| CASE NAME | Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v UOI |
| CITATION | AIR 2014 SC 2114 |
| COURT | The Supreme Court of India. |
| BENCH | R.M. Lodha, C.J.I., A.K. Patnaik, S.J. Mukhopadhaya, Dipak Misra and F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, JJ. |
| PETITIONER | Pramati Educational & CulturalTrust ® &Ors. |
| RESPONDENTS | Union of India &Anr. |
| DECIDED ON | Decided on 6May, 2014 |
INTRODUCTION
In the Pramati case, which was brought before the Supreme Court in 2014, private schools once again brought a constitutional challenge to the RTE Act. This time, the issue was brought before a bench of five judges. During this particular instance, the grounds for challenge were that Article 15(5) and 21A of the Constitution, as well as the Right to Education Act, breached the fundamental structure of the Constitution and the right to equality by imposing an arbitrary distinction between minority schools that receive assistance and those that do not receive assistance.
CLPR acted as an intervenor in this action, representing the Azim Premji Foundation from its perspective. Jayna Kothari argued that there was a distinction between the level of scrutiny that was applied in a fundamental rights review and a basic structure review, and that the obligation that was imposed on private unaided non-minority schools by Article 15(5) and 21A was not unreasonable or in violation of the fundamental characteristics of the Constitution.
Once again, the constitutional bench of the Supreme Court ruled that the Right to Education Act (RTE Act) maintains its validity. As a result of the fact that the goals of Articles 15(5) and 21A were to give equal opportunity for students who come from less fortunate sections of society, the Court came to the conclusion that these provisions would not violate the right of private schools as articulated in Article 19(1)(g). Regrettably, the Court made yet another exception and decided that all minority schools, including those that receive financial assistance, would be free from the RTE Act’s coverage.
FACTS
In the Pramati case, which was brought before the Supreme Court in 2014, private schools once again brought a constitutional challenge to the RTE Act. This time, the issue was brought before a bench of five judges. During this particular instance, the grounds for challenge were that Article 15(5) and 21A of the Constitution, as well as the Right to Education Act, breached the fundamental structure of the Constitution and the right to equality by imposing an arbitrary distinction between minority schools that receive assistance and those that do not receive assistance.
CLPR acted as an intervenor in this action, representing the Azim Premji Foundation from its perspective. Jayna Kothari argued that there was a distinction between the level of scrutiny that was applied in a fundamental rights review and a basic structure review, and that the obligation that was imposed on private unaided non-minority schools by Article 15(5) and 21A was not unreasonable or in violation of the fundamental characteristics of the Constitution.
Once again, the constitutional bench of the Supreme Court ruled that the Right to Education Act (RTE Act) maintains its validity. As a result of the fact that the goals of Articles 15(5) and 21A were to give equal opportunity for students who come from less fortunate sections of society, the Court came to the conclusion that these provisions would not violate the right of private schools as articulated in Article 19(1)(g). Regrettably, the Court made yet another exception and decided that all minority schools, including those that receive financial assistance, would be free from the RTE Act’s coverage.
ISSUE RAISED
- Whether by inserting clause (5) in Article 15, the Parliament has altered the Basic Structure or framework of the Constitution.
- Whether by inserting Article 21 in the Constitution, the Parliament has altered the Basic Structure or framework of the Constitution.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
- The Petitioner, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, cited the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others vs. the State of Karnataka and others, in which the majority of the eleven-judge bench concurred that Article 19(1)(g) also encompasses the right to operate and manage private unaided educational institutions. Furthermore, he stated that the golden triangle, which was established in the case of Minerva Mills and Others vs. Union of India and Others, guaranteed the people the promise enshrined in the Preamble. Additionally, it was determined that Section 4 of the Constitution was beyond the amending power due to its violation of the fundamental structure of the Constitution. The petitioner argued that Article 19(1)(g) is a critical feature of the Indian Constitution. Consequently, the insertion of clause (5) in Article 15 violates the fundamental structure of the constitution, as it allows the state to make any provision regarding the admission of socially and economically disadvantaged individuals to educational institutions, regardless of the provisions of Article 19(1)(g).
- An additional argument presented by Mr. R.F. Nariman on behalf of the petitioner was that clause 5 of Article 15 fails to establish a distinction between aided and unaided educational institutions, treating them as equals. Consequently, this was a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. He cited the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others vs. the State of Karnataka and others and argued that the distinction between these educational institutions was acknowledged.
- The petitioners’ submission regarding the second issue at hand is that the State, as defined under Article 12, does not encompass private unaided educational institutions. If it were to do so, it would contravene the right granted under Article 19(1)(g) and, as a result, would not impose any obligation on these institutions.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
Mr. Mohan Parasaran, representing the Union of India, asserted that clause (5) of Article 15 does not contravene the fundamental structure of the Constitution, as it is merely an enabling provision that enables the State to establish special provisions for the backward classes to facilitate their ascension in society. Referring to the same case, he further stated that Article 19 (1)(g) is not violated by reserving only a minor percentage of the seats. He also argued that minority institutions have been excluded under Article 30 of the Constitution, while also incorporating clause (5) of Article 19 into the scope of the Constitution, as it has granted them special status. He substantiated this assertion by citing the case of Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, in which it was determined that the exclusion of the private institution does not violate Article 14. Therefore, the incorporation of clause (5) into Article 15 does not violate the Constitution’s fundamental framework.
The second issue was addressed by the respondent, who argued that private unaided educational institutions would be classified as “State” after the functional tests were conducted. Consequently, they would be required to fulfill their obligations and guarantee access to educational institutions.
JUDGEMENT
The court determined that the primary objective of clause (5) of Article 15 was to grant the State the authority to guarantee equal access to education for the socially and economically disadvantaged segments of society by granting seats in all educational institutions, with the exception of minority educational institutions. The inclusion of clause (5) has been implemented to guarantee the provisions outlined in Article 15 and to guarantee equal access to educational institutions. The court cited the case of the State of Kerala and others vs. N.M. Thomas and others, in which it was determined that clause (4) of Article 16, which contains language similar to clause (5) of Article 15, was not a proviso or exception to the Article, but rather an intention to provide equal opportunities to all in terms of accessing public employment. The same conclusion was reached in the case of Indra Sawhney & Others. v. Union of India & Others. The court also clarified that the petitioners’ argument that the insertion of clause (5) of Article 15 violated Article 19(1)(g) to establish and administer private educational institutions was dismissed, indicating that the allocation of a small percentage of the seats does not impede their ability to exercise their right. The court also differentiated between private aided and unaided educational universities, asserting that private aided institutions receive funding from the State, while private unaided educational institutions do not.
The second issue, which was whether the insertion of Article 21 (A), which provides free and compulsory education to the backward classes of society, violates the basic structure of the Constitution, was resolved by the court. The court determined that the amendment was made to grant the State a new power to ensure the establishment of Article 21, which provides free and compulsory education to children aged six to fourteen, as this objective had not been achieved in 50 years. Consequently, the court determined that the constitutional validity of the incorporation of clause (5) of Article 15 and Article 21A.
CONCLUSION
The aforementioned ruling is a clear indication that Article 21A supersedes Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution, provided that the State’s authority does not conflict with that granted by Article 45 of the Indian Constitution. This type of supremacy may not be acknowledged by the courts if it is not executed effectively. The main topics of discussion in the case at hand were the inclusion of Articles 15(5) and 21A and their constitutionality. These two Articles—Articles 14, 19, and 21—violate the golden triangle, according to the petitioners’ main claims. However, the Court found that the addition of Articles 15(5) and 21A did not contradict any Articles, thereby ruling in favor of the respondents.
Many academics think that the Court erred in declaring in its ruling that the rights of private unaided institutes under Article 19(1)(g) are not violated by the addition of Article 15(5). The petitioners presented compelling precedents to support their claims that their rights were being infringed, but the Court only declared that Article 19(1) would not be breached by reserving a small number of seats in their institutes (g). It is a well-established fact that private, independent institutions are free to establish and run themselves as they see fit, free from intervention from the government. This well-established concept is violated by the Court’s ruling, which mandates reservations in for-profit, independent schools.
