CASE NAME	Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107
CITATION	1980 AIR 2147, 1981 SCR (1)1196
COURT	The Supreme Court of India.
BENCH	V.R. Krishnaiyer, Y.V. Chandrachud, P.N. Bhagwati, Syed Murtaza Fazalali, A.D. Koshal
PETITIONERS	Maru Ram & Anr.
RESPONDENT	Union of India & Anr.
DECIDED ON	decided on 11th November, 1980

INTRODUCTION

The Indian Supreme Court rendered a historic ruling in the 1980 Maru Ram v. Union of India case, which addressed the constitutionality of certain sections of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Penal Code, particularly those that dealt with life in prison and the remission system. Understanding the balance between judicial supervision and legislative authority in the context of correctional reforms requires an understanding of this case. 

The corresponding clause pertaining to the president’s compassion jurisdiction is found in Article 161. The president may commute or remit penalties imposed on any individual for any offense against a law pertaining to an issue to which the executive power of the Union extends, as per Article 72 of the Constitution. The 1978 Amendment Act introduced Section 433A, which limits the authority of the relevant government to commute a life sentence given to an accused person for a specific offense. Article 20 (1), Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution are not violated by Section 433A of the Crpc, and this section does not prohibit parole or any other kind of release during the 14-year period.

The President of the Indian Union is granted a special authority known as the “pardoning power” under Article 72 of the Indian Constitution. A pardon is not a matter of right; rather, it is an act of grace. To provide relief from excessive severity or blatant errors in the administration or execution of the criminal code, the executive branch has been endowed with a broad range of authority. It is a check that the executive has been given for unique circumstances. Therefore, it is evident that this authority’s goal typically referred to as the President’s “mercy jurisdiction,” is to rectify potential judicial errors because no human system of judicial administration can be flawless.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Section 433A of the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure was challenged for being unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated Articles 14, 20(1), 72, and 161 of the Indian Constitution. Each and every petition falls into one of two categories. It was argued that this Section only prevented the government from issuing an order under Section 432 to remit the entire sentence before the convicted party serves at least 14 years in jail. In this instance, the prisoner had not argued for definitive release without a government order under Crpc Section 432 or Articles 72 and 161. 

ISSUES RAISED

• What impact will Section 433A of the Criminal Procedure Code have on Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution? 
• Does the requirement under Section 433A Crpc take precedence over the policy outlined in Article 161 for the issuance of remission?

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF BOTH SIDES

Arguments on behalf of Petitioner

• The Code of Criminal Procedure’s Sections 432 and 433 grant the authority to remit funds and commute sentences, but Section 433A imposes limitations on a particular group of inmates. The inmates’ expectations are dashed in this unfair and unjust imprisonment, and because of this limitation, they are unable to change for the better. This clause conflicts with the president’s pardoning authority as granted by Indian Constitution articles 72 and 161. It is said that the harshness of the law’s requirements and treatment of prisoners disregards their feelings and powerlessness. 
• The petitioners contend that the primary goal of punishment must be reformation and that it should take precedence over the other goals of punishment, such as deterrence, retaliation, and prevention, even though these goals only warrant secondary consideration.
• Statutes should be construed in a straightforward manner, with provisions that are simple to understand and apply.
• Section 433A places restrictions on inmates that make them unhappy and put them in a difficult situation. Statute interpretations should be clear and simple to provide a more basic approach rather than cause confusion in understanding such interpretations.

Arguments on behalf of Respondent

• Although section 433A restricts the types of inmates it can release, it does not go against the Constitution’s pardoning authority. The advice of the federal and state governments is considered, and the decision made by them is binding on the head of state, therefore the president and governor do not have full control over pardoning. Furthermore, the fair principle states that a sentence reduction does not occur unless the governor or president chooses to exercise their authority. Remission does not absolve the offense; it solely impacts how the sentence is carried out. 
• A fair criminal justice system requires a balance between the four primary purposes of punishment. Each of the four items needs to be treated equally. Other items will become chaotic if the only goal—reformation—is the center of attention. For instance, preventative theory—which aims to safeguard the public when offenders cause problems—cannot be established if we only concentrate on reformative measures.
• They claimed that Section 433A was enacted for the legitimate reasons of preserving public safety and order and that this included outlawing the early release of prisoners convicted of serious offenses.

JUDGMENT

The court determined that the President cannot exercise the authority granted by Article 72 on his own; rather, the President must heed the counsel of the Central Government, which has binding authority over him. The President’s authority under Article 72 and the Governor’s pardoning authority under Article 161 coexist. It has also been noted that no power, not even constitutional, should be used dishonestly or arbitrarily.

The court determined that Section 433A will only operate prospectively, meaning that it will only apply from the date it came into effect in order to avoid any constitutional flaws. It was also decided that while Section 433A limits the authority of the relevant government to execute its rights under Section 432 Crpc, it does not have the authority to restrict the power granted by Article 72 and Article 161 of the Indian Constitution.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional provisions of Section 433-A in the Maru Ram case, ruling that the former cannot restrict the authority granted by Articles 72 and 161 to the President (Union Council of Ministers) and the Governor of a State (Council of Ministers of a State), respectively, to grant complete pardons even prior to the end of the statutory period stipulated by Section 433-A. The ruling stated that Article 72 and Article 161 of the Constitution cannot be restricted by Section 433-A, but the competent government can still exercise its rights under Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code. There is no distinction or difference between the exercise of power under Articles 72 and 161 and Section 433 CrPC. 

In cases where the action can be linked to Section 433 CrPC, the President’s or Governor’s approval is not required, but if the power can be linked to Article 72 or 161, then the President’s or Governor’s sanction is. However, the Council of Ministers’ advice also binds the Governor and the President in this situation. As a result, when the provisions included in the nation’s fundamental law are invoked, the restriction found in Section 433-A may be pointless.

Article 60 of the Constitution might be impacted by the Maru Ram case 1 ruling. Following the seven-judge bench ruling in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, it is standard law that the President is an acronym for the Central Government, and the Governor is a shorthand for the State Government (see Maru Ram v. Union of India). Following the ruling in the Maru Ram case 1 by the Constitution Bench, a criminal may receive a pardon from the President under Article 72, even if their case clearly fits under Section 433-A.