CASE BRIEF: KARTAR SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB, (1994) 3 SCC 569

CASE NAME	Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569
CITATION	JT 1994 (2) 423, 1994 CRI. L. J. 3139, (1994) 2 SCR 375 (SC), 1994 (2) SCR 375
COURT	Supreme Court of India
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice R.M. Sahai, Justice S.R. Pandian, Justice M.M. Punchhi, Justice K. Ramaswamy and Justice S.C. Agarwal
PETITIONER	Kartar Singh
RESPONDENTS	State of Punjab
DECIDED ON	Decided on 11 March 1994

INTRODUCTION

Today, terrorism is a major problem in most of the world. People from all around the world are recommending different actions to the government to address that issue. It led to several problems. First, it’s unclear what constitutes terrorism and what kinds of actions fall within its purview. The second concern relates to the issue of human rights. Many governments have enacted harsh laws that violate due process and human rights in an effort to combat terrorism. It thus turned into a conflict between terrorism and human rights. Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (Amendment), 1967 is a relatively new statute that comes after Terrorist and POTA (Amendment). In order to combat the issue of terrorism, the aforementioned laws violated due process rights and set harsh punishments and procedures.
This is not just an Indian problem. The detention of individuals in the United Kingdom, the terrorist legislation of Spain, and the actions taken by the United States are examples of sophisticated legal systems that place insufficient emphasis on civil rights and liberties when it comes to national security. National security is regarded as being extremely important. The legitimacy of anti-terrorist laws was maintained in the “Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab” decision, arguing that it serves the interests of the state. These statutes were upheld by a five-judge bench and were meant to be interpreted in light of the social conditions that existed in the nation at the time.

FACTS OF THE CASE

A writ petition, a criminal appeal, and Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) were filed in the instant case as separate legal actions. There was a similarity between these cases. The Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act (1984 Act), the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (1985 Act), and the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (1987 Act) are the three legislative enactments that were the subject of the cases. These three acts are collectively referred to as the “Impugned Acts,” with the 1985 and 1987 Acts being more widely recognized as TADA Acts. Furthermore, in this case, the court was also presented with a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (U.P. Amendment) Act 1976 (1976 Act). The Uttar Pradesh government forbade the use of Section 438 of the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure in the state of Uttar Pradesh by enacting Section 9 of the 1976 Act.

During the hearings, the Supreme Court compiled the arguments and rendered a common decision regarding the legality of Section 9 of the 1976 Act as well as the 1984, 1985, and 1987 Acts. The Supreme Court underlined that every case should be decided individually depending on the outcome of the decision on the legitimacy of these three statutes.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether the TADA Acts are covered by “Public Order” Entry 1 of List II?
Whether the Central Government’s lack of legislative capacity rendered the 1984 Act extra vires?
Whether any of the essential rights protected by Part III of the Indian Constitution are violated, either whole or in part, by the contested Acts?
If the police confession is acceptable as evidence against the defendant?
If Article 21 of the Constitution is violated by the 1973 Code’s provision rendering Section 438 inapplicable, and if the legislature has the authority to do so?
Whether it is reasonable and appropriate to impose strict restrictions on the granting of bail on top of those outlined in Section 437(3) of the 1973 Code?
Whether a person’s ability to petition the High Court for bail under Article 226 may be limited if the 1987 Acts covers the offense.

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Argument from the side of the petitioner

With all of their might, the petitioners challenged the legitimacy of the contested Acts in order to contest their constitutionality. They first and principally contended that the Central Legislature had overreached itself by passing these contested Acts, raising doubts about the validity of its legislative authority.
Furthermore, they contended that some sections of the 1987 Act, such as Sections 3, 4, 8, 9, 15, 20 (3), and 22, violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and, as a result, their validity is called into doubt.
The petitioners also claimed that the Acts were biased and did not follow fundamental criteria of justice and fairness, denouncing them for disregarding humanitarian law and universal human rights values.
In addition, the petitioners denounced these Acts as oppressive and repugnant, implying that they were inherently cruel and liable to be diluted or abused.
Additionally, they contested the contested Acts on the grounds that law enforcement agencies, which possess great power and can admit confessions made by officers into evidence, would abuse this power by conducting “witch hunts” against law-abiding citizens and igniting a climate of terror reminiscent of past periods of institutionalized terror.
The petitioners argued in a thorough presentation of their case that the contested Acts in question violated fundamental human rights and natural justice principles in addition to constitutional precepts.

Argument from the side of the respondent

In response to the petitioner’s claims, the respondents contested the legality of the contested Acts on the grounds that they were arbitrary and violated the rule of law. They argued that the only way to effectively combat the terrorists’ violent and disruptive actions is to enact strict regulations that don’t compromise the nation’s fundamental ideals.
Consequently, they recommended that these activities necessitated the enlargement and strengthening of the State’s legal authorities to fight terrorism within the bounds of a valid framework.
The contested Acts underwent a thorough parliamentary procedure, implementing the legislature’s belief that these were imperative to bridge the gaps in the current criminal laws due to the significant rise in terrorist and disruptive actions. Furthermore, the responders argued that an examination of the Acts showed neither a lack of legislative competence nor a violation of basic rights.
They said that the main goal of the Acts’ creation was to safeguard national security through appropriate channels and procedures. In addition, the respondents claimed that terrorists employed a variety of strategies, from inhumane to brutal and barbaric, to achieve their goals. These tactics included scaring the populace and making them feel hopeless and demoralized, undermining the target nation’s economy, and using the government’s overreaction to garner attention or sympathy.
The respondents emphasized that innocent groups of people are the main targets of these terrorist acts; these groups select their victims in order to maximize public attention and further the political objectives of the terrorists.
Thus, it was imperative to implement these contested Acts while giving careful regard to national values and legal principles in order to stop these destructive terrorist actions.
They claimed that these Impugned Acts complied with the legal process and procedures and did not contradict any of the constitutional principles established in Part III of the Indian Constitution.

JUDGMENT

The majority of justices maintained the 1984, 1985, and 1987 Acts—the three Acts that were being challenged—as being constitutionally legitimate. The court determined that, in the relationship between the Union Government and the State, the Union Government has the authority to pass the contested Act since it addresses more serious public disorder, which is covered by Entry 1 of List I, the Union’s legislative purview. The court further found that the legislature is fully authorized to enact special laws to address the particular circumstance and keep it from happening. The legislature must pass a special law to stop terrorism’s effects since it is a rising cause for concern and has the potential to undermine the nation’s sovereignty and integrity. Consequently, since the contested Acts represent a special legislature, their unique provisions pertaining to the criminal justice system’s procedural aspects, such as recording confessions, setting up specialized courts, and granting bail, among other things, cannot be contested on the grounds that they violate the principles outlined in Articles 14, 20, and 21 of the Indian Constitution.

In order to finish its ruling regarding the validity of the contested Acts, the court posed several questions. It addressed each one in detail in order to fully resolve the parties’ arguments. For a deeper understanding, reviewing the court’s issue-by-issue ruling is crucial.

CONCLUSION

An important part of striking a balance between individual liberty and national security considerations is shown by this case. Even though the majority upheld the constitutional validity of the contested Acts, the dissenting opinions of Justices Ramaswamy and Sahai struck down some provisions of the 1987 Act, establishing a principle that, even though terrorism poses a greater threat to national security and calls for the implementation of stricter laws to combat it, it is always important to make sure that the rights of the accused are respected and that anti-terror laws are not abused.

Journalists and human rights advocates harshly criticized most judges’ decisions. Public discourse in India revolved around the Supreme Court’s ruling on Section 15 of the 1987 Act. It was widely disapproved of that this part, which was upheld by a majority of 3:2 judges because it clearly violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Nonetheless, the dissenting opinions of Justices Ramaswamy and Sahai were valued and are thought to have served as the starting point for the conversation about the principles of separation of powers, fair trials, and the use of checks and balances on the executive branch to better protect individual liberties. The dissenting justices’ observation is currently used to resolve disputes involving the tension between national sovereignty preservation and individual rights. In the 2005 case of NCT v. Navjot Sandhu, also referred to as the Parliament attack case, the Supreme Court declared that the accused’s confession, which the deputy commissioner of police had recorded, was not genuine. It was decided that the police officer’s taped confessions, regardless of their rank, were unreliable and not admissible as proof. This Supreme Court ruling emphasizes the worries about police power abuse and the need for safeguards inside the criminal justice system to prevent coerced or false statements.