CASE NAME	Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P., (1977) 1 SCC 677
CITATION	1977 AIR 908, 1977 SCR (2) 611, 1977 SCC(CRI) 147, 1977 BBCJ 136 (SC), 43 CUTLT 382, (1977) 1 SCJ 478, 1977 UJ (SC) 156, 1977 MADLJ(CRI) 320, ILR (1977) CUT 431
COURT	Supreme Court of India
BENCH	Hon’ble Chief Justice A.N. Ray, Justice M. Hameedullah Beg,  Justice D.G. Palekar, Justice P.N. Shingal and Justice Jaswant Singh
PETITIONER	Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society and Another
RESPONDENT	State of Gujarat and Another
DECIDED ON	Decided on 17th January, 1977

 

INTRODUCTION

In India, caste, religion, and culture are all possible determinants of identity and are undoubtedly also potential causes of prejudice. Religion, the governing element in establishing identity, is the basis for both culture and caste. Although there is religious conversion, there is neither cultural nor caste conversion. Caste and cultural conversion are implied outcomes of religious conversion. Supporting a religion alters a person’s identity in the community. When the right to convert was challenged before the Supreme Court of India3, it was decided that it was not covered by the freedom to propagate religion, upholding the laws governing religious conversion in India. However, the right to change one’s religion cannot be prohibited in a secular democracy that promises freedom of religion.

Laws governing conversion place the state in the position of a guardian of these borders because religious conversion permits people to cross them. In order to further assume responsibility for this function, governments in secular democracies have passed anti-conversion legislation, which is reviewed in relation to this position. In addition to India, several secular multireligious democracies also have contentious laws governing conversion. South Asia has become the center of the debate over these regulations. In a democratic nation that upholds religious freedom, India has a long-standing but growing disquiet with religious conversions. India has a long history of religious conversions among its many communities, including notable conversions to minority religions by lower classes. 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Baloda-Bazar authorized the prosecution of the appellant, Rev. Stainislaus, for violating Sections 3, 4, and 5(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Act, which, in a broader sense, is the charge of forcible or illegal conversion from one religion to another. When the matter was heard by Magistrate, First-Class, Baloda-Bazar, the appellant, Rev. Stainislaus, made his primary complaint. He claimed that the State Legislature lacked the essential legislative authority and that only the Parliament, not the State Legislature, had the power to enact laws. Additionally, he argued that the Madhya Pradesh Act was unconstitutional since it was not covered by Entry I of List II and List III of the Seventh Schedule.

Additionally, it was argued that Sections 3, 4, and 5(2) were null and void because they violated Article 25 of the Constitution. With the opinion that the objections made lacked merit, the magistrate chose not to refer the case to the High Court. The Additional Session Judge expressed the same opinion when asked to revise the order. Thus, the appellant filed petitions and moved to the High Court. Therefore, the case primarily addressed the legality of the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act of 1967 and the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya Adhiniyam of 1968, which were challenged in the respective High Courts of Madhya Pradesh and Orissa.

ISSUES RAISED

• If the two Acts broke Article 25 of the Indian Constitution? 
• If the State Legislatures had the authority to pass these laws?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Argument on behalf of the appellant

• The petitioner’s primary contention was that the Madhya Pradesh Act’s sections 3, 4, and 5(2), which address the ban on illegal religious conversion and penalties, respectively, violated Article 25 of the Indian Constitution, which protects freedom of conscience and the free practice, profession, and spread of religion. As a result, the petition was declared invalid. 
• The fact that the State lacked the authority to create the act was another point of contention. Since the act did not fall under the purview of Entry I of Lists II and III of the Seventh Schedule, it was beyond the bounds of the Constitution. It was argued that the only body with the authority to create and implement laws was Parliament.
• On the second matter, it was contended that the legislatures of the states of Madhya Pradesh and Orissa lacked the power and ability to enact the Acts because their legislation was covered by Residuary Entry 97 in List 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which addresses religious regulation. 

Argument on behalf of the respondent

• The respondents contended that the goal of the anti-conversion statutes is to preserve public order, which is a limitation that is allowed under the Constitution. They argued that forced or fraudulent conversions affect public peace by upsetting social concord and causing disputes between communities. The rules were presented as preventative steps to stop immoral religious conversion techniques that would strain public order and cause rifts within communities.

JUDGMENT

Given the arguments presented, the High Court ruled that the Madhya Pradesh Act and the Madhya Pradesh Swatantraya Rules, 1969, could not be considered to violate Article 25(1) of the Indian Constitution because they were only passed to punish and prevent the illegal conversion of religion through coercion, fraud, or seduction. Sections 3, 4, and 5(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Act, in particular, established equality and religious freedom for everyone by forbidding unlawful conversion of religion, the court observed, adding that the Act upholds equality and freedom for all. The Court elucidated that Article 25(1) of the Constitution establishes the right to propagate the tenant religion but does not guarantee the freedom to convert to one’s own faith.

In addressing the second matter, the Court determined that the Madhya Pradesh Act’s provisions solely serve to preserve public order by guaranteeing that coercive or illegal religious conversion is avoided. The court further stated that there would only be public unrest in its absence. The case of Ramjilal Modi v. State of U.P. was also mentioned, in which it was decided that the rights protected by Articles 25 and 26 had bearing on public order. Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal was another case referred to; in this case, it was determined that something is considered a public disorder if it disturbs an individual and the community’s everyday existence.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh established a precedent for interpreting the “right to propagate religion” in relation to India’s anti-conversion legislation. When determining whether such legislation is constitutional, precedent has been regarded as the guiding principle. In order to acknowledge that India’s anti-conversion laws do not grant unchecked restrictions on religious freedom, a reality check must also be carried out. 

Special laws known as anti-conversion laws are meant to shield vulnerable populations from coerced religious conversion. In India, there are broad rules that make deception illegal, and that can be applied to coerced religious conversions. However, anti-conversion laws also serve to guarantee that the majority religious group always maintains its majority status and is not impacted by minority religious groups. For this reason, there is ambiguous legislation that can forbid religious conversions outright. When constraints on the right to spread religion are imposed by the Right of Religion Acts and, over time, the state’s social tensions rise, the legislature must reevaluate the laws. 

The government must repeal these Freedom of Religion Acts, and no legislation containing ambiguous language may be passed. It is also possible that unethical conversions could be defined as a separate offense and added to Chapter VX of the Indian Penal Code 1860. Anti-conversion laws must be eliminated to limit the power of these discriminatory limitations. These Acts must be amended and must precisely define fraud, coercion, and incentive in order to meet future demands for such legislation. False complaints must be addressed, and the law cannot be abused. The targeted minority religious groups cannot be subjected to discriminatory implementation of the law. Finally, it is recommended that converts who remain in the disadvantaged segments of society be granted affirmative action. The limitations on the freedom to spread religion will be significantly lessened if anticonversion laws are implemented as part of this reformation, placing India in the moderate range. 

The Supreme Court emphasized that the freedom to spread religion does not entail the freedom to convert people against their will, upholding the validity of the anti-conversion legislation in Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. The Court upheld states’ right to control religious conversions in order to maintain public order and shield people—especially the weaker members of society—from forced or dishonest conversions. By making it clear that although people have the right to propagate their religious views, this right does not include coerced or rewarded conversions, this ruling set a precedent for interpreting the scope of religious freedom under Article 25. Essentially, the ruling upheld the constitutionality of a balance between individual liberties and the state’s interest in maintaining social peace, public order, and protection from exploitation.