INTRODUCTION

The case of Mahmood Farooqui vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), decided by the Delhi High Court on September 25, 2017, concerns the alleged sexual assault of an American research scholar by Mahmood Farooqui, a well-known Indian writer and filmmaker. The incident apparently occurred on March 28, 2015, at Farooqui’s Delhi home, where the complainant accused him of forcing her into nonconsensual oral sex.

In August 2016, a trial court convicted Farooqui under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced him to seven years in prison. Farooqui appealed the decision to the Delhi High Court. In this decision, the High Court acquitted him, sparking heated debate about the legal understanding of consent. The court stated that a “feeble no” could indicate consent, implying that the lack of strong verbal or physical resistance could be interpreted as approval of the sexual act.

This interpretation provoked extensive controversy and criticism, with many legal professionals and campaigners claiming that it undercut long-standing understandings of consent and could create a dangerous precedent for future cases of sexual violence. Some saw the ruling as a setback in India’s march toward stronger rape laws, particularly those emphasizing affirmative consent. 

The Supreme Court of India later failed to grant leave to appeal against the High Court’s acquittal, affirming the ruling. The case continues to be a focal point in conversations regarding consent, legal interpretations of sexual assault, and the obstacles that survivors confront in the Indian justice system.

FACTS OF THE CASE

An American research scholar connected with Columbia University and Delhi University’s History Department accused Indian writer and filmmaker Mahmood Farooqui of sexual assault in March 2015. While seeking contacts in Gorakhpur for her PhD research on Hindi literature and the Nath Sampraday, the complainant met Farooqui through Danish Hussaini, a common acquaintance.

The complainant requested performance tickets from Farooqui on March 28, 2015. Farooqui invited her to supper that night. She met Farooqui’s friend Ashish Singh and two departing classmates around 9 p.m. She found Farooqui drunk and emotional. She joined Farooqui on the porch after 20 minutes in his office. She was uncomfortable when Farooqui kissed her, saying it wasn’t what he required. Farooqui tried to remove her underpants while she pulled them up. The complainant said Farooqui immobilized her and forced oral sex. 

The complainant faked an orgasm to terminate the assault out of fear of Farooqui’s strength. Farooqui tried to repeat but was interrupted by his pals. The complainant ordered a cab and told Ashish Singh she was leaving. She was told to wait for Farooqui’s wife, Anusha, to return because nighttime travel was risky. Ashish got the complaint a cab when Anusha arrived. After getting in the car, she called Danish Hussaini to report the event and threatened to sue Farooqui. She denied medical examinations then.

Following the claims against Farooqui, an FIR (First Information Report) was filed under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code on June 19, 2015. A trial court sentenced Farooqui to seven years in jail for rape in August 2016. The Delhi High Court acquitted him in September 2017, sparking debate on consent law. The court noted that a “feeble no” may signify permission, meaning that the absence of strong verbal or physical resistance may lead to sexual consent. 

This approach was widely criticized by legal professionals and campaigners for undermining consent and setting a worrying precedent for future sexual abuse trials. Some saw the ruling as a setback to India’s push toward stronger rape legislation, notably affirmative consent laws. The Supreme Court of India upheld the High Court’s acquittal by denying leave to appeal. Discussions regarding consent, legal interpretations of sexual assault, and survivors’ issues in the Indian judicial system center on the case.

ISSUES RAISED

• If consent was given or not?
• Whether the appellant mistook the prosecutrix’s actions for permission? 
• Whether the appellant could be adequately informed of the prosecutrix’s sentiments?
• Whether the appellant’s misinterpretation of all of this as consent is sincere or merely a front for his defense?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Arguments on behalf of the appellant

• The appellant contended that the witness depositions revealed some undeniable facts. The appellant’s attorney has argued that further evidence in the record may be used to verify the accuracy of this chain of events. 
• The appellant’s second point, an alternate argument, was that the prosecutrix had agreed if such an incident had occurred at all. The attorney contended that even if she did not consent to the act, she conveyed something the appellant interpreted as permission. 
• Additionally, the appellants have demonstrated the existence of consent. First of all, she gave the appellant hugs and kisses while knowing that he was intoxicated. Second, just prior to the incident, the prosecutrix was joking around and engaging in lighthearted discussion. Thirdly, the appellant was completely unaware that the prosecutrix was afraid. 
• Mr. Sibal has maintained that the appellant called the prosecutrix on her phone for 76 seconds within a few hours following the email conversation on March 30, 2015. The prosecutrix did not mention this fact, and she denied it when questioned about it. 

Arguments on behalf of the respondent

• • It was maintained that her claims in the FIR, her statement made in accordance with section 164 of the Cr.P.C., and the trial court’s decision were all consistent with the accused’s guilt. 
  • In accordance with section 375(d) of the IPC, the appellant had forced oral sex on her. Additionally, the appellant has expressed regret for carrying out the action against the prosecutrix’s wishes and consent. 
  • Additionally, it was argued on the prosecutrix’s behalf that she returned to the United States because she was unable to handle the emotional and mental hardship. She only found the guts to return to India and file a formal complaint at the New Friends Colony police station on June 19, 2015, after she gained confidence in the backing of her friends and family in the United States.
  • Additionally, the prosecutrix refrained from acting because she feared more severe consequences. The belief that she would suffer the same fate as the victim in the Nirbhaya Rape Case was said to have made her fearful. 

• The fact that she reserved the MERU taxi makes it obvious that she wanted to get out of the appellant’s place as soon as possible. When she was unable to obtain confirmation, she attempted to take an autorickshaw but was forced to wait under the guise that it was unsafe for her to ride in a rickshaw at night.

JUDGMENT

Although it is a general rule that when a particular section defines a concept for the purpose of an offense, the general explanation or definition given in the statute need not be accepted and the former understanding needs to be used for the purpose of that section, the court uses section 375 (explanation 2) read with section 90 of the IPC to interpret the concept of consent. 

Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code and its explanation (2) make it abundantly evident that consent must be categorical, unequivocal, voluntary, and conveyed by words, gestures, or any other verbal or nonverbal communication indicating a willingness to engage in a particular sexual act. The court also noted the Indian Penal Code’s Section 90. The court stated that the accused must be aware that the permission was provided out of fear of harm or a misrepresentation of the facts.

Additionally, the court ruled that the prosecutrix was considered a “stellar witness” and acknowledged that the victim’s testimony in a rape case does not require confirmation to be found guilty. By stating that a woman’s “feeble no” can occasionally be interpreted as a “yes” and by distinguishing between the “no” of a learned woman and a more orthodox woman, as well as between situations in which the victim knows the accused and one in which they are strangers, the court also attempted to read into consent the stereotypes that it itself rejects. 

According to the Court, the appellant in this case has not been informed—or, at the very least, it is unclear whether he has been informed—that the prosecutrix did not consent. The appellant’s bipolar disorder and how memory functions in humans, as well as how it might become distorted in extreme circumstances, were also covered by the court. 

After considering all of the facts, circumstances, and evidence presented, the Hon’ble Court ultimately decided that the appellant must be given the benefit of the doubt regarding his consent. As a result, the appellant’s conviction, sentence, and judgment were overturned, and he was found not guilty of any of the charges. If the appellant was not wanted in any other case, they were ordered to be freed immediately.

CONCLUSION

The High Court’s understanding of consent served as the main justification for its acquittal. The court implied that the lack of a strong vocal or physical objection could be interpreted as consent to the sexual act, suggesting that a “feeble no” might signify consent.
The affirmative model of consent, which holds that explicit and passionate assent is required for legal sexual activity, has been attacked for being undermined by this interpretation. 

Critics contend that the ruling unfairly requires survivors to provide unambiguous evidence of non-consent, so reinforcing negative stereotypes and rape myths. Such a position runs the risk of discounting the experiences of people who might not express their resistance directly because of trauma, fear, or power disparities. 

Additionally, the ruling has been viewed as a setback in India’s march toward stronger rape laws, especially those that place an emphasis on affirmative consent. The court’s ruling might establish a troubling precedent for future sexual abuse trials by implying that a lack of significant resistance could infer consent. 

The Mahmood Farooqui case highlights the difficulties and complications involved in deciding cases involving sexual assault, especially when it comes to interpreting consent. The High Court’s ruling has generated a lot of discussion and brought attention to the need for a more complex and survivor-centered legal definition of consent. In order to guarantee that interpretations of consent are consistent with modern conceptions of autonomy and agency, it highlights the significance of continuous legislative reforms and public education.