INTRODUCTION

The criminal procedures involving the appellant, Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar, and the State of Madhya Pradesh are at the center of the case Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, which the Supreme Court of India resolved on May 1, 2002. The main issue in this case is the appellant’s conviction for aiding and abetting suicide under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The main question addressed in the judgment is whether, in accordance with the legal definition given by Section 107 of the IPC, the appellant’s words and acts amounted to aiding and abetting the deceased’s suicide. The case concerned the meaning of abetment, mens rea, or criminal intent and whether the appellant’s purported provocation or encouragement had a direct bearing on the suicide. This case serves as a reminder of several crucial criminal law concepts, such as the evaluation of purpose and causality in situations involving aiding and abetting suicide. The Court’s ruling in this case clarifies how the law should be applied in certain situations, putting special emphasis on the necessity of the victim’s having the intention to commit suicide.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant is Neelam Sengar’s brother, who was married to the late Chander Bhushan @ Babloo. It is said that the deceased’s sister and the appellant’s sister were married in 1993. It is also said that she was forced to live apart from her husband and kids for approximately a year following her marriage due to ongoing abuse from the deceased and other family members. She then moved in with her brother, the appellant in this case, in her parents’ home. 

The appellant counseled the deceased to return his sister to her marital home and treat her well approximately two months before the occurrence. It is claimed that on July 25, 1998—a pivotal date—the appellant went to the deceased’s parents’ home and begged them to let his sister recover at the married home and not to be physically mistreated or tormented. It is further claimed that on that day, the deceased’s parents were threatened by the appellant, who threatened to file a complaint under Section 498 A of the Indian Penal Code if they did not change their behavior toward their sister. The parents of the deceased reportedly expressed their helplessness in response to the threat, given that their son, Chander Bhushan, had been living apart from them.

It is further alleged that after the deceased’s mother told him this tale and pleaded with him to return his wife so, there wouldn’t be a police report against them, the deceased went to the appellant’s parent’s house, and the two got into a fight. The deceased then made his way back to his siblings and other acquaintances, telling them that the appellant had used derogatory language to threaten and attack him. The deceased was discovered dead on the following date, July 27, 1998, after being discovered hanging by a rope around his neck on the raft of his home. A suicide note that the deceased left on a stray piece of wrapping paper was also found. Upon conducting an autopsy on the deceased on July 27, 1998, it was discovered that the cause of death was suffocation following a 24-hour hanging. Following the conclusion of the inquiry, the investigating officer filed the charge sheet, and on July 2, 2001, the appellant was charged with a crime under Section 306 I.P.C. The investigating officer had recorded the witness statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C.

ISSUES RAISED

• Whether the appellant is liable under Section 306 of IPC?
• Whether the FIR can be quashed under Sec. 482 of CrPC?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Argument from appellant

• The appellant contends that he has not committed any offense, and that FIR should be quashed under Sec. 482 of CrPC.

Arguments from the side of the respondent

• It is alleged that the appellant has used abusive language and has asked the deceased to go and die.

JUDGMENT

According to the Court, it is evident from a straightforward reading of the suicide note that the deceased was extremely stressed out and despondent. One reasonable explanation would be that, according to the wife, Smt. In Neelam Sengar’s account, the deceased had no job or hobby and still enjoyed alcohol use. The man was irritated. When the suicide note is read aloud, it becomes abundantly evident that this is not the handwritten note of a sensible, sound guy. The deceased’s wife, Smt. Neelam Sengar appeared before the investigating officer to provide a statement pursuant to Section 161 Cr.P.C. She claimed that the deceased did not work and would constantly engage in wine consumption. She added that on July 26, 1998, while her husband was drunk and mistreating her and the other family members, he came to them. 

If the prosecution’s account is accepted, it indicates that the deceased and the appellant had a fight on July 25, 1998. Since the deceased returned to the house on July 26, 1998, it is not possible to conclude that the deceased’s suicide was a direct consequence of their argument on July 25, 1998. When the aforementioned facts are considered separately, it is evident to us that the current case does not meet any of the requirements for “abetment” in order to qualify as an offense under Section 306 I.P.C. The wife’s statement indicates that the deceased was consistently inebriated. Everyone knows that consuming too much alcohol can lead to debauchery. Therefore, it was evident that the dead was the victim of his own actions, which had nothing to do with the argument that had occurred on July 25, 1998, during which the appellant was accused of using foul language. 

The judgment that the dead and no one else is accountable for his death will become unavoidable when all available evidence is taken into account, together with the case’s facts and circumstances. Ultimately, this appeal is successful. The ruling of the High Court under challenge is hereby overturned, as is the charge sheet dated July 2, 2001, framed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sihora, in Sessions Trial No. 469 of 1998 for an offense under Section 306 I.P.C. The petitioner is free on bond. His bail bond and surety will be released.

CONCLUSION

According to Section 107 I.P.C., someone is said to be aiding someone in carrying out an action if they: (1) encourage someone else to carry out the action; (2) participate in a conspiracy with one or more other individuals to carry out the action, if an act or illegal omission is carried out as part of the conspiracy and in order to carry out the action; or (3) knowingly assist in carrying out an action by any act or illegal omission. 

Both of the lower courts have mistakenly accepted the prosecution’s version of events, according to which the deceased’s suicide was caused by an argument that occurred on July 25, 1998, during which the appellant is said to have used foul language and advised the dead to “go and die.” The courts based this on a statement given under Section 161 Cr.P.C. by the deceased’s brother, Shashi Bhushan, who claimed that the deceased had told him, upon returning from the appellant’s home, that the appellant had degraded and cursed at him. The word ‘instigate’ is to arouse provoke, or urge someone to do a dramatic or unwise action. Therefore, mens rea must exist in order for instigation to occur. It is well known that statements made during a fight or on the spur of the moment cannot be assumed to be made with mens rea. It’s emotional and in a fit of rage. 

Second, a quarrel on July 25, 1998, is reported to have followed the allegedly insulting statements spoken to the dead. The body was discovered hanging on July 27, 1998. Given that the dead had, if one is to assume, taken the insulting language seriously, he had ample opportunity to consider and ponder; so, it cannot be stated that the appellant’s use of abusive words on July 25, 1998, ultimately led to the deceased’s suicide. The deceased’s suicide on July 27, 1998, is not directly related to the appellant’s derogatory remarks on July 25, 1998. The deceased’s suicide on July 27, 1998, would seem to indicate unequivocally that it was not the direct outcome of the argument on July 25, 1998, during which it is claimed the appellant used derogatory words and encouraged the deceased to go ahead and end his life. The lower courts were unaware of this fact.