INTRODUCTION

On October 5, 1956, the Supreme Court of India made a decision regarding the matter of Shyam Behari vs. the State of Uttar Pradesh. The case involved the application of Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which handles dacoity that is followed by murder. In this case, the appellant and associates tried to commit dacoity in Mendai’s house. Mendai and Ganga raised an outcry, which caused the attackers to run away without taking anything. The appellant shot one of the pursuers to death in order to help the gang escape when one of the pursuers caught a member of the group during their escape. The main legal concern was whether the murder that occurred during the escape, after a robbery attempt that failed, fell under the definition of “committing dacoity” as defined by Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Supreme Court’s decision, in this case, offers important information about how far accomplices can be held criminally responsible in situations when a murder takes place during a dacoity, even if the first effort to rob was not successful. 

The Supreme Court looked into whether the murder that took place during the escape, which followed an aborted robbery attempt, could be classified as having been done “in the commission of dacoity” according to Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court determined that the murder took place during the act of dacoity because the assailants were still in the midst of executing the crime when the murder happened. As a result, the appellant was found guilty of violating Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code. 

This case highlights the idea that if a murder is committed during a robbery, even if the robbery itself is not successful, the person who committed the murder can still be convicted under Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code. It emphasizes the significance of taking into account the complete sequence of events that occurred during the conduct of a dacoity, including the escape, in order to determine if Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code is applicable.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant was charged with a number of offenses, including one under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code. This charge stemmed from the fact that, on the 10th or 11th of September, 1954, around two or three gharis before sunrise, the appellant and a group of other people committed dacoity in the house of Mendai, which is located in the village of Banni Purwa, the hamlet of Banni, police station Kotwali, Kheri. One of the members of the group committed murder during the commission of the dacoity. The learned Sessions Judge determined that the appellant and the others had entered Mendai’s house with the intention of committing a robbery. 

However, they were unsuccessful in their endeavor because Mendai and Ganga made a hue and cry. The villagers of Banni Purwa and the nearby ‘abadi’ of village Banni came to the scene, and the appellant and his associates fled from Mendai’s house without taking anything. Mendai and Ganga were pursuing them, and when they were crossing the ditch at Pipra Farm, Mendai managed to catch one of the dacoits. Another dacoit, who many witnesses recognized as the appellant, then fired a shot from a pistol. The bullet struck Mendai, causing him to fall to the ground. He was taken to the hospital, where he later died. There is no need to chronicle the subsequent movements of the appellant here. The learned Sessions Judge and the High Court both found that the appellant shot and killed Mendai in order to gain the release of one of his colleagues and to guarantee that they might escape safely.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether the appellant is guilty of only Sec. 395 or Sec. 396 also?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Arguments on behalf of the appellant

• Any murder that the dacoits performed as they were fleeing without any stolen goods during their struggle could not be considered a murder that was done in the course of the dacoity. A distinction was intended to be drawn between a case where the dacoits were escaping with the booty and a case where the dacoits were rushing away without any booty. It was claimed that the dacoits committed robbery and then murdered someone in order to escape with the stolen goods, which would make it a dacoity with murder. However, if the dacoits did not have any stolen goods with them and committed the murder in order to avoid being caught, it would not be considered a dacoity with murder.
• The minute the dacoits fled without taking any loot, the dacoity transaction was finished, and the appellant’s murder of Mendai was a separate transaction involving different circumstances. Therefore, when the dacoits were fleeing for their lives and had traveled a substantial distance from the Mendai residence where the dacoity had been perpetrated, the appellant killed Mendai, not as part of the dacoity transaction but separately.

Arguments on behalf of the respondent

• Because the appellant and his companions were jointly committing dacoity and the appellant, one of the members, killed Mendai in the process, the appellant was guilty of both the section 395 and section 396 offenses under the Indian Penal Code. 
• Suppose the transaction that began when the appellant and his friends entered Mendai’s home continued until the appellant shot Mendai while crossing the Pipra Farm ditch. In that case, it is safe to say that the appellant committed the dacoity by killing Mendai.

JUDGMENT

The two components of the charge under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code were (1) the commission of the dacoity and (2) the commission of the murder in connection with the commission of the dacoity. The first ingredient was proven beyond a reasonable doubt and was not contested by the appellant’s knowledgeable attorney. The second ingredient was also proven in any case with regard to the murder since the accused’s focus was on both the specific role he played in the murder as well as the offense committed during the dacoity. He was aware, as far as he was concerned, from the charge that was brought against him that he was being held accountable for both the murder that was committed in addition to the act of dacoity. The prosecution’s evidence particularly implicated him, and the prosecution witness identified him as the shooter who fired at Mendai as he crossed the Pipra Farm ditch. That argument was expressly used against him during his examination under section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and he was questioned about it. 

The case against the appellant regarding the commission of the murder of Mendai has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and in those circumstances, we would convict the appellant of having committed the offense under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, even if the conviction of the appellant under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code were not perchance sustainable. This is because the murder of Mendai was committed after the dacoits had fled without taking any loot. The appellant’s conviction will be upheld, as will the death sentence that the learned Sessions Judge imposed on him.

CONCLUSION

In the case of Shyam Behari vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1956), the Supreme Court looked into whether a murder that took place during the flight of dacoits following a robbery attempt that failed would be considered a dacoity accompanied by murder, as defined in Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The appellant and his companions tried to steal from Mendai’s house. The attackers ran away without stealing anything when the residents raised the alarm. The appellant shot Mendai and killed him in order to make their getaway easier.

The Court deliberated on whether the murder took place “in the commission of dacoity.” It made reference to earlier decisions, pointing out that the question of whether or not a murder was committed during the conduct of dacoity is a factual one that is established by the individual circumstances of each case. The Court determined that the murder took place during the act of dacoity because the assailants were still in the midst of executing the crime when the murder happened. As a result, the appellant was found guilty of violating Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code. 

The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case emphasizes that if a murder occurs during a dacoity, even if the first effort to rob was unsuccessful, the perpetrator can be convicted under Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code. In evaluating whether Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code applies, the Court stressed the significance of taking into account the complete sequence of events that occurred during the commission of a dacoity, including the escape. This ruling emphasizes the importance of the idea that the continuity of the criminal enterprise, from the beginning of the dacoity to its conclusion, is essential in determining whether Section 396 IPC is applicable.