s judgment, and the ultimate conclusion.

FACTS

The applicant, M/s Central Aercanut & Coca Marketing and Processing Co-op Ltd., advertised for training at its Chocolate Factory in Puttur. As part of this training, stipend was given to the candidates selected. A total of 45 candidates were chosen for training. It is important to mention that the notice for the training program clearly indicated that the training would not ensure future employment with the respondent. In addition, the terms and conditions of the training provided that any trainee who dropped out of the program prior to serving one year would be responsible to refund the stipend paid.
Thereafter, the appellant, “Regional Provident Fund Commissioner”, Mangalore, sent a notice to the respondent under “Section 7-A of the Employees Provident Fund & Misc. Provisions Act”, 1952. In the said notice, the appellant argued that the 45 trainees employed by the respondent were actually “employees” in terms of the Act. Relying on this assumption, the appellant asserted that the respondent was bound to pay a certain amount towards the provident fund of these trainees under the Act.
Being aggrieved by this notice, the respondent challenged the notice given by the appellant by filing a writ application before the High Court of Karnataka. The case was first heard by a Single Judge of the High Court. The Single Judge, considering the facts and the provisions of law, held that the claim made by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner was not sustainable in law. In arriving at the above finding, the Single Judge referred to “the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946”, and “The Apprentices Act, 1961”. The Commissioner of the Regional Provident Fund then appealed to the order passed by the Single Judge before a Division Bench of the High Court. But even the Division Bench confirmed the order passed by the Single Judge and rejected the appeal made by the Commissioner. It was against this ruling of the Division Bench that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner went to the Supreme Court in the form of a further appeal.

ISSUE RAISED

1. Were the trainees’ “employees” as per Section 2(f) of the Employees Provident Fund & Misc. Provisions Act, 1952?
2. Did the character of the “training” participation amount to employment for wages?
3. Did the “Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946”, and “The Apprentices Act, 1961”, come into play to decide the status of trainees under the Provident Fund Act?
4. Were the trainees legally treated as apprentices or workers under the Provident Fund Act?
5. What should be the understanding of the interaction between these various labor laws in this regard?

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS

The key contention raised by the petitioner, the “Regional Provident Fund Commissioner”, Mangalore, in the Supreme Court was that the High Court had misinterpreted “Section 2(f) of the Employees Provident Fund & Misc. Provisions Act, 1952”. The Commissioner argued that the 45 trainees hired by the respondent must actually be treated as employees under the Act provisions. The counsel representing the Commissioner submitted that the term “employee” in the Act is comprehensive and wide and should include persons who are engaged in relation to the work of the establishment and who are getting a stipend, which might be regarded as wages in an extended sense.
Additionally, the attorney for the petitioner insisted that the Employees Provident Fund Act is a positive law which aims to secure social security and economic benefits to employees. The term “employee” should then be interpreted in a broad and liberal manner so as to promote the purpose of the Act. The Commissioner submitted that the trainees were doing work in connection with the operations of the Chocolate Factory and being paid an amount of money for their work, and that should put them within the framework of the Act. The petitioner must have contended against the applicability of the “Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946”, and “The Apprentices Act, 1961”, in excluding the trainees from the scope of the “Provident Fund Act”, possibly contending that the “Provident Fund Act” has a different purpose and a wider definition of employee in some situations.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The respondent, M/s Central Aercanut & Coca Marketing and Processing Co-op Ltd., generally upheld the judgments rendered by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. Although the exact arguments made by the respondents are not elaborated at length in the given document, it can be understood that their primary argument was that the 45 workers were hired solely as trainees and did not enjoy the status of regular employees under the “Employees Provident Fund & Misc. Provisions Act, 1952.”
The respondent would have contended that the initial notice for the training program explicitly mentioned that it would not lead to a job and that the trainees were also subject to a condition of refunding the stipend in case of resignation within a year, emphasizing the temporary and training-specific nature of their involvement. They would have stressed that the stipend given was not akin to wages offered to permanent workers for work done but was more an allowance during training. The respondent would have used the “Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946”, and “The Apprentices Act, 1961”, as referred to by the High Court, to put forward the view that the trainees were similar to apprentices under these particular legislations, which have special provisions of their own and need not necessarily come under the term “employee” in the “Provident Fund Act”. The respondent’s counsel likely argued that interpreting “employee” too broadly under the Provident Fund Act to include trainees would blur the distinction between training programs and regular employment, potentially undermining the purpose of apprenticeship and training schemes designed for skill development.

JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court, after hearing the appeal, dismissed it, thus affirming the rulings of the Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court. The top court held that the 45 persons hired by the respondent on a trainee basis were indeed apprentices hired under the Standing Orders of the establishment. On this basis, the court held that such trainees cannot be termed as “employees” within the meaning of “Section 2(f) of the Employees’ Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952”.
The judgment is an expression of the Supreme Court’s concurrence with the High Court’s opinion that the nature of the engagement of the 45 individuals was largely one of training and skill acquisition, as opposed to normal employment for wages in the usual employer-employee relationship context contemplated by the “Provident Fund Act”. The fact that the Standing Orders were referred to indicates that the terms and conditions of the training program conformed to the norms set under the apprentice within the respondent’s unit. By classifying the trainees as apprentices according to the Standing Orders, the court necessarily excluded them from the purview of the definition of “employee” in the “Provident Fund Act”. The rejection of the appeal indicates that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner’s insistence on provident fund contributions from these trainees was found to be unsustainable, which gives relief to the respondent.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of “Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Mangalore vs. M/s Central Aercanut & Coca Marketing and Processing Co-op Ltd.,” Puttur reiterates the distinction between apprentices or trainees and regular employees under the “Employees Provident Fund & Misc. Provisions Act, 1952.” The court’s ruling, affirming the High Court’s decisions, was based on the conclusion that the 45 persons in question were employed as apprentices under the Standing Orders of the establishment. This classification was decisive in concluding that they did not come within the definition of “employee” under “Section 2(f)” of the Act.
The case establishes the significance of the particular terms and conditions of engagement, more so in training programs, to determine the relevance of labor legislation. The inclusion in the notification of training explicitly stating that no employment was offered and the clause of refunding the stipend in case of early withdrawal from training most likely contributed to a great extent towards determining the character of the engagement as training rather than employment. The ruling also implicitly recognizes the presence and applicability of other labor legislations, like the “Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act” and the “Apprentices Act”, in determining the status of persons in various types of engagement within an establishment. The rejection of the appeal clarifies the position of apprentices under the Provident Fund Act in this particular situation, implying that bona fide training schemes with defined terms and conditions need not necessarily place trainees within the purview of the Act’s definition of “employee.” This case acts as a precedent for such situations where the character of the engagement is primarily for training and development of skills rather than ordinary employment for remuneration.