CASE BRIEF: M. N. SANKARAYARAYANAN NAIR vs. P. V. BALAKRISHNAN & ORS, 1972 SCR (2) 599

CASE NAME	M. N. Sankarayarayanan Nair v. P. V. Balakrishnan & Ors, 1972 SCR (2) 599
CITATION	AIR 1972 SC 496, 1974 (1) SCJ 84, 1972 SCD 322, 1974 MADLW (CRI) 128
COURT	Supreme Court of India
BENCH	Hon’ble Justice P. Jaganmohan Reddy and Justice D.G. Palekar
PETITIONERS	M. N. Sankarayarayanan Nai
RESPONDENT	P. V. Balakrishnan & Ors
DECIDED ON	decided on 26th November, 1971

INTRODUCTION

The Public Prosecutor, who represents the government in court and serves as an official of the court, is crucial to the administration of justice since the State is in charge of prosecuting the offender in the criminal justice system. Section 321 gives the public prosecutor the authority to end the prosecution at any point before the verdict is rendered, with the court’s approval. The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor is the main actor in the process of withdrawing from prosecution, and the court serves as the supervisor. The government has no part in this procedure, as the provision explicitly specifies. But in actuality, the government has the final say because the executive branch handles prosecutions. Since the state government appoints the public prosecutor, an agent-principal connection exists between the two, which, in fact, gives rise to all practical and interpretive issues.

The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 321 addresses the Public Prosecutor’s withdrawal from prosecution. This provision is in accordance with S. 494 of the previous Cr.P.C. There are two primary differences between the new section and the old one. No public prosecutor withdrew a case because the phrase “in charge of a case” was absent from the prior section. Only the public prosecutor or assistant public prosecutor in charge of the specific case may ask for withdrawal from prosecution under the new clause. Second, clauses (i) through (iv) have been added to the new section to require the Central government’s consent before the Public Prosecutor may drop charges in instances involving the Central government.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The first respondent served as the agent for Shree Narayana Transport Company at its Baliapattom branch. One of his responsibilities there was to receive products from the general public for the company’s lorry service and to issue waybills. These Way Bills included an agreement that the Transport Company would be liable to the Bank if any of the Banks discounted them and if the items were lost or damaged in transit. According to the allegations, the First Respondent allegedly issued nine Way Bills in the name of the Second Respondent on various dates, indicating that the products had been received, even though none of the commodities had been sent or accepted for transportation.

The second respondent, the consignor, who withdrew approximately Rs. 84,000 against these Way Bills, duly discounted them from his bank account. The general manager of Shree Narayana Transport Co., Kozhikode, discovered this fraud on a check, and it seems that the first accused, or first respondent, signed a document promising to reimburse the transport company for any losses it had sustained before being suspended on 10-4-63. The same day, Accused One and Accused 2 were the targets of a case that was opened after a complaint was made to Baliapattom Police. Sub-Inspector of Police Baliapattom issued a charge sheet following an inquiry. The accused was committed to stand trial before the Assistant Sessions Court on June 15, 65, based on the materials given in the report under Section 173. On July 9, 65, a revision was filed in the Kerala High Court in response to this decision.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether the public prosecutor can file the application or memo for withdrawing the case before the court under CrPC?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Argument on behalf of the petitioner

Since the State Government directed the Public Prosecutor to seek permission, the Public Prosecutor has not decided or used his independent judgment to determine whether the case qualifies for the Court’s permission to withdraw from prosecution. This is in accordance with Section 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which states that the Public Prosecutor alone is responsible for deciding whether to withdraw from the prosecution.

Argument on behalf of the respondent

Since no evidence had been presented in the case, the committal was unlawful, and it was premature to determine whether any could be revealed at that point and, if so, what offense.
There was a delay in the disposal of the case, which was more related to a civil matter and thus should not be tried in criminal court.
The decision of the public prosecutor to withdraw was just and fair and was taken after careful consideration of the issues.
In the Memorandum submitted by the Public Prosecutor, it was mentioned that the accused was charged with offenses stemming from a contract between the accused and the defacing complainant, Shree Narayana Transport, that the case was registered in 1963, and the trial had not yet started; that witnesses from distant locations, including Bombay and Calcutta, were cited and that the State would incur significant costs to obtain their evidence; and that the case was of a civil nature.

JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court tried to lay out the parameters within which the public prosecutor can use their discretion. The court noted that the implicit requirement that the withdrawal be made in the interest of the administration of justice serves as a guide for discretion. These could include the prosecution’s inability to gather sufficient evidence to support the accused’s allegations, the need for withdrawal to maintain public peace and tranquility or handle the law and order situation, etc. The trial court’s decision, which the High Court confirmed, was set aside, and it was ordered that the trial proceed.

CONCLUSION

Section 333 permits the Advocate General, at any point during a High Court trial and prior to the verdict being returned, to inform the Court on behalf of the Government that he will not be prosecuting the Defendant further upon the charge. This information ends the case against the accused. The power contained in this section provides a general executive direction to withdraw from the prosecution, subject to the Court’s consent, which may be determined on many possible grounds. As a result, it is broad and uncontrolled by any other provision in the Code. The ability to initiate a noble prosecution under Section 333 of the Criminal Procedure Code is independent of the court’s approval. A reading of Section 494 would indicate that in order to drop charges against any individual, either generally or in relation to one or more of the offenses for which he is being tried, the Public Prosecutor, who is in charge of the case, must request permission from the court. He may request this authorization at any point—during the investigation, following committal, or even before the announcement of the verdict.

While the Section does not specifically limit the Public Prosecutor’s ability to request permission to drop the prosecution, it implicitly provides that the power withdrawal must serve the interests of the justice administration. This could mean that the prosecution will not be able to provide enough evidence to support the charge, that information obtained later would lead the prosecuting agency to falsify prosecution evidence or any number of other similar situations that are difficult to predict because they depend entirely on the facts and circumstances of each case. Nevertheless, the Court has an additional responsibility to ensure that justice is served by preventing the request for permission from being made for reasons unrelated to the interests of justice or from allowing crimes against the State to go unpunished simply because the Government orders the public prosecutor to drop the case for reasons unrelated to its obligation to prosecute offenders under the law.

In conclusion, this case serves as an example of differentiating between executive powers and judicial powers. It also interprets the section in a way that keeps the Government’s influence out of the judiciary and leaves no scope for any loopholes and lacunas. As an officer of the court, the Public Prosecutor is required to assist the court in exposing injustices, but in their capacity as government representatives, they are also expected to argue cases in support of government policy. The Supreme Court acknowledged in the Sheon and Paswan case that, although a public prosecutor is an officer of the court, he also has an agent-principal relationship with the state government, and as such, he must obey the state government’s decision or resign. This suggests that the discretion granted by section 321 to public prosecutors and assistant public prosecutors appears to be based on the state governments rather than on them.