CASE BRIEF: RAMJI LAL MODI v. STATE OF U.P., 1957 SCC OnLine SC 77

CASE NAME	Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., 1957 SCC OnLine SC 77
CITATION	1961 MADLJ(CRI) 108, ILR (1960) KER 1045, 1960 KER LJ 673, 1960 KER LT 623
COURT	Supreme Court
BENCH	Hon’ble Chief Justice S.R. Das, Justice Syed Jafer Imam, Justice S.K. Das, Justice P. Govinda Menon And Justice A.K. Sarkar
PETITIONER	Ramji Lal Modi
RESPONDENT	State of U.P.
DECIDED ON	Decided on 5th April, 1957

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of India rendered a significant decision in the 1957 case of Ramji Lal Modi vs. The State of U.P., which addressed the legitimacy of restrictions on the right to free speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. The main point of contention was whether Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which punishes acts meant to offend religious sentiments, was still legal. The Supreme Court was given the chance to define the parameters of “reasonable restrictions” under Article 19(2) in this case, with a focus on maintaining public order and religious harmony in a multicultural society. The Court’s judgment in this case highlighted the balance between individual liberties and social interests in preserving communal peace, setting important precedents about the acceptable bounds of free expression in India.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner is the publisher, editor, and printer of Gaurakshak, a monthly magazine. Cow protection is the focus of the aforementioned periodical. Following the publication of an article or cartoon about a donkey in the Hindu daily newspaper “Amrit Patrika” of Allahabad in July or August of 1954, the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh began to agitate. The State brought charges against the editor, printer, and publisher of “Amrit Patrika,” but the Allahabad High Court ultimately found them not guilty. Meanwhile, an article appeared in the petitioner’s journal “Gaurakshak” in its issue for the month of Kartik Samvat 2009, which corresponds to November 1952. The state government ordered the petitioner’s prosecution on December 12, 1952, based on the aforementioned article. Consequently, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Kanpur, filed a complaint against the petitioner on June 8, 1953, alleging violations of Sections 153Ai and 295Aii of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was prosecuted under Sections 153A and 295A by the magistrate in his August 5, 1953, order and was committed to the Sessions Court of Kanpur for trial. Not guilty was the petitioner’s plea.

By ruling on November 16, 1953, the learned Sessions Judge cleared the petitioner of the charge under Section 153A but found him guilty under Section 295A and sentenced him to 18 months of rigorous imprisonment, a fine of Rs. 2000, and an additional 4 months of rigorous imprisonment if the fine is not paid. The petitioner appealed to the Allahabad High Court. By his ruling on October 25, 1956, the learned Single Judge ruled that the petitioner was guilty under Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code since the article was published with the malice and purposeful intent to offend Muslims’ religious sentiments. Nevertheless, the learned judge lowered the fine and jail term to 12 months.

After the High Court denied the petitioner’s request for a certificate to appeal to this court under Articles 132 and 134 on October 30, 1956, the petitioner requested special permission to appeal the Allahabad High Court’s October 25, 1956, ruling. Additionally, on 25 October 1956, the petitioner filed the petition for the aforementioned reliefs under Article 32. Along with his writ petition, the petitioner also requested a stay of the sentence that had been imposed on him. The stay application under Article 32 has finally been heard on December 18, 1956. It is assumed that the petitioner has turned himself in and is serving his jail sentence.

ISSUES RAISED

If Section 295A, which is being contested, is a legislation that places reasonable limitations on the exercise of the right granted by Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. Is the freedom of speech and expression being violated, if so?
Are all offenses falling under the category of “in the interests” of public order covered by the law?
Whether the wording used in the contested provision is sufficiently broad to encompass limitations that impact the basic right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) both inside and outside the bounds of constitutionally permitted legislative action.

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Argument on behalf of the appellant

Because it infringes upon the petitioner’s right to freedom of speech and expression, which is protected to him as an Indian citizen by Article 19(1)(a) of our Constitution, Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code is ultra vires and null and void. The argument is that, as stated in cl. (2) of the aforementioned Article, this provision cannot be justified as a law that places reasonable limitations on the exercise of the right granted by Art. 19(1)(a).
According to learned counsel, the sole element in cl. (2) that the State may potentially rely on to support its argument for the legitimacy of the contested section is the interest of public order. Counsel claims that a law that restricts the right to free speech and expression and punishes those who violate it can only be “in the interests of public order” if the likelihood of public disorder is included in the offense and preventing public disorder is a matter of immediate, not distant, consideration.
A learned attorney notes that while disparaging the faith or religious beliefs of a group of Indian residents may occasionally cause public unrest, it is not always the case. Therefore, even if a law is applied within the constitutionally permissible limits, it cannot be severable, so the court should not uphold it when it purports to authorize the imposition of restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression in language broad enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limitation of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, as the impugned section does.
According to Learned counsel, it must be declared completely unlawful and void as long as there is a chance that it would be used for purposes that are not permitted by the Constitution.

Argument on behalf of the respondent

Only expressions that are “deliberate and malicious” in their purpose to offend religious sentiments are covered by Section 295A. Protection is provided by the need for harmful intent, which makes sure that harmless expressions are not punished. Restrictions only apply to acts that actually endanger public harmony.

JUDGMENT

The Court determined that s. 295A of the Indian Penal Code was unquestionably legitimate and fell under the protection of Cl. (2) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. The phrase “in the interests of” that appears in the amended Cl. (2) of Art. 19 had the effect of extending the protection provided by that clause, and a law that is not specifically intended to uphold public order would fall under its purview if the actions it punishes had a propensity to cause disorder in the community. It was ludicrous to imply that religious insults as crimes could not affect public order in order to draw cl. (2) of Art. 19 in light of the provisions of the Constitution’s Articles 25 and 26 specifically rendered religious freedom subject to public order even if they guaranteed it. Furthermore, it could not be argued that the limitations established by S. 295A of the Indian Penal Code could be employed for purposes outside of those that are within the purview of the Constitution, given its wording and contents.

CONCLUSION

In the Ramji Lal Modi vs. State of U.P. case, the Supreme Court considered whether Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which punishes “deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings,” was constitutional. The primary question was whether this clause violated the Indian Constitution’s Article 19(1)(a), which protects the right to free speech and expression, and if so, whether Article 19(2) permitted the restriction. Because Section 295A was within the parameters of “reasonable restrictions” allowed by Article 19(2), the Court determined that it did not violate Article 19(1)(a). The State may restrict free expression for the purposes of maintaining public order, morality, decency, and other predetermined reasons under Article 19(2).

The Court held that, particularly in a sensitive and varied culture like India, statements that intentionally offend religious beliefs could endanger public order. Therefore, it was reasonable to punish speech that incites religious offense in order to keep the peace. The Court underlined that behaviors that have the potential to upset social harmony are included in the definition of public order. It decided that actions meant to incite religious fervor could cause civil unrest, which is why Article 19(2) prohibitions are justified. By adopting this view, the Court expanded the definition of public order to encompass actions that might not result in direct violence but have the potential to disrupt peace.

According to the Supreme Court’s decision, Section 295A of the IPC is a legitimate constitutional restriction on the right to free speech under Article 19(2). The State has an obligation to uphold public order and suppress inflammatory speech that can incite religious strife, according to the Court’s judgment. Section 295A is narrowly drafted and, as a result, meets the Constitution’s requirements for a reasonable restriction by concentrating only on statements made with malevolent and intentional purpose. This ruling, which reflected the Court’s sophisticated interpretation of appropriate restrictions within India’s constitutional framework, emphasized the need to strike a balance between the right to free speech and the necessity to suppress speech that can inspire religious hatred.