FACTS OF THE CASE

The deceased Smt. Bachamma was deprived of her gold jewels and strangled to death in her home in the village of Mallur on the night of March 21–22, 1979. As was customary on the night in question, the family members were fed dinner by the late Smt. Bachamma. While the deceased slept in the hall next to the kitchen and her son P.W.4 G.M. Parkash slept in the house’s courtyard, P.W.3 walked upstairs to his bedroom after eating, and her mother-in-law P.W.2 Smt. Bayamma went to the ‘Kana’ to maintain watch. The appellant, who had just started working for P.W. 3 as a servant, slept in the ground floor chamber where the silk cocoons were once raised and stored. When P.W.4 went to wake up his mother on the 22nd morning at around 6 a.m., he discovered that she was lying dead. He walked upstairs and phoned his father, P.W.3. They removed the deceased’s ornament after observing that she had been strangled to death. 

Her gold nose, earrings, and gold mangalsutra and rope chain were gone. The screw from the missing gold nose ring was on the right side of the bed. Additionally, a towel (M.O. 1) that P.W. 3 had provided to the appellant for his use was lying there; it appears that the deceased had strangled himself with the towel. A number of keys that the deceased had carried with her were discovered missing, and the iron safe and almirah in the hall were discovered to be open. Six silk sarees kept in the almirah and all of the jewelry and Rs. 1700 in cash put in the iron safe were also discovered to be missing. The appellant had fled with the jewelry and valuables after a search was conducted for him, but he was not located in the village or the residence.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether, in light of the diamonds being discovered with the specified individual, the accused’s statement was admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Arguments on behalf of the Appellant

• Given the time between the murder and robbery and the discovery of the stolen articles, the presumption arising under illustration (a) to s. 114 of the Evidence Act should be that the appellant was merely a receiver of the stolen articles and thus guilty of an offense punishable under s. 411 of the Indian Penal Code, rather than that, he was guilty of culpable homicide amounting to murder punishable under s. 302 as well. This is because there is no proper identification that the seized ornaments belonged to the deceased Smt. Bachamma. 

Arguments on behalf of the Respondent

• By pointing out the vicious killing of Smt. Bachamma, the appellant’s employer’s wife, and the subsequent theft of her gold ornaments, the respondent underlined the seriousness of the crime. The respondent contended that the death penalty should be applied since the appellant’s acts showed a great deal of cruelty and a total disdain for human life.
• The respondent also addressed the appellant’s false denial of the recovery of stolen property. In the face of overwhelming evidence, it was argued that this denial was an incriminating factor that further linked the appellant to the crime.

JUDGMENT

The fact that the accused provided a statement that resulted in the discovery of the stolen objects under s. 27 of the Evidence Act is insufficient to support a charge under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. There must be more evidence linking the accused to the offense’s commission. The presumption arising under illustration (a) to s.-114 of the Evidence Act is that the accused not only committed the deceased’s murder but also robbed her of her gold ornaments, which were part of the same transaction. This is because the circumstances cited by the prosecution, in this case, led to no other conclusion than that the accused was guilty because murder and robbery were proven to have been integral parts of one and the same transaction.
The prosecution presented enough evidence to link the accused to the crime’s commission.

The type of presumption based on recent and unexplained possession under illustration (a) to s. 114 of the Evidence Act must be determined by the type of evidence presented. Regarding what “recent possession” means, it was noted that each case must be evaluated on its own facts and that there is no set time limit for determining whether possession is recent. Whether recent possession is sufficient to support the assumption of guilt differs depending on whether the stolen item is easily transferable from one person to another. It cannot be argued that a year had passed between the commission of the crime and the recovery of the ornaments based on the accused’s statement, which led to their discovery under s. 27 of the Evidence Act as soon as the police captured the accused. 

This is especially true if the accused had been evading capture during that time and the stolen items were of a type that was unlikely to be easily transferred from one person to another. There was no delay between the moment of his arrest and the recovery of the stolen stuff. The accused could not provide a convincing defense for why he possessed it. Conversely, he denied that he had retrieved the stolen property. On its own, the false denial is a damning event. The court has the authority to commute the appellant’s death sentence into a life sentence in prison.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of India considered the appellant Earabhadrappa’s conviction for the murder and robbery of Smt. Bachamma, the wife of his employer Makrappa, in the 1983 case of Earabhadrappa Alias Krishnappa vs. the State of Karnataka. The appellant worked as a domestic servant in Makrappa’s home under Krishnappa’s fictitious identity. Smt. Bachamma was robbed of her jewelry and possessions the night of the crime and was discovered strangled to death.

Circumstantial evidence, such as the discovery of stolen goods in the appellant’s possession and his subsequent attempts to get rid of them, formed the main basis of the prosecution’s case. The appellant was sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge after being found guilty of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and robbery under Section 392 of the same code. The High Court upheld the conviction and death sentence.

The Supreme Court modified the death sentence to life in prison even though it upheld the conviction. The Court justified the death penalty by emphasizing that the offense was horrific and featured severe violence. However, it also took into account the “rarest of the rare” theory put forward in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab and came to the conclusion that the case did not fit the requirements for a death sentence. The Court commuted the sentence to life in prison as a result.

This case demonstrates how the Court handles capital punishment sentencing by striking a balance between the seriousness of the offense and the guidelines set forth in earlier rulings. It draws attention to the Court’s responsibility to guarantee that the death sentence is applied only in the most dire situations.