INTRODUCTION

The appellant, Dibia, contested his conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, which resulted in a life sentence for the alleged murder of his cousin Puswa in Dibia v. State (22 February 1952). The prosecution claims that the incident happened in the village of Todarpur in the Hamirpur district on December 11, 1949. The claimed disagreement that preceded the crime involved Dibia’s wife, who had left his house after an argument and lived with Puswa and his brother, Baddu, before being brought back to Dibia. The wife’s location was later unclear, and Dibia suspected that his wife and Puswa were having an extramarital affair. On the day of the murder, Puswa was getting a haircut when Dibia allegedly hit him with an axe, killing him on the way to the police station.

Eyewitness accounts, medical records, and a partial confession were all used in the case. Dibia denied any involvement, stating that the charges were motivated by animosity. The impartiality of Dibia’s examination under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code may have been impacted by concerns raised throughout the trial on whether crucial elements, such as motive and specifics of witness statements, were sufficiently disclosed to him. Nevertheless, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the murder conviction after concluding that the eyewitness statements were sufficient to establish Dibia’s culpability despite procedural flaws.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant was charged with killing his cousin Puswa on December 11, 1949, at around midday in the home of a Bhikhari in the village of Todarpur in the Hamirpur district. According to the prosecution, the appellant beat his wife in Baisakh (April) 1949, causing her to leave his home and move in with the deceased Puswa and his brother Baddu, who were the appellant’s cousins. After spending the night there, Baddu convinced her to return to her husband in the morning, and after phoning the appellant, he convinced his wife to accompany him. After the accused removed his wife from the village, no one knew where she was. It was unclear if she was still alive or dead. The appellant then started spreading the word around the village that Puswa had degraded his wife and that he would kill him at any opportunity. 

Around midday on November 12, 1949, Babu Lal, a barber, cut Sheo Nath’s hair at the Bhikhari barber’s house. Puswa, who had passed away, also went there for a haircut, and shortly after, Dibia, the appellant, did the same. The deceased Puswa’s hair was cut after Sheo Nath’s, and when his nails were being trimmed, the appellant Dibia abruptly picked up an axe that was lying there, struck Puswa’s head once and fled. Sheo Nath pursued him but was unable to apprehend him. Puswa took the hit and collapsed to the ground. After learning of the occurrence, his brother Baddu arrived at Bhikhari’s house. He loaded Puswa into his cart and drove him to the police station Korara, which is seven kilometers from the hamlet. Puswa passed away en route to the police station.

The first information report was submitted at 5 p.m. on the same day. An investigation was conducted after the police arrived in the area during the night. They took custody of some of the deceased’s blood-stained clothing. Two pairs of shoes, one purportedly belonging to the appellant and the other to the dead, were also seized, along with the axe, which was also bloodstained. Except for the appellant’s shoes, the items were sealed in a bundle, and a recovery list was created.

ISSUES RAISED

• Whether the appellant is liable under Section 302 of IPC and if the conviction should be upheld?
• Whether the trial was faulty and Magistrate did not investigate properly?

ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES

Argument on behalf of the Appellant

The appellant claimed that hatred was the reason the lawsuit was brought against him and denied ever assaulting the dead.

It was argued that the accused was prejudiced, and the trial was tainted since the examination was completely inadequate.

Argument on behalf of the Respondent

Sheo Lal, a barber, was cutting Sheo Nath’s and the deceased’s hair. Sheo Nath, who had been sitting when the appellant struck the deceased with the axe, and Ram Bilas, a 14 or 15-year-old boy who was standing in front of his house across from Bhikhari’s, witnessed the appellant fleeing from Bhikhari’s house while being pursued by Sheo Nath.

Three more eyewitnesses were presented. The village’s zamindars, Pirbhu Singh and Bans Gopal, testified that the deceased Puswa had an extramarital affair with the accused’s wife. The accused admitted to killing the dead in an extrajudicial confession made by Pyare Lal. We are completely convinced that the prosecution’s account that the deceased was killed when the appellant whacked him on the head with an axe is accurate based only on the eyewitnesses’ statements and other witnesses’ testimony.

JUDGMENT

He was not questioned about the motive behind the crime, the prosecution’s allegations of an illicit relationship between the deceased Puswa and the appellant’s wife, the fact that the appellant had beaten his wife six months prior to the incident, that she had moved in with the deceased and Baddu P. W., that Baddu P. W. brought her back to the appellant the following morning, that the appellant had taken her out of the village, and that her whereabouts were unknown. Pyare Lal was also not shown the extrajudicial confession that was given to him. The worst thing that can happen if the accused is not given the material circumstances is that they might not be taken into account against them. It can be claimed that the accused has not been disadvantaged by the omission if the conviction can be upheld after those circumstances have been removed.

The Court decided that even after excluding all of the previously mentioned circumstances that were not presented to the accused, the appellant did, in fact, use an axe to injure the deceased’s head, causing his death. As a result, the appellant was found guilty of causing the death. It must be obvious that the appellant intended to kill the deceased if a dangerous weapon, such as an axe, causes substantial harm to a crucial section of the deceased’s body. Thus, it was obvious that he had committed murder. The Honorable Court upheld the appellant’s conviction.

CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding many procedural errors, the court determined that the prosecution’s evidence, including eyewitness statements, was adequate to prove Dibia’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, reaffirming his conviction for murder. The court’s ruling emphasizes a number of significant facets of criminal law, including those pertaining to mens rea, the assessment of eyewitness accounts, and procedural justice requirements.

The court stressed that proving intent is essential for a conviction under Section 302 IPC (murder), especially when a deadly blow is delivered with a weapon as lethal as an axe. In this case, the court determined that Dibia met the requirements for murder since she had a clear purpose of causing death by using an axe to harm a vital area of Puswa’s body seriously. Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which requires that the accused be given a chance to explain the evidence against them, was another procedural law issue that the court discussed. Because it gives the accused the opportunity to address all incriminating circumstances, this criterion is essential to ensuring a fair trial.

The court’s handling of the procedural requirements under Section 342 CrPC is one of the main points of contention in this case. The accused’s examination was judged inadequate since Dibia was not specifically presented with important information on purpose and other circumstances that bolstered the prosecution’s case. Due to his restricted capacity to adequately address every facet of the evidence against him, this omission may have compromised the appellant’s defense. It raises questions regarding the implementation of Section 342, even though the court finally determined that these errors had no bearing on the decision, especially in situations where the prosecution’s case heavily relies on circumstantial evidence. 

The way the court handled the procedural obligations under Section 342 CrPC is one of the main objections leveled in this case. Because Dibia was not specifically presented with important facts regarding the purpose and other factors that bolstered the prosecution’s case, the accused’s examination was judged insufficient. This omission may have harmed the appellant’s defense since it prevented him from thoroughly refuting every facet of the evidence used against him. Even while the court decided that these errors had no bearing on the final result, they raised questions about how Section 342 should be applied, especially when the prosecution’s case heavily relies on circumstantial evidence.