CASE NAME | Baban Singh And Anr. v. Jagdish Singh & Ors., (1966) 3 SCR 552 |
CITATION | 1967 AIR 68, (1967) 1 SCWR 8, 1967 MADLW (CRI) 123, 1967 SCD 140, 1966 BLJR 843 |
COURT | Supreme Court of India |
BENCH | Hon’ble Justice M. Hidayatullah and Justice R.S. Bachawat |
PETITIONERS | Baban Singh And Another |
RESPONDENT | Jagdish Singh & Others |
DECIDED ON | decided on 8th February, 1966 |
INTRODUCTION
Evidence is any statement made under oath that the court orders or authorizes and any document produced in compliance with its directives. All information and facts that support the truth are referred to as “evidence.” Furthermore, evidence that is not true qualifies as “false evidence.” False evidence includes fabricating evidence, demonstrating something that has never happened, or simply changing an incident that has actually occurred. The Indian Penal Code, 1860’s Chapter XI addresses crimes against public justice and the use of false evidence.
Evidence is any legal proof allowed to be used in court and intended to convince the judge or jury of the alleged material facts of the case. Information that has been created or unlawfully obtained in an attempt to sway the outcome of a court case is referred to as false or fake evidence. A statement or piece of paper used in court that is known to be false or is suspected to be false is considered false evidence. Criminal evidence comprises any tangible or intangible proof given to establish a crime.
This case deals with the implication of false evidence, and the court has interpreted Sections 191 and 192 of IPC to contemplate what will come within the purview of the witness.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under s. 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure by one Baban Singh and his wife Dharichhan Kuer against a judgment and order of the High Court at Patna ordering the Registrar to file a complaint against them under s. 199 of the Indian Penal Code for making false affidavits. Under Section 476 of the Code, the respondents are those who filed a motion with the High Court to prosecute the appellants under the following situations. In F. A. 301 of 1952, Jagdish Singh and Parmhans were the appellants before the Patna High Court. In the appeal, Mst. Dharichhan Kuer was respondent number thirteen. A settlement was allegedly reached between Jagdish Singh and Parmhans, as well as Dharichhan Kuer, during the pending appeal period. On June 22, 1953, Dharichhan Kuer and Jagdish Singh took an oath to favor the compromise petition submitted to the High Court. Before the Oath Commissioner, Dharichhan Kuer was recognized by Baban Singh’s brother, and in the Commissioner’s presence, Rs. 4,000 was given to him in accordance with the provisions of the compromise. Additionally, Dharichhan Kuer passed a receipt, and Baban Singh’s brother was able to identify her thumb impression. On July 13, 1953, the compromise petition was submitted to the court.
On the same day, Baban Singh denied any knowledge of the compromise or the receipt of Rs. 4,000 by his wife in an affidavit (Ex. B). On July 31, 1953, this affidavit was submitted to the High Court. Dharichhan Kuer further submitted an affidavit (Ex. A) in favor of her spouse on September 9, 1953. The High Court directed the Registrar to conduct an investigation because the compromise was under dispute. On behalf of Jagdish Singh and Parmhans, nine witnesses—including the Oath Commissioner—were questioned. Dharichhan Kuer and her spouse, Baban Singh, provided testimony on their own behalf. On 14 July 1954, the Registrar stated that the compromise was authentic and that Dharichhan Kuer had indeed sworn the affidavit before the Oath Commissioner and been paid Rs. 4,000.
The report was approved by B. N. Rai and Kanhaiya Singh, JJ, through an order dated October 5, 1956. One of the conditions of the agreement stated that Dharichhan Kuer would receive a refund of Rs. 4,000 less Rs. 500 in fees if he renounced. On October 9, 1956, Dharichhan Kuer deposited this sum with the court. After that, the first appeal was heard and resolved. The s. 476 application that gave rise to this appeal was filed while the first appeal was pending and was heard after the appeal was resolved. The possibility of filing a complaint in the Indian Penal Code under section 193 for prosecuting Baban Singh and Dharichhan Kuer for an offense arose, additionally, on January 1, 1956, s. 479A was established. As a result, on October 5, 1956, when the High Court approved the Registrar’s report, it came into effect due to s. 479A, the Divisional Bench did not consider pursuing legal action under s. 193. It also seems that the attorneys for Jagdish Singh and Parmhans agreed that no prosecution could be brought under that section. Nonetheless, the High Court deliberated about whether any action ought to be done regarding the two affidavits (Exs. A and B). It is not essential to refer to the statements in these affidavits since we are not assessing whether they are true or false.
ISSUES RAISED
- Whether actions under s. 479A could be conducted against Baban Singh and his wife, for if they could be, then action ought to have been taken under that section and s. 476 cannot be invoked?
- Does the swearing of false affidavits constitute a crime under Indian Penal Code Section 199 or under Sections 191 or 192?
ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES
Argument on behalf of the Appellant
An application for prosecution under S. 476 was barred since the procedure under that provision was not followed, and prosecution under S. 199 of the Indian Penal Code would be similarly covered by S. 479A.
Argument on behalf of the Respondent
The respondent did not present the case even after the notice was sent to them.
JUDGMENT
Based on the statements provided in their affidavits, Baban Singh and Dharichhan Kuer may be found guilty of creating false evidence for use in court, which would make their offense under Ss. 191/192 rather than Ss. 199 of the IPC. The appellants may be regarded as witnesses in the HC’s investigation as they produced false evidence, and any legal action taken against them will follow S. 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Considering the previously indicated details, the appeal is successful and granted. As a result, the prosecution’s order is revoked, and all filed complaints will remain withdrawn.
CONCLUSION
The learned judges in the High Court believed that even though the Registrar had recorded the evidence, s, 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply to the offence of giving false testimony on oath, which is defined in s. 191 and punishable under s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, they did not take action regarding it. According to the two affidavits, the High Court determined that the offense was prima facie punishable under Section 199 of the Indian Penal Code. Hence, the charge was chosen for prosecution. The same penalties apply to that offense as they would if fraudulent testimony had been provided. Section 191 deals with statements and declarations made fraudulently by a person legally compelled to tell the truth under oath or by an express statutory provision. This is how Section 191 and Section 199 differ from one another. Statements and declarations made freely that meet the requirements to be admitted into evidence by the court are covered by Section 199.
In this case, the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) clarified the differences between offenses pertaining to false statements and false evidence and the relevant legal proceedings. In affidavits filed with the High Court, the appellants had made false statements with the intention of misleading the court about a settlement in an appeal that was still proceeding. After conducting an inquiry, the High Court determined that their denial was untrue. Accordingly, it filed a Section 476 CrPC action, considering the offense to fall under Section 199 IPC (false statements made in declarations).
However, the Supreme Court determined that the appellants’ activities were under Sections 191 and 192 IPC, which deal with supplying or producing false evidence, rather than Section 199 IPC. The Court stressed that Section 479-A CrPC, which offers a unique procedure for perjury committed in court proceedings, must be initiated when a witness gives false evidence. Crucially, in these circumstances, Section 479-A(6) forbids the implementation of Section 476 CrPC.
The Court determined that only Section 479-A CrPC may be used for action as the appellants’ violation contained false evidence. Consequently, the High Court’s directive to pursue proceedings under Section 476 CrPC was deemed void, and the appropriate approach was to adhere to the unique process described in Section 479-A. This judgment reinforces the procedural safeguards and particular legal procedures for addressing offenses of false evidence and perjury in court processes.