Case Brief: Githa Hariharan & Anr. v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr.

Case Details	Information
Name of the Case	Githa Hariharan and Anr. v. Reserve Bank of India and Anr.
Citation	AIR 1999 SC 1149; MANU/SC/0117/1999; JT 1999(1) SC 524; (1999) 2 SCC 228
Date of Judgement	February 17, 1999
Petitioner	Githa Hariharan and Dr. Mohan Ram (Wife and Husband)
Respondent	Reserve Bank of India and Others
Bench/Judges	Dr. A.S. Anand, CJI, M. Srinivasan and U.C. Banerjee, JJ.
STATUTES INVOLVED	Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956Section 19 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India
IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES/DOCTRINES	Natural guardianship rights of motherConstitutional interpretation to avoid gender discriminationWelfare of the child as paramount considerationHarmonious construction of statutes

FACTS OF THE CASE

In W.P. (C) No. 489/95, the petitioners Githa Hariharan (a writer) and Dr. Mohan Ram (Medical Scientist at JNU) jointly applied to the Reserve Bank of India on December 10, 1984, for 9% Relief Bonds worth Rs. 20,000/- in the name of their minor son Rishab Bailey. Both parents expressly agreed that the mother would act as the guardian of the minor for investment purposes, and accordingly, the mother signed the application form as the guardian.

The Reserve Bank of India rejected the application and advised the petitioners to either produce an application signed by the father or obtain a certificate of guardianship in favor of the mother from a competent authority, stating that as per Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the father is the only natural guardian.

In W.P. (C) No. 1016/91, the petitioner (wife) challenged the same provisions in the context of a divorce proceeding where her husband was claiming exclusive guardianship rights over their minor son.

ISSUES INVOLVED

1. Whether Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, and Section 19(b) of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, are violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution for discriminating against mothers in matters of natural guardianship?
2. What is the correct interpretation of the word “after” in Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956?
3. Whether a mother can act as a natural guardian during the lifetime of the father?

ARGUMENTS FROM THE PETITIONER’S SIDE

• Ms. Indira Jaising, learned senior counsel, contended that Section 6(a) of HMG Act and Section 19(b) of GW Act violate the equality clause of the Constitution by relegating the mother to an inferior position based solely on sex.
• The mother’s right as natural guardian is made cognizable only “after” the father, which constitutes gender discrimination.
• Both sections must be struck down as unconstitutional for violating Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.

ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT’S SIDE

• The Reserve Bank of India contended that under Section 6(a) of the HMG Act, the father is the only natural guardian during his lifetime.
• The application was not rightly accepted as the mother is not the natural guardian when the father is alive.
• The Bank’s policy was in accordance with the statutory provisions.

JUDGEMENT PRONOUNCED

The Supreme Court, through a three-judge bench, delivered a landmark judgment interpreting Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956:

1. Constitutional Interpretation Approach: The Court held that if one construction makes a statute unconstitutional while another keeps it within constitutional limits, courts will prefer the latter, presuming the Legislature acted in accordance with the Constitution.

2. Interpretation of “After”: The Court interpreted the word “after” in Section 6(a) to mean “in the absence of” rather than “after the lifetime of” the father. The word “absence” refers to the father’s absence from the care of the minor’s property or person for any reason whatever, including:

• Physical inability to take care of the minor
• Mental incapacity
• Mutual understanding between parents
• Father’s indifference to the minor’s affairs
• Father staying away from where mother and minor live

3. Harmonious Construction: The Court applied harmonious construction of Sections 4 and 6 of the HMG Act, noting that both parents are defined as natural guardians and both are duty-bound to take care of their minor child.

4. Welfare of the Child: The Court emphasized that the welfare of the minor in the widest sense is the paramount consideration, and this principle should guide the interpretation of guardianship laws.

5. Validation of Mother’s Actions: The Court held that in situations where the father is not in actual charge of the minor’s affairs due to indifference, agreement between parents, or incapacity, the mother can act as natural guardian and all her actions would be valid even during the father’s lifetime.

6. Prospective Application: The judgment was given prospective effect to avoid reopening past transactions that may have been invalidated on the ground that mothers were not natural guardians during fathers’ lifetime.

CONCLUSION

The aforementioned case provided the new perspective on equal rights being accorded to both parents, as natural guardians, toward their minor children. With this interpretation by the Court, discrimination based on sex was rendered obsolete, all while preserving the statutory framework. The decision also recognized the practically realizable situation in which the father may be absent (either physically or mentally or by way of mutual agreement) and thus, the mother can validly exercise her powers as a natural guardian.

The judgment buttressed the constitutional authority for gender equality and commanded the interpretation of personal laws in consonance with fundamental rights. The Reserve Bank of India and similar institutions were directed to draw up suitable procedures so that, in matters of guardianship, mothers are not discriminated against when they are the primary caregivers for their minor children.

The case stands as a huge step forward towards gender justice in family law and stands out as an example of what could be done to abolish discriminating provisions through constitutional interpretation without crushing the whole statutory framework.