CASE NAME	Shabir Hussain Bholu v. State of Maharashtra, 1963 Supp (1) SCR 501
CITATION	1963 AIR 816, 1963 ALL. L. J. 844, 1963 MAD LJ 574, 1963 ALL CRIR 132, 1964 (1) SCJ 609
COURT	Supreme Court of India
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice  J.R. Mudholkar, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, and Justice  N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
PETITIONER	Shabir Hussain Bholu
RESPONDENT	State of Maharashtra
DECIDED ON	Decided on 28 September 1962

INTRODUCTION 

The Supreme Court of India rendered a significant ruling in 1962 that addressed the intricate relationship between criminal procedure and perjury prosecution. Application of Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with false evidence, and the processes required under Section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) were at the center of the case. The central question was whether, after rendering its final decision, a court might file charges of perjury against a witness without adhering to the particular guidelines set forth in the CrPC. Strict adherence to the procedural requirements is required by the perjury legislation in order to protect the accused’s rights. 

In order to expedite the prosecution of witnesses who provide false testimony, Section 479-A of the CrPC mandates that the court note its reasoning and provide the accused with a chance to clarify their actions at the time of the verdict. This procedural protection makes sure that the choice to bring a perjury case is not made hastily but rather on the basis of rigorous judicial consideration. The case demonstrated how crucial court supervision and strict procedural guidelines are in shielding people from unjust prosecutions and how any laxity in the legal system could compromise the integrity of the legal system. 

FACTS OF THE CASE

At Rafique Ahmed’s murder and abetment of murder trial before the Additional Sessions court in Greater Bombay, the appellant testified on behalf of the prosecution alongside two other witnesses. During his witness examination before the committing magistrate, the appellant said that Rafique Ahmed had stabbed the deceased Chand when he was fleeing in his presence. However, the appellant testified at his trial before the Court of Sessions three months later that he observed Rafique Ahmed and his two companions approaching from the Muhammaden burial place as he was standing on his doorstep. He claimed that just one of them carried a dagger and the others only carried sticks. But because he shut the door and stayed inside because his kids were scared, he did not see anything else. 

Under cross-examination, he denied knowing about the events that followed and said he did not witness Rafique Ahmed stabbing the victim. The appellant provided two quite different statements about a different aspect of the occurrence, which the learned Additional Sessions judge who heard the case brought up in his charge to the jury. Following a review of all the evidence, the jury found Rafique Ahmed not guilty of the offense under section 302 of the I.P.C. but found him guilty under s. 304, first part.

ISSUES RAISED

• Whether the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, could not take cognizance of a complaint against the appellant for an offense under s. 193, Indian Penal Code?
• S. 479-A(1) would not be applicable if the procedures before the committing magistrate were to be deemed wholly distinct from one another. Could the same be said of the testimony provided during the committal phase?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Arguments on behalf of the appellant

• According to the petitioner, the Sessions Judge disregarded Section 479-A of the CrPC, which establishes a particular process for perjury prosecutions. The clause requires the court to note the basis for charging the defendant with perjury at the time of the ruling, which was not done in this instance.
• The appellant argued that no action could be taken under Sections 476 to 479 CrPC since Section 479-A expressly prohibits their applicability in situations involving false evidence. Any further prosecution under Section 476 of the CrPC was prohibited due to noncompliance with the process outlined in Section 479-A.
• The argument was that Section 479-A’s timeliness requirements—which stipulate that the decision to prosecute must be made at the moment of judgment and not later—were broken by starting the prosecution after the trial was over.

Arguments on behalf of the respondent

• The State’s representative, Mr. Prem, argued that Parliament has made it apparent that the process outlined in s. 479-.A is just an alternative method to be pursued in “flagrant cases” by failing to amend s. 195(1), clauses (b) and (c). He has cited the ruling in Durga, Prasad Khosla v. The State of U. P. to bolster his claims. In that instance, it was decided that s. 479-A was passed in order to offer the Court more authority and enable it to handle more severe or egregious situations of purposeful fabrication or false testimony in court. 

• The Court may move under Section 479-A or Section 476, and in the event that it chooses not to act under Section 479-A, it may act under Section 476.
• Next, Mr. Prem argued that the provisions of s. 479-A, Cr. P.C. would not apply to the matter at hand for two reasons. He cites the following as the first justification: since the Additional Sessions judge presided over the trial with the assistance of the jury, he was unable to record in his judgment a finding of the kind required by s. 479-A (1) and provide justification for it. The second cause is that conflicting statements were given in the case—one before him and another before the Committing Magistrate—according to the Additional Sessions judge’s objection. In such a situation, Mr. Prem claims that s. 476, Cr. P.C. is the only clause under which a complaint might be filed. 

JUDGMENT

Two requirements were set down for the exercise of the powers under s. 479A: (i) the court must form an opinion that the person has committed one of the two categories of offenses referred to in s. 479A; and (ii) the court must conclude that it is expedient to prosecute the person in order to eradicate the evils of perjury, etc., and in the interests of justice. The Court held that the provisions of s. 479A had not been complied with, and no cognizance could be taken of the offense. This view and determination must be made at the time the verdict or final order in the trial is delivered; the court cannot subsequently invoke s. 476 and file a complaint against the witnesses. When an offense falls under the category covered by section 479A, the provisions of sections 476 to 479 are completely excluded. If an action is not taken under section 479A in this situation, no action may be taken under sections 476 to 479.

These provisions will inevitably have the effect of excluding the provisions of sections 476 to 479 with regard to offenses that are specifically covered by subsection (1). Limiting our discussion to situations in which the crime is willfully providing false testimony “at any stage of a judicial proceeding,” it is undeniably true that, in accordance with Section 476, the Court is the entity responsible for adjudicating such cases and must first act in accordance with Section 479A. The Court that may take action under sections 476 and 479A does not seem to differ significantly from one another. 

CONCLUSION

The procedural requirements for prosecuting a witness for perjury under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the related procedural obligation of Section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) are at the heart of the Shabir Hussein Bholu v. State of Maharashtra case. Shabir Hussein, the appellant, was charged with making inconsistent statements during a murder trial. This raised the question of whether the Sessions Judge had followed the proper procedural procedures to bring a perjury case against him.

Interpreting Section 479-A of the CrPC, which outlines the procedure for prosecuting witnesses for providing false testimony, was the main issue of disagreement. The clause makes it extremely clear that the court must note the reasons for the decision-making process and provide the party with a chance to clarify their actions before receiving a complaint alleging perjury. But in this instance, at the time of judgment, the Sessions Judge did not do so.

The appellant’s defense claimed that because Section 479-A prohibits the application of Sections 476 to 479 CrPC in perjury cases, no other procedural avenue could be pursued and that, as a result, the prosecution was declared illegitimate. The appellant additionally emphasized that the prosecution was started following the trial’s conclusion, which is against Section 479-A’s mandate that these decisions be taken during the judgment. The appellant was granted a favorable ruling by the Supreme Court, which declared that the prosecution was rendered illegal due to the obligatory procedural safeguards specified in Section 479-A. This case serves as more evidence of the need to closely follow procedural law in perjury prosecutions. The ruling emphasizes that the prosecution may be dismissed for any violation of the law, particularly when it comes to an accused person’s rights.