| CASE NAME | Vinod Chaturvedi v. State of M.P., (1984) 2 SCC 350 |
| CITATION | 1984 SCR (3) 93, AIR 1984 SUPREME COURT 911, 1984 (2) SCC 350, 1985 CRI LJ (NOC) 70, 1984 CURCRIJ 128, 1984 CRIAPPR(SC) 181 |
| COURT | Supreme Court of India |
| BENCH | Hon’ble Justice Misra Rangnath ra and Justice Syed Murtaza Fazalali |
| APPELLANT | Vinod Chaturvedi and Others |
| RESPONDENT | State of Madhya Pradesh |
| DECIDED ON | 5th March 1984 |
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of India’s March 5, 1984, ruling in the matter of Vinod Chaturvedi & Others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh explores intricate questions of criminal law, evidentiary standards, and procedural integrity. According to Sections 148 (rioting, armed with a deadly weapon), 364 (kidnapping or abducting in order to murder), and 302 read with 149 (murder with common object) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Additional Sessions Judge initially cleared the appellants, including Vinod Chaturvedi. The appellants were found guilty under Sections 148 and 367 of the IPC (kidnapping or abducting with intent to subject a person to grievous hurt, slavery, etc.) and sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment for each offense, to run concurrently, after the Madhya Pradesh High Court overturned this acquittal on appeal.
According to the prosecution’s case, which focused on the events of April 27, 1973, the appellants kidnapped Brindaban from his hamlet, Budha, while ostensibly trying to settle a disagreement in the neighboring village of Rampura. It was then claimed that Brindaban had been killed. Notably, a different group of accused people had been found not guilty in a previous trial in 1973 based on identical accusations, and the testimony of important eyewitnesses who were close relatives of the deceased was used. The same eyewitnesses changed their testimony to accuse the new defendants in the later trial against the present appellants, raising severe questions regarding the consistency and dependability of their assertions.
Exhibit P-1, a letter from the deceased’s father to the Superintendent of Police, and Exhibit P-9, a confidential letter from the Superintendent to the Deputy Inspector General, were two documents that the Supreme Court examined closely as part of the evidence supporting the High Court’s conviction. Due to their lack of cross-examination, the Court determined that these materials were illegally accepted and relied upon, in violation of the evidentiary admissibility and fair trial rules.
The Supreme Court also pointed out inconsistencies in the prosecution’s story, particularly with regard to the purported kidnapping. According to testimony, the allegations under Sections 364 and 367 of the IPC may have been undermined if the deceased had freely followed the appellants. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s ruling and reinstated the appellants’ acquittal from the trial court in light of these contradictions and the questionable reliability of the eyewitnesses.
This case emphasizes the need for consistent and reliable witness testimony, the strict requirements for the admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings, and the judiciary’s vigilant observance of procedural justice.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The prosecution claims that on April 27, 1973, at approximately 4 p.m., the appellants abducted Brindaban, the deceased son of P.W. 1, from the village of Budha and transported him to Rampura, which was about a kilometer away, in a jeep under the guise of resolving a pending conflict between Brindaban and some Rampura villagers. Furthermore, it was claimed that the appellants’ shared goal of killing Brindaban was carried out later that night when blunt, lethal weapons repeatedly struck him. The next day, the corpse was taken to Budha village. Five people were put on trial in session, trial No. 107 of 1973, as a result of the investigation, which was started based on the first information report. However, the learned trial judge cleared them in a judgment dated 29.1.74. The trial court concluded that the actual accused had not been tried and that the inquiry was flawed. It seems that nothing was done about the case until 1977, when a new investigation was conducted and the appellants were charged as Brindaban’s murderers at the court of session.
The trial court fairly evaluated the evidence but was not ready to rely on it. As a result, he dismissed the prosecution’s argument and ordered the accused to be acquitted. The High Court mainly relied on two documents, Exhibit P-1, a letter sent by P.W. 1 Sunderlal to the Superintendent of Police on 29.4.73, and Exhibit P-9, a confidential letter from the Superintendent of Police to the Deputy Inspector General of the Department, rather than concluding that the ocular evidence was sufficient and that a conviction could be recorded based on it. The High Court reversed the acquittal after finding support for the prosecution’s case in these two letters and accepting the argument that their contents supported the witnesses’ oral testimony. However, it rejected the prosecution’s argument about the murder charge. Therefore, the court found the appellants guilty under Sections 148 and 367 of the I.P.C. while upholding their acquittal regarding the murder charge.
ISSUES RAISED
Whether the witness is reliable and sufficient to conclude the guilt of the accused?
ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES
Arguments on behalf of the appellant
The appellants argued that Exhibit P-1, a letter written after the investigation began, was inadmissible because it was not cross-examined and had no evidentiary value and that Exhibit P-9, written by the Superintendent of Police, was introduced without the author being called as a witness, preventing the defense from contesting its contents. They claimed that depending on such unconfirmed documents undermined the integrity of the legal system.
Arguments on behalf of the respondent
The prosecution had forced the current appellants to stand trial after claiming that Brindaban had been killed by a group of five individuals who were not related to them. P.Ws. 1, 3, and 24 of the current trial, the three most important witnesses, who are close relatives of the deceased Brindaban, then testified before the court that Brindaban’s death was caused by the five accused and not by the appellants or anyone else.
JUDGMENT
During the first trial for murder and abduction, the prosecution claimed that the deceased was murdered by five individuals other than the appellants. Three eyewitnesses, PWs. 1, 3, and 24 of the Second Trial, who were close relatives of the deceased, testified that only the accused five were responsible for the murder. The alleged eyewitnesses’ willingness to implicate acquitted individuals and present appellants in serious charges like murder suggests that their evidence is unreliable and they were willing to testify for the prosecution. In an appeal against acquittal, the High Court should not have relied on the remaining evidence to convict the appellants.
In error, the High Court relied on PW 1 Sunderlal’s letter to the Superintendent of Police on 29.4.1973, which occurred after the inquiry began based on the First Information Report. A letter prepared by PW 1, who acted as the prosecutor, is not admissible as evidence.
Relying solely on the letter Ex. P. 9 from the Superintendent of Police to his higher officer without investigating the writer or allowing the defense to cross-examine them is misguided.
The document was unreliable, and the High Court erred in using it to support oral evidence.
The definition of “abduction” in Section 362 of the I.P.C. does not fully prove the offense of abduction against the accused. The investigation did not mention Vinod, the party leader, and most witnesses testified that he went inside his house and dressed to accompany the accused.
The appellants were not convicted under section 367 of the Penal Code because the High Court rejected their claim of murder and did not find that they caused the grievous hurt that led to death. This means that the act of picking the deceased from his village was unrelated to the later events. The State counsel has admitted that the charge under section 148 I.P.C. pertains to what occurred at Rampura and is not related to the abduction accusation. The prosecution’s asserted common object cannot support a conviction under section 148 I.P.C. in this context.
CONCLUSION
The admissibility of Exhibits P-1 and P-9 was crucial. Exhibits P-1, a letter from the deceased’s father to the Superintendent of Police, and P-9, a confidential letter from the Superintendent to the Deputy Inspector General, were crucial to the prosecution’s case. The introduction of these papers without cross-examination violated natural justice and the right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court stressed that unconfirmed papers compromise judicial proceedings.
The Court also examined the credibility of important eyewitnesses, close relatives of the deceased—who had testified differently in a previous trial about the same occurrence. Their revised testimony in the subsequent trial cast doubt on their credibility. The Court recognized that discrepancies, especially in murder cases, make evidence unreliable.
The Supreme Court also noted procedural errors in the investigation. The initial trial acquitted a different set of accused due to poor investigation and the real criminals not being brought to trial. The inquiry that led to the current appellants’ prosecution after a long time failed to address these concerns, weakening the prosecution’s case.
The Supreme Court ruled that the High Court erred in overturning the appellants’ acquittal. The use of inadmissible documents and untrustworthy witnesses failed to fulfill criminal proof criteria. Focusing on procedural fairness and reliable evidence, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s acquittal and the appellants’ innocence. This ruling shows the judiciary’s dedication to legitimate convictions and protecting persons from miscarriages of justice.
