CASE BRIEF: NARAYANSWAMI v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, (1971) 2 SCC 182

CASE NAME	Narayan swami v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC 182
CITATION	1971 SCC (Cri) 507, 1971 Cri LJ 1301, AIR 1971 SC 1789
COURT	Supreme Court of India
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice K.S. Hegde and Justice A.N. Grover
PETITIONER	Narayanswami
RESPONDENT	State of Maharashtra
DECIDED ON	Decided on 30th April, 1971

INTRODUCTION

A police officer is accused of lying and fabricating evidence in the case of Narayanswami v. State of Maharashtra (1971), which emphasizes the significance of honesty and integrity in the legal system. Sub-Inspector Narayanswami, the appellant, was involved in a dacoity investigation in July 1965 concerning railway property theft in Nagpur. Ambadas and Deorao were among the individuals the police detained throughout the inquiry; as a result of their admissions, stolen goods were found. The two witnesses, Pochanna and Abdul Gani, confirmed the retrieval through a panchnama.

Pochanna did not bolster the prosecution’s case at the dacoity case trial in June 1966, and Abdul Gani did not appear at first. A man named Abdul Gani testified in court on June 10 and provided an account of the panchnama. Abdul Gani’s identification was verified by the appellant. However, as time went on, the defense learned that the individual was actually an imposter named Dilawar and not the real Abdul Gani. After more investigation, the true Abdul Gani was located and gave a statement claiming to have verified the panchnama. During the cross-examination, Dilawar acknowledged that he had given a false statement in response to pressure from the appellant.

Consequently, the trial judge concluded that the appellant had lied on purpose and provided false evidence. Sections 195 and 196 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) were used to prosecute the appellant as well as Dilawar for lying and creating fake evidence. After being found guilty, the appellant received a harsh three-year prison sentence. His appeals were denied by the Supreme Court and the Maharashtra High Court, which upheld his conviction and emphasized the need to maintain the integrity of the legal system.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Within the purview of the Railway Police Station, Nagpur, there was a dacoity in July 1965 involving the theft of railroad property. The Railway Police asked the local police for help throughout the inquiry. The appellant was a Sub-Inspector working under Inspector Khandagale, who oversaw the Tehsil police station, and he gave him instructions to help with the inquiry. As a result of the appellant’s participation in the inquiry, Ambadas and Deorao were among the people who were taken into custody. On July 21, 1965, these two guys are said to have given information that led to the police recovering stolen stuff in front of Pochanna and Abdul Gani, two Panch witnesses who verified the panchnama (record of the recovery). Later, Ambadas, Deorao, and others were the subject of a charge sheet filed under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for dacoity. In June 1966, the trial got underway in Nagpur’s Additional Sessions Court. One of the Panch witnesses, Pochanna, disapproved of the prosecution’s case on June 9. The second witness, Abdul Gani, was not present on June 9. On June 10, however, someone claiming to be Abdul Gani showed up and gave a statement attesting to the fact that he witnessed the panchnama being attested and that he was present when the stolen goods were recovered. The appellant attested the following day, confirming that this individual was, in fact, Abdul Gani.

However, as time went on, the accused learned that the witness on June 10 was actually an imposter by the name of Dilawar, not Abdul Gani. Mr. Ingle, the defense attorney, discovered that Dilawar, the persona of Abdul Gani, was facing a criminal case in the Nagpur Munsiff’s court and that the actual Abdul Gani had moved to Rajnandgaon. Mr. Ingle presented the trial judge with an application in which he claimed the witness was a forger and presented evidence that identified him as Munirsha’s son Dilawar. On June 14, 1966, the trial judge summoned back the witness. After more questioning, the witness admitted that the appellant had forced him to provide false testimony and that he was actually Dilawar, not Abdul Gani. The trial court sent the appellant a notice to show cause as to why he shouldn’t be charged with perjury and creating false evidence in light of this confession. Responding on June 16, the appellant reaffirmed that Abdul Gani was the witness who gave his testimony on June 10 and refuted the assertion that he was Dilawar.

After being summoned back for additional questioning, the appellant stuck to his original stance. It seems doubtful that he misidentified the witness because, during cross-examination, he acknowledged having known him for more than three years. The genuine Abdul Gani was then brought forth by the accused and testified in court, attesting to the panchnama. The trial judge discovered a link between the signatures on the panchnama and the genuine Abdul Gani. Following the trial, the court dismissed all of the defendants from the dacoity allegation but ordered that the appellant and Dilawar be prosecuted for lying and creating false evidence in accordance with Sections 195 and 196 of the IPC. After being found guilty on both counts, the appellant received a concurrent sentence of three years in a strict prison. The appellant filed an appeal with the Maharashtra High Court, which dismissed it summarily. Following his appeal, the Supreme Court sent the matter back to the High Court for a hearing. The case was placed before the Supreme Court to examine its merits after the High Court once more denied the appeal.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether the prosecution is vitiated if the criteria of Section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not followed before the complaint from which this appeal originates was instituted?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Argument on behalf of the appellant

It is not impossible that the appellant mistakenly believed Dilawar to be the genuine Abdul Gani.
The appellant said that he lacked mens rea, or the criminal intent, to perjure himself or create false evidence. He contended that since he had known the witness for three years, he was unable to introduce a different person, Abdul Gani, with the intention of misleading the court. The appellant believed that the witness was, in fact, the right person and any error he may have made was accidental, according to the defense.
The appellant drew attention to the contradictions in the prosecution’s evidence, which included the testimony of the genuine Abdul Gani and the identification of the phony witness as Dilawar. The defense contended that in order to weaken the case, the accused provided Dilawar under duress or through manipulation by the defense attorney, who made up the story that he wasn’t Abdul Gani. The defense also questioned the validity of the process of comparing signatures and the unexpected appearance of the actual Abdul Gani.

Arguments on behalf of the respondent

The prosecution contended that Narayanswami purposefully substituted Abdul Gani with a fake witness, Dilawar, in order to strengthen the prosecution’s case in the dacoity trial. Under oath, Dilawar acknowledged that the appellant had forced him to provide a false statement and that he was not Abdul Gani. This admission proved the appellant had created false evidence and committed perjury with knowledge and intent.
Perjury and fabricating evidence, according to the State, are grave crimes that compromise the legal system. The appellant’s premeditated acts were demonstrated by the ultimate discovery and testimony of the actual Abdul Gani. The prosecution stressed that, despite the fact that the dacoity accused were found not guilty, the appellant’s attempt to mislead the court by providing false evidence constituted a serious injustice and needed to be punished severely in order to prevent similar acts in the future.

JUDGMENT

The Court noted that it is also evident from the case’s facts and the evidence in the file that the appellant was in charge of persuading Dilawar to pretend to be Abdul Gani. The argument that the appellant provided false testimony cannot be accepted under these circumstances. The appellant’s disregard for the truth is evident. In the current case, admissions made in the explanation provided and during the deposition are pertinent and admissible. Although the individual making the admission has the option to demonstrate that the information they disclosed is untrue, an admission is nonetheless considered meaningful evidence. The admission must be regarded as significant evidence in the absence of any such proof.

CONCLUSION

This case sets forth the importance of admission in the trial process in the absence of any other evidence. The Court takes a narrower approach in deciding the case and rules out the innocence of the accused. While the trial court retains discretion over whether to offer a witness a chance to present evidence against a proposed complaint before filing a formal complaint, the appellate court mandates that the witness be given a chance to do so. It makes sense why this distinction was made. The trial court is the one that has seen the witness and assessed his disposition, as far as the trial court is concerned.

In a dacoity trial, the case centered on whether the appellant purposefully portrayed Dilawar, a fake witness, as Abdul Gani, the genuine attestor to a panchnama. The appellant claimed it was a case of mistaken identity, but the courts determined this was unlikely given his extensive knowledge of the witness—more than three years. Dilawar significantly damaged the appellant’s case when he confessed that the appellant forced him to pose as Abdul Gani.

The ruling emphasizes the gravity of perjury and evidence fabrication, emphasizing how these actions jeopardize the fairness of the legal system. The courts decided that the appellant should receive harsh punishment for his activities in order to discourage similar behavior in the future, even though the false testimony did not lead to a conviction in the initial dacoity trial. This case serves as a reminder that people in positions of trust within the legal system must answer for their conduct. The courts affirmed that any attempt to deceive the court, regardless of the result, is a serious criminal, taking a strong stand to protect the integrity of the judicial system.