INTRODUCTION

The assault event that occurred in the Barnala Court Complex on March 3, 2001, is at the center of the Manjit Singh v. State of Punjab case, which was determined on September 3, 2019. After attacking Dalip Singh, Rajinder Pal Singh, Gurnam Singh, and Beant Singh, among others, the accused—including the appellant Manjit Singh—were charged with a number of crimes, including murder. Following a court hearing where the victims and the accused were present for different legal concerns, the incident took place. According to the prosecution, the defendants attacked the victims without warning while brandishing a variety of weapons, causing Dalip Singh to suffer severe injuries and eventually pass away.

After Dalip Singh’s death, Section 302 IPC (murder) was added to the accusations, which had previously been filed under Sections 307, 148, 149, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). A number of things happened in this case, such as the accused’s arrest, the finding of weapons, and the filing of further charges in response to the victims’ statements. The trial court moved forward with the charges against the appellant and others in spite of the prosecution’s plea to drop the case, which ultimately resulted in an appeal before higher courts.

The appeal looks at the validity of the trial procedure, the strength of the evidence against the accused, and whether the convictions were justified in light of the relevant IPC sections. Important legal questions are brought to light in this case, including the sufficiency of witness testimony, the burden of proof in criminal proceedings, and the accused’s procedural rights while facing serious allegations like murder and attempted murder.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The dead Dalip Singh, Rajinder Pal Singh (PW-5), Gurnam Singh (PW-6), and the complainant, Beant Singh, visited the Barnala Court Complex on March 3, 2001, in relation to a criminal matter. The defendants were in court for another case at the same moment, including Manjit Singh (the appellant), Labh Singh, Avtar Singh, Bakhtaur Singh, Sukhwinder Singh, Prem Kumar, and Narain Datt. The victims were attacked by the accused at approximately 11:15 a.m. when they were getting into their vehicle next to the typewriter cabin in the Court Complex.

Five of the defendants, according to the prosecution, were equipped with a variety of firearms. Manjit Singh, the appellant, and the other defendants attacked. Both men lifted their hands to deflect the strikes, but Labh Singh used a kirpan to strike Beant Singh in the right hand, and Sukhwinder Singh used a kirpan to strike Dalip Singh in the head. Prem Kumar and Narain Datt restrained Dalip Singh’s arms as Bakhtaur Singh struck him in the head with a ghop. Using a kirpan, Avtar Singh hurt Gurnam Singh on his left leg. Bakhtaur Singh then began to attack Gurnam Singh, striking him three times on the face, back, and thigh. Manjit Singh injured both of Rajinder Pal Singh’s hands when he hit him with a kirch.

When the injured sounded an alert, onlookers in the area came to their aid. Following their transport to the hospital, where Beant Singh’s testimony was collected, FIR No. 56/2001 was filed in accordance with Sections 307, 148, 149, and 120-B IPC. On the other hand, Dalip Singh was deemed unfit to speak. On March 12, 2001, he passed away from his wounds, and the charges were amended to include Section 302 IPC.

As a result of the investigation, firearms connected to the attack were found, and Bakhtaur Singh, Labh Singh, and Avtar Singh were arrested. The trial court called Manjit Singh, Prem Kumar, and Narain Datt under Section 319 CrPC even though they were initially not charged. The trial judge denied the prosecution’s motion to drop the accusations against Manjit Singh and the others after they were fabricated. As the matter developed, applications were filed with the Supreme Court and High Court but were denied.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether the appellant is liable for the offense committed?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Arguments on behalf of the appellant

• The appellant, Manjit Singh’s learned counsel, has vehemently argued that, as far as the appellant is concerned, it is well established in the evidence that he was not present at the scene of the incident in question. 
• He has specifically cited the DW-9 statement to argue that, on the day of the incident, the appellant was present before the said witness at 11.30 a.m. in the village of Dhaner, which is approximately 25 km from the Barnala Court Complex. As a result, his presence at the crime scene at 11.15 a.m. is completely ruled out. 
• A learned attorney has argued that there has been a major miscarriage of justice as a result of the Trial Court and High Court rejecting the alibi plea without providing compelling reasons. The learned counsel has contended that the appellant has been implicated in the aforementioned matter because the High Court has not recognized the fact that there was prior animosity between the appellant and the deceased’s family. The fact that PW-5 Rajinder Singh is the brother of Jagraj, who was actively involved in the aforementioned rape and murder case that appellant 
• Manjit Singh pursued, has been specifically mentioned by experienced counsel in this respect. 
• The learned counsel has further contended that no independent witness has been questioned, no proof regarding the accused parties’ shared object has been found, and no weapon of offense was found at the appellant’s request. Thus, the experienced counsel believes that the appellant’s conviction is not warranted.

Arguments on behalf of the respondent

• The State’s skilled counsel has defended the appellants’ conviction by arguing that the Trial Court and the High Court have addressed all of the arguments made by the appellants and that there are no flaws in the contested rulings that warrant intervention. 
• The learned counsel has argued that, in addition to injuring Rajinder Pal Singh, the appellant, Manjit Singh, actually encouraged the accused party before the assault. Given the unambiguous evidence on file, the appellant Manjit Singh’s failure to recover the kirch he used would not absolve him. 
• The learned counsel has further argued that all the requirements for the formation of an unlawful assembly with a common purpose were met when the accused, at least five of them, attacked the injured at the same time while brandishing lethal weapons. 
• Regarding the alibi plea, the learned counsel has argued that it was never proposed to the prosecution witnesses or included in the statement under Section 313 CrPC. The Trial Court and the High Court have duly taken into consideration and rejected the fabricated witnesses that were presented in this regard after careful consideration. 

JUDGMENT

A criminal case involving their relatives was being heard in the Court Complex, and the complainant party—which included Dalip Singh, Rajinder Pal Singh, Gurnam Singh, and Beant Singh—was there. Additionally, the appellants and other accused were present for another case. Around 11:15 a.m., the accused employed kirpans, Kirch, and shop, among other weapons, to attack the complaint party. Manjit Singh exhorted the attack, saying that the goal was to get revenge for the rape and killing of a rural girl.

Five defendants, including the appellants, were proven to have been at the scene by the prosecution. Dalip Singh was fatally injured, especially to his head, and the complaining party suffered severe injuries. Every member of the illegal assembly took part in the attack, either by using weapons or by physical restraints on the victims. The assault was executed in a coordinated fashion.

The common aim of an unlawful assembly can arise abruptly, and all members of such an assembly are accountable for any offenses committed by any of its members in support of the common object, the court emphasized, relying on the principles established in Sections 143 and 149 IPC. The complaining party was the intended attack victim, and the accused’s conduct and deeds amply demonstrated their same goal.

After weighing the evidence, the court found that the appellants were guilty of rioting, participating in an illegal assembly, and causing serious injuries, including Dalip Singh’s death. After the appeals were denied, the appellants were ordered to surrender and complete the remainder of their sentence.

CONCLUSION

Manjit Singh and the other appellants in this case were charged with participating in an illegal assembly and engaging in lethal weapon-wielding rioting on March 3, 2001, at the Barnala Court Complex. The interpretation and execution of Sections 143 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which address unlawful assembly and the members’ culpability for offenses committed in furtherance of the assembly’s common goal, are at the heart of the case. The accused’s presence at the scene with the intention of harming the complaining party was effectively proven by the prosecution. In this instance, the assembly’s shared goal—expressed by Manjit Singh’s call to exact revenge for the rape and killing of a rural girl—was crucial. This declaration made it clear that the attack on the complaining party was motivated by a deliberate desire to cause harm in order to achieve the shared goal rather than being an impromptu action.

The accused’s actions throughout the assault were also noteworthy. Dalip Singh was fatally struck, and other members of the complaining party suffered serious injuries. The employment of lethal weapons by multiple accused members throughout the assault suggested a concerted attempt to accomplish the shared goal of causing significant harm. In accordance with Section 149 IPC, which states that all members of an unlawful assembly are accountable for the acts of other members even if they did not personally commit the offense, as long as the act was carried out in furtherance of the assembly’s common goal, the court properly invoked the principles of constructive liability.

In summary, the appellants were found guilty by the court of rioting, causing serious bodily harm, including Dalip Singh’s murder, and belonging to an unlawful assembly. Injuring the complaint party was the shared goal of the attack’s planning and execution. It was evident from the appellants’ participation in the assault, their presence at the scene, and their actions that they were involved in the commission of the offenses.

The appellants were ordered to surrender and complete the remainder of their sentence after the appeals were denied. The case highlights how crucial it is to ascertain the unlawful assembly’s common purpose and the individuals’ responsibility under Sections 143 and 149 of the IPC.